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 The study investigates the potential of diaspora to support development in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The main novelty of this research is an empirical analysis based on new data gathered from three sectors that 
are particularly relevant for development - government, business and household sector.  
 The study is structured as follows. The first chapter details the structure of the BiH diaspora, as well as 
its legal, institutional and political context (I. BiH diaspora). The second chapter is a literature review (II. 
Diaspora and development) exploring the role of financial, human, and social capital of diaspora in supporting 
development, the role of institutional environment, followed by a discussion of research on BiH specifically. 
 
 The empirical chapter (III. BiH - diaspora - potential for development) is focused on perceptions about 
the role of BiH diaspora and its potential to support development. First, the study focuses on the capacity of BiH 
institutions at all administrative levels (state, entity, cantonal, municipality, the Brčko District of BiH) - as well as 
on their policy priorities and challenges - to involve the diaspora in development. The main research question 
that we investigate is: How is the role of diaspora in development perceived in BiH by institutions? This analysis 
particularly investigates institutional perceptions at the local level by having a specific section focused on the 
municipality officials. 
 Second, the business sector is examined by interviewing ex-diaspora entrepreneurs in BiH with the 
main aim of identifying their personal migration experience, business performance and obstacles of their 
businesses. The main research task was to investigate examples of return experience: successes and obstacles. 
 Third, the study focuses on the household sector of BiH (general population) using empirical 
investigation from two surveys. First, the issue of diaspora and development is investigated using a targeted 
survey (2013) to analyse migration characteristics, connections to diaspora, migration intentions and opinions 
about the role of diaspora and development in BiH. The next empirical analysis uses a repeated cross-sectional 
data set (2000-2010) from the household surveys BiH to assess determinants of aspiration for migration 
abroad. The study concludes with the main findings and recommendations.
Introduction
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 1.1. Background 
 In the last decades the potential of diasporas as “wings of development” or the “heroes of 
development” (Khadira, 2008) of their countries of origin has been recognised in development thinking. The 
increases in remittances, knowledge transfer as well as other forms of philanthropy and voluntarism have 
encouraged governments to formalise the diaspora capacity for development of the country of origin through 
the various policy initiatives (Gamlen, 2006).  
 The term diaspora has a long history and number of definitions. Generally, it refers to a people 
dispersed from their original homelands that possess a collective memory, myth, sentimental and/or material 
links to the homeland (Safran, 1991), where the time-space dimension has a particular role (Cohen, 2008). 
GFMD (2008, p. 2) defines diaspora as “individuals originating from one country, living outside this country, 
irrespective of their citizenship or nationality, who, individually or collectively, are or could be willing to 
contribute to the development of this country. Descendents of these individuals are also included in this 
definition”. However, it is unclear in practice how to distinguish between migrants who are members of the 
diaspora and those who are not. What level of attachment is required for an individual to be considered a 
member of the diaspora? Furthermore, the difficulties of collecting data mean that often it is not possible to 
distinguish between diaspora and migrants.  As a consequence, throughout this study we use data on migrants 
as the best available proxy for the diaspora. 
 Diaspora contributions to the development of their homeland vary enormously according to specific 
circumstances. It is therefore important to understand the background and the structure of BiH diaspora. This 
includes size, time-space, individual characteristics, integration outcomes and experiences of engagement 
with BiH. These elements help understand the diversity of diaspora agendas, interests and strategies towards 
its relationship with the homeland (IOM, 2012).
 
 According to the latest estimate published by the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of BiH 
(MHRRBiH) (2014), the estimated number of the BiH population settled abroad (in 51 host countries) is about 2 
million or 51% compared to BiH resident population of  3.8 million (ASBiH, 2013). This relative size of BiH 
diaspora (%) is the largest among the former Yugoslavia republics and being the highest among developing 
countries of Europe. The size of the BiH diaspora was frequently estimated to be around 40% of population 
before this latest MHRRBiH (2014) publication (e.g. Valenta and Ramet, 2011; Halilovich, 2012; MSBiH, 2012).
 
 Most data about BiH migration indicate that the BiH diaspora is more educated than the population of 
BiH - one third of BiH emigrants have finished higher education (IOM, 2007). This suggests that the diaspora 
may be an important source of human capital and a potential conduit for knowledge transfers. However, the 
educational profile of BiH emigrants varies between receiving countries. Around 55% of emigrants from BiH in 
Australia have tertiary education, as do around 40% of emigrants in SAD and around 30% in Sweden (MHRRBiH, 
2014). The percentage of BiH emigrants with tertiary education is the lowest in Slovenia, Germany, Austria and 
Switzerland where it is up to 5% (MSBiH, 2012, p. 21).
  
 In contrast to the high unemployment levels in BiH, the majority of BiH emigrants are economically 
active and employed (IASCI/IOM, 2010), and on average, the employment rate of BiH diaspora labour force is 
around 80% (MHRRBiH, 2014). Furthermore, some research indicates that most BiH women abroad actively 
participate in the labour market despite patriarchal family arrangements (Miskovic, 2012). It is estimated that 
the primary sectors of employment of BiH migrants are construction, service/tourism and manufacturing 
sectors (IASCI/IOM, 2010), although this might be different in different host countries. There are also a large 
number of migrants from South-East Europe employed in these sectors, although compared to other SEE 
countries, there are a significant number of BiH migrants in management positions. Considering education and 
employment level, existent data suggests that BiH migrants aren't underemployed (IASCI/IOM, 2010). 
DIASPORAI.
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Ethnicity still plays an important role in the structure of the BiH diaspora. For example, BiH diaspora 
organizations are mainly supported by Bosniacs whilst other ethnic groups, such as BiH Croats and BiH Serbs, 
are likely to be actively involved in Croatian or Serbian diaspora communities (Halilovich et al., 2006; Iseni et al., 
2014). This does not mean that there is clear distinction between the ethnically-based diaspora communities or 
that there is unity within each of them. For example, class differences (Coughlan and Owens-Manley, 2006) - as 
well as rural versus urban backgrounds (Halilovich, 2011) - have a strong impact on the structure of BiH diaspora 
even within the same ethnic group. In general, it is important to acknowledge that existing studies on the BiH 
diaspora indicate the high heterogeneity and diversity of the BiH diaspora (Valenta and Remet, 2011). A key 
aspect of this heterogeneity relates to the period and circumstances under which BiH citizens migrated. 
 The BiH diaspora should be defined through three periods: pre-war, war and post-war emigration 
period. 
 
 The pre-war period refers to the emigration before the 1990s, when the migrants from BiH – as 
members of the former Yugoslavia – emigrated mainly for economic reasons. The main destinations for 
migrants were the former Yugoslav republics, as well as numerous Western European countries such as 
Germany, where thousands migrated under the guest workers schemes. Other destinations included the USA, 
Canada and Australia. 
 The war period refers to the period between 1991 and 1995. This period witnessed the largest outflow 
of refugees – between 1992 and 1995 more than 1.2 million BiH citizens left the country and settled abroad, 
while there was around 1.0 million of internally displaced (IOM/IASCI, 2010). In other words, every second 
person in BiH was forced to leave their home. Just in the period between 1992 and 1993 more than 800,000 
citizens of BiH left the country, and resettled around the world (Kupiszewski, 2009). During the conflict, the 
main emigrant receiving countries were Croatia (262,620), Germany (240,000), Austria (133,585), Serbia 
(131,108), USA (120,655), Slovenia (97,142), Switzerland (59,222) and Sweden (56,290) (Host Countries' 
Agencies for Statistics, 2012). For most of the receiving countries the number of BiH refugees was stable during 
the war period 1992-1995, but later, in some countries such as Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Austria, 
Italy, Hungary, Netherlands, FYR Macedonia, Germany, Switzerland and Turkey, this number considerably 
declined over time. These fluctuations were caused by return migration, but also by the migration to third 
countries. People started to return to BiH immediately after the General Framework Agreement for Peace in 
1
BiH (GFAP)  was signed in 1995. Since the permanent settlement status was not granted in some countries and 
refugees from BiH did not want to return, they were forced to move to third countries (Valenta and Ramet, 
2011).
 Annex 7 of the GFAP contains 18 articles which regulate refugees' and internally displaced persons' 
2
rights . They regulate rights concerning property owned prior to 1991 – either via restoration or compensation 
for property which cannot be returned. Each “side” in the contract declared that they would take all necessary 
steps to ensure the safe and voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes. Parties also 
agreed to create a suitable environment – political, economic and social conditions – for sustainable return, 
showing no preference for any particular (ethnic) group (OHR, 2013a).
 The largest number of returnees was registered in the first three years after the GFAP and these made 
up more than half of the total number of returnees (MHRRBiH, 2005). Over 1.0 million people returned to BiH 
since 1995 (FMDPR, 2011). Between 1997 and 1998, Germany repatriated more than 194,100 persons back to 
BiH. Conversely, the Netherlands has stimulated returnees by giving them financial donations to rebuild lives in 
BiH. Initially, around 25,000 refugees escaped to the Netherlands, and around 15,000 received permits to stay. 
According to estimates, around 40% of the emigrants have returned back to BiH, around 18% migrated to third 
countries and the remaining 42% (around 500,000), still live in the first receiving country (Koning, 2008). 
MHRRBiH (2012, p. 4) reports some estimates that around 55% of BiH emigrants have strong desire to return to 
BiH one day. 
1
 GFAP is also known as the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). 
2
 More on: http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=375 
8
3For more information: The General Framework Agreement: Annex 4: http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=372. It is also known as the “Dayton Peace 
Agreement”. 
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In BiH, the term 'state government' refers to what would be considered the national or federal government
in other federal systems; 'entity governments' is analogous to 'state or provincial governments' in other federal systems; and the canton governments in 
the Federation also resemble state or provincial governments (World Bank, 2002, p. 5).
 The post-war period refers to the period from 1995 onwards. This emigration wave is likely to involve 
(young) people who are leaving BiH due to its high unemployment rate, institutional inefficiencies, political 
situation and some other individual reasons (e.g., see the later UNDP BiH, 2000-2010 data based investigation 
on migration intentions). According to EUROSTAT tens of thousands of BiH citizens entered the EU in the last 
two decades. In the period between 2000 and 2007 that number was 143,985 (MSBiH, 2011a).
 
 Over 95% of emigrants from BiH have acquired citizenship or residence permits in their host countries. 
At least 400,000 persons have acquired host-country' citizenship (MSBiH, 2012), whilst 61,752 BiH nationals 
renounced BiH citizenship to acquire a new citizenship (mostly in Austria and Germany) between 1998 and 
2012 (MCABiH, 2013). 
 
 The number of BiH citizens who obtained the citizenship of host countries is an important indicator of 
integration. Around 15% of total migrant households are in the former Yugoslav countries, and 85% are in 
Europe, USA, Canada and Australia (IASCI/IOM, 2010). Additionally, a high degree of naturalization of BiH 
citizens might be an indication that emigration from BiH is a long-run phenomenon (MHRRBiH, 2012). That 
however does not diminish their interest and engagement with BiH. Furthermore, migration is not always 
intended to be permanent: in 2010, it was estimated that most new emigration was on temporary (MSBiH, 
2012).
 The above-mentioned characteristics of the BiH emigrants influence engagement with the homeland. 
The level of integration – defined through residential, employment, and educational status, amongst other 
factors – strongly influences the nature of migrant engagement with the homeland. Despite theoretical claims 
that weaker destination-country integration results in stronger links to the homeland (Portes et al., 2002), this 
does not appear to be the case in BiH. According to Povrzanovic-Frykman (2011), for example, the more 
economic integration into the host country, the stronger the link with BiH. BiH emigrants in better economic 
positions send more remittances, visit BiH more frequently, and are more involved in investment initiatives. For 
example, in a study about maximizing the development potential of BiH emigrants, among the 1,216 BiH 
emigrants interviewed, 32% of them having or intending to invest in their country of origin and, on average, 
they send 2,189 Euros in remittances per year to BiH households (IASCI/IOM, 2010). Furthermore, individuals 
who are better integrated in host countries are more engaged in grass-roots movements and ethnic 
organizations (Halilovich et al., 2006). These activities are frequently realized through the professional, 
hometown, ethnic and alumni associations. In addition, there are active diaspora media networks - such as BiH 
newspapers, TV programs, blogs and internet portals – in a number of host countries (MHRRBiH, 2012). 
1.2.    Legal, institutional and political context
 The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was drawn up as part of The General Framework 
3
Agreement for Peace in BiH (GFAP), Annex 4, in 1995 . According to the GFAP, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a 
democratic state, which shall operate under the rule of law and with free and democratic elections. BiH consists 
of the two Entities and one District, namely: the Federation of BiH (FBiH), the Republika Srpska (RS), and the 
4
Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina (DB). State level government  is represented by a tripartite rotating 
presidency, a Council of Ministers of BiH (executive branch) and a bicameral Parliamentary Assembly. The FBiH 
is rather decentralized Entity by having ten Cantons, each with its own decision-making powers, including the 
municipality level within these Cantons. In contrast, RS has only the entity and municipality (local) level 
governance structures. DB has its own government and one municipality.
 
 The GFAP defines the Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with Others), and 
citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms should be secured to all persons 
9
in BiH without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 
5
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status . The 
6 
Constitution of BiH assigns “immigration, refugee and asylum policy and regulation” to the state level. It sets 
out that a citizen of BiH abroad shall enjoy the protection of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
 One of the diaspora's major issues, especially in the period after the signing of the GFAP, was 
7
implementation of Annex 7 of the GFAP , which relates to the sustainable return of refugees and internally 
displaced persons to their homes of origin. Because of the deficiency in political engagement, partly insufficient 
commitment from the international community and the lack of basic conditions for a safe and sustainable 
return, the implementation of this important part of GFAP was generally unsuccessful and led many BiH citizens 
to stay abroad. There are also unresolved or inadequately resolved issues related to repossession, regulation of 
citizenship status, participation in elections, census, etc.
 There is no established coherent system for monitoring migration in BiH. BiH institutions use the 
migration statistics of recipient countries (though this data is not sufficiently standardized or comparable). 
Currently, BiH is developing a system of migration statistics comparable to EU standards; the Ministry of 
Security of BiH is working on a system that will keep track on migration statistics.
 Dual citizenship is an important issue for the BiH diaspora as well. Various legal provisions as well as a 
lack of political engagement in addressing the issue of dual citizenship led a significant number of BiH citizens 
renouncing their BiH citizenship in order to obtain a new one. According to the most recent data of the Ministry 
of Civil Affairs of BiH (MCABiH), 61,752 citizens of BiH renounced their citizenship in the period 1998-2013, 
mostly to get citizenships of Germany, Austria, Denmark and some other countries (MCABiH, 2013). However, 
in November 2013, the Law on Citizenship of BiH was changed giving now possibility to keep BiH citizenship 
when acquiring new one (if the host country's law recognizes this possibility). Although this change represents 
an improvement, still some countries (like Austria and Germany) do not allow dual citizenship.
 The legal and institutional framework that governs the BiH diaspora differs according to the main three 
categorisations:
 a) Immigrants by country of birth (born in BiH), regardless of their citizenship;
 b) Immigrants by citizenship (citizens of BiH); and 
 c) Descendants of migrants with BiH origin.
 Note, the illegal immigrants' status is regulated by provisions on re-admission. 
 Part of the international legal framework relevant for BiH diaspora issues are contracts signed before 
BiH gained its independence, which are the basis of the Agreement on succession between member states of 
the former Yugoslavia embedded into the legal system of BiH including the Convention relating to the Status of 
8
Refugees  1951 and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 1967. The second source of international 
laws is international agreements which are an integral part of the Constitution. The third source are multilateral 
and bilateral agreements that were concluded after the GFAP was signed. Of these, it is important to mention 
9
those related to EU integration (e.g., The Stabilisation and Association Agreement  from 2008 which has been 
ratified but has not yet entered into force, and the AGREEMENT between the European Community and BiH on 
10
the readmission of persons residing without authorisation ), as well as EU decisions concerning the visa 
regime, stay and movement of foreigners in the EU. The harmonization of migration-related regulations with 
EU standards is of particular importance in the context of EU integration. A Common Immigration Policy for 
Europe: Principles, actions and tools; the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility; the Hague and Stockholm 
Programmes - all represent an important framework for designing current and future policy in BiH.
5
 The General Framework Agreement: Annex 4, Article II: http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=372
6
 In BiH, the term "state” level or government refers to what would be considered the national level or government in other systems (WB, 2002a, p. 5).For 
more information please see the Article III of the Constitution of BiH; ”Responsibilities of and Relations Between the Institutions of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the Entities”: http://www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=372
7
 More on GFAP, Annex 7: http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=375
8
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?&src=UNTSONLINE&mtdsg_no=V~2&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&lang=en
9
 More on: http://www.dei.gov.ba/bih_i_eu/ssp/doc/default.aspx?id=2952&langTag=en-US
10
 More on: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:334:0066:0083:EN:PDF
10
11
 More on: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/vanj/Template.aspx?cid=3564,1,1
12
 More on: http://www.mhrr.gov.ba/PDF/Izbjeglice/Revidirano%20strategija%20Engleski.pdf
13
 More on: http://migracije.org/files/2010%20January,%20Revised%20Strategy%20of%20Bosnia%20and%20Herzegovina%20for%20the%            
                     20Implementation%20ofAnnex%20VII%20of%20the%20Dayton%20Peace%20Agreement.pdf
14
 More on: http://www.predsjednistvobih.ba/vanj/Template.aspx?cid=3564,1,1
  Based on this framework, the authorized institutions of BiH have designed several key 
policies/documents, including the following ones:
· General Direction and Priorities for Implementation of Foreign Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which  
defines the intensification and institutionalization of relations with the EU (including migration) as a 
11
priority, as well as the care for BiH citizens abroad (2003) ;
12
· Strategy in the Area of Migration and Asylum and Action Plan for the Period 2012-2015 (2012) ;
· An Integrated Border Management Strategy of BiH (Revised Strategy with Action Plan, 2011);
· BiH Strategy of Reintegration of Returnees Based on the BiH's Readmission Agreements; 
· Strategy for the Reintegration of Returnees, Based on the Agreement for Readmission of 2009;
· Revised Strategy of BiH for the Implementation of Annex VII of the Dayton Peace Agreement (adopted 
13
in 2010) , etc.
 In late 2009, a draft Law on the implementation of cooperation between BiH and its diaspora was 
written, but not adopted. It defined the basic principles and responsibilities of BiH institutions in the field of 
migration – institutional cooperation with BiH emigrants/diaspora. The key objectives for cooperation with the 
BiH diaspora listed in this draft were:
· the preservation of the cultural and national identity of the people of BiH;
· establishing and enhancing cooperation with receiving countries;
· social and economic inclusion of BiH immigrants abroad.
 Individual provisions recommended cooperation in the fields of culture, education, preservation of 
languages, science, technology, higher education, sports, and business. A strategy on diaspora cooperation was 
envisaged, too. 
 The key public institutions at the state level responsible for different diaspora issues primarily include 
the following:
 
 The Presidency of BiH which has jurisdiction over the conducting of foreign policy of BiH. It has stated 
that BiH will cooperate with the BiH diaspora in different areas, such as science, technology, culture, education 
14
and sport. Since 2003, when the “General Directions and Priorities for Foreign Policy of BiH Enforcement”  was 
adopted, the strategic goals and methods of using the BiH diaspora for development were not revised or 
developed. The Presidency of BiH, in cooperation with the Parliament of BiH, is responsible for signing, 
ratifying, presenting and carrying out international agreements, legislation and policy, as well as managing 
membership in international institutions.
 
 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs BiH (MFA) has jurisdiction over the implementation of BiH foreign policy. 
The MFA represents BiH in diplomatic relations with other countries, international organizations and at 
international conferences. They are monitoring the development of international relations with other 
countries and cooperate with international organizations. They protect the rights and interests of BiH citizens 
with residency abroad (MFA, 2013). Related to migration management, the MFA is engaged in issues pertaining 
to visas and passports, but also to the enforcement of foreign policies established by the Presidency of BiH. 
 The Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of BiH (MHRRBiH) was established in 2000 by the Law on 
Ministries and Other Administrative Bodies of BiH and its responsibilities are defined by the same law. The 
MHRRBiH has an exclusive jurisdiction over the creation of policies towards BiH diaspora. MHRRBiH has a 
Department for Diaspora with two units:  the Unit for Cooperation with the Organizations of BiH Diaspora and 
the Unit for Cooperation in the Areas of Economics, Education and Culture. The Diaspora department 
cooperates with BiH diaspora and currently has 10 employees. 
11
 For the purpose of this study, we list here some of most relevant of the MHRRBiH's activities in the area 
of diaspora and development: MHRRBiH collects, systematises, investigates, publicises and distributes data 
related to BiH diaspora; it promotes economic, human and other potential of BiH diaspora relevant for 
development; it monitors BiH diaspora in different countries; it creates and/or participates in a number of 
projects on diaspora knowledge transfers; provides assistance in networking and information sharing to BiH 
diaspora members; informs the Council of Ministers of BiH on BiH diaspora and participates in the Migration 
Profile BiH reporting; it drafts diaspora related laws and strategic documents in BiH; finally, it is involved in a 
number of other direct and indirect activities aiming to include BiH diaspora in social, economic and political life 
of BiH. 
 MHRRBiH has been working in partnership with a number of international organizations as well, such 
as: the International Organization for Migration (IOM), International Centre for Migration Policy Development, 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC); German Agency for International Cooperation, United 
Nations/UNDP, TAIEX office of the Directorate General for Enlargement in Brussels, MARRI Regional Centre, 
and many NGOs. MHRRBiH has been involved also in a number of regional initiatives in the field of emigration 
(e.g. regional projects implemented in collaboration with TAIEX, SDC, GIZ, MARRI, etc).
 In terms of migration, the main challenge for BiH is the coordination and development of migration 
policy. The MHRRBiH was involved in the drafting process and, in particular, development of the mid-term 
strategic goal 6 - Strengthening institutional capacities in BiH with the purpose of connecting migration and 
15
development - in the Strategy in the Area of Migration and Asylum and Action Plan for the Period 2012-2015 . 
16
Furthermore, the MHRRBiH is taking part in the working stream of the Coordination body in BiH  that 
supervises the implementation of this Strategy/action plan. Of particular importance, MHRRBiH is actively 
involved in the current SDC-UNDP project “Mainstreaming the Concept on Migration and Development Into 
Relevant Policies, Plans and Actions in BiH” which aims to directly include the concept of migration and 
development into strategic documents of the local municipalities in BiH. To sum up, the MHRRBiH (Diaspora 
department) is an institution that is directly and actively involved in “diaspora and development” initiatives in 
BiH.
 The Ministry of Security of BiH (MSBiH) is responsible for the protection of international borders, 
internal border crossings and regulating traffic at border crossings of BiH. The enforcement of immigration and 
asylum is also an important task in order to establish procedures related to the movement and stay of the 
aliens. The Ministry is responsible on creation, monitoring and implementation of policy on immigration and 
asylum in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The priority of the EU migration policy is security; so the main responsibility 
of this Ministry concerns issues of immigration and asylum. Recognizing the importance of issues concerning 
migration and development, the Ministry coordinated the process of creation for the Strategy in the Area of 
17
Migration and Asylum and Action Plan for the Period 2012-2015 . This Document was adopted by the Council 
of Ministers of BiH in June 2012 and was published by MSBiH.
 For migration management that refers to immigration and asylum, direct responsibility is given to the 
Border Police of BiH, the Service for Foreigners' Affairs, the State Investigation and Protection Agency, the Policy 
Support Agency, and other administrative organizations. The jurisdiction for the part that refers to readmission 
is divided between Ministry of Security and the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of BiH.
 The Ministry of Civil Affairs of BiH (MCABiH) is responsible for matters related to citizenship, citizen 
protection, residency registration, identity papers and travel documents. They coordinate activities in the fields 
of science, education and culture and provide additional classes in the native language for BiH emigrants. An 
implemented activity of the MCABiH in the field of additional schooling is the creation and release of textbooks 
and teaching programs for emigrant children abroad, of elementary-schoolage. The Ministry has the following 
15
 More on: http://www.msb.gov.ba/PDF/Strategy%20and%20Action%20Plan%202012-2015,%20engleski.pdf
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 MHRRBiH has established a national cooperation mechanism through the Working Group Migration and Development with the aim to start and lead 
respective policy discussions, to facilitate a serious public debate about the effects of migration for the country's progress and to design a better 
coordination mechanism for well planned joint migration and development actions. This working group will play a steering, advisory and coordination 
role in the process of mainstreaming migration into strategies and policies, prepare and disseminate country-wide guidelines (policy road map) as well as 
inputs for the consultation process of a new Country Development Strategy and the Strategy on Migration and Asylum.
17
 More on: http://www.msb.gov.ba/PDF/Strategy%20and%20Action%20Plan%202012-2015,%20engleski.pdf
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organizational units: the Department of Legal, Personnel and General Affairs, the Department of Citizenship 
and Travel Documents, the Department of Education, the Department of Labour, Employment, Social 
Protection and Pensions, and some other.
 The Ministry of Justice of BiH, The Directorate for European Integration, The Court of BiH, The 
Constitutional Court of BiH - are also institutions more or less directly/indirectly involved in migration/diaspora 
issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
 For reasons of space, we shortly present some other relevant institutions, diaspora organizations and 
international organizations in Appendix A. 
13
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2.1. Introduction
 In this section we aim to assess the existing literature which might be useful in obtaining some key 
insights for research on the diaspora and development in BiH. It is important to stress that this literature review 
will cover and discuss relevant economic and non-economic determinants of diaspora which might affect 
development of a country. Development is a multi-source and multi-level phenomenon, and identification of 
the key channels of influence is particularly important. A nice identification of “development agents” and the 
potential channels of a diaspora's influence on development is given by Faist (2008, p. 21): 
 Migration networks and organizations have emerged as development agents. They interact 
 with state institutions in flows of financial remittances, knowledge, and political ideas. 
 
 Accordingly, we focus on financial issues (remittances, investment and access to finance), human 
capital issues (brain drain, brain gain, brain circulation, transfer of knowledge), social capital (networks, social 
remittances) and institutional issues (institutions, policies, political ideas, organizations, lobbying), ending with 
the existing empirical literature that was focused directly on BiH. Note, in this study we refer to development in 
its broad meaning – development includes both increasing the economic welfare of a country's people as well 
as their non-material quality of life and standard of living (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1994).
2.2. Diaspora and financial capital
 International migration is an important factor affecting economic relations between countries. 
Accordingly, diaspora today can be considered as a development agent (Faist, 2008), which might bring a 
number of economic benefits to native countries.
 
 Although it is difficult to separate the economic and non-economic determinants of BiH diaspora that 
might affect economic development - particularly since they might work simultaneously, through indirect and 
direct channels of influence - for the purpose of this study we will identify three main economic channels of 
influence – namely, remittances, investment and access to finance. 
 Remittances, in its narrow financial meaning (flow of money or financial remittances), are considered 
as the most visible product of international migration and they tend to be the best measured and recorded 
aspect of the migration experience (Adams, 2003). Remittances infuse more money into some economies than 
either foreign investors or foreign banks through loans (Eckstein, 2010). Although some proportion of 
remittances is invested in business development, the majority of remittances are spent on consumption 
(Nielsen and Riddle, 2010).
 Publically-available data on remittances are based on official remittance flows, indicating that 
unofficial remittances are not recorded, and therefore some remittances must be discounted. A transition from 
informal to formal systems is desirable for development and for security reasons (Agunias and Newland, 2012). 
The flow of remittances globally has an increasing trend, whilst the level of remittances between different 
countries is very heterogenous.
DIASPORA AND DEVELOPMENTII.
15
 Financial remittances carry huge economic potential for developing economies, most often through 
poverty reduction and investment. Remittances are a source of fresh money for individuals/households, 
hence, they support the short-run liquidity of the whole system. They also have one important characteristic – 
they are not dependent on domestic business cycles (Faist, 2008). Accordingly, one solution for supporting the 
(economic) development of one's native country is through an increase in financial remittances.
 
 The macroeconomic effects of remittances in the short-run will most likely affect total household 
consumption and also, through the multiplier effect, change the level of GDP. Therefore they will usually 
produce a short-run growth of GDP. If remittances are used for investment purposes, then a positive effect 
might remain in the long run as well. Hence, the structure of remittances' spending is important. Sharma (2009) 
also emphasizes that remittances have an important impact on economic security – they often tend to be more 
stable than private capital flows and might be counter cyclical to economic conditions in the recipient country. 
Their indirect channels of influences include increased eployment, increased investment, increased public 
revenues, and generally, an increase in economic incentives. Whether the short-run effect of remittances will 
cause a multiplying increase in GDP – and the degree of multiplication – will differ from country to country. 
Generally, benefits might be smaller in more open and import-dependent economies, as remittances might 
lead to increased imports. The long-run benefits of remittances will occur primarily if they finance capital 
consumption, which is not usually the case. All in all, the positive short-run effect of remittances is hard to 
ignore, and some studies do suggest that they support better economic performance by reducing the level, 
depth, and severity of poverty in the developing world (e.g., Adams and Page, 2005). 
 
 Diaspora can also economically contribute to their home countries by providing badly-needed 
investment, but also by improving perceptions of the investment climate (Gillespie at al., 1999). In addition, 
Nanda and Khanna (2010) find that even domestic investors who have previously lived abroad often rely on 
diaspora networks to improve their businesses. Thus, even domestic investment is sometimes determined by 
indirect diaspora support. Leblang (2010) argues that migrant networks are a key mechanism to support 
investment from the migrant's host country to their country of origin, for example through direct portfolio 
investment and foreign direct investment (FDI). These networks are used to support capital flow as well as the 
provision of relevant information for investors.
 
18
 Total remittances cover workers' remittances, compensation of employees and migrants' transfers.
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Figure 2.2.1. Remittances in the global economy, 2000-2012
World remittances
Source: UNCTAD, 2013.
138.6  
154.2  
174.7  
210.9  
240.5  
288.8
 
332.8
 
401.2
 
464.2
 
436.9
 
464.4
 
515.4
 
527.7
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
 
Remittances Inflows (US$ billion)
16
 Investment is the most important macroeconomic aggregate which positively affects both a short-run 
increase of GDP (increase in consumption and aggregate demand) as well as a long-run increase in growth 
(economic development). Hence, the overall effect of investment is almost always positive (ignoring some non-
standard cases and practices).
 Gillespie et al. (1999, p. 624) identify underlying factors that encourage homeland investment by the 
diaspora, and these usually go beyond pure economic determinants. Examples include: 
· The diaspora maintains a memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland,
· The diaspora is committed to the maintenance and restoration of their homeland,
· The diaspora's consciousness and solidarity are defined by a continuing relationship with homeland.
 Similarly, Nielson and Riddle (2010) identify three types of investment-return expectations, held by a 
diaspora:
· Financial motives – the potential to make money by using their experience from the homeland;
· Emotional motives – altruism and emotional returns which they receive from investing in their 
homeland, perceiving these investments to be a contribution to stability and development;
· Social status motives – the need for social recognition by fulfilling their patriotic duty and maintaining 
bonds with the home country.
 Nielson and Riddle (2010) focus their attention on a post-conflict environment, which is of particular 
interest for this research. Interestingly, the authors identify non-pecuniary motivations of diaspora support – 
such as emotional and social-status concerns - as being more important to members of the diaspora whose 
origin country has post-conflict status.
  
 Among standard economic factors (e.g. desire for making profit), the diaspora has some investment 
advantages that enable them to overcome barriers to entry. These are: knowledge of domestic culture; better 
access to physical, financial and legal infrastructure and more information on government bureaucracy. To 
summarise, a diaspora's interest for investment is defined by both economic and non-economic reasons. 
However, where some non-economic determinants might be partly altruistic, they can also be considered as 
embodying a diaspora investor's advantage over a foreign investor.
 
 Access to finance and especially access to international capital markets is a continuous problem faced 
by all over the world (Leblang, 2010). Diaspora networks offer potential conduits to increase access to 
international finance. By having better connections between home and host countries, diaspora and its 
networks generally facilitate cross-border investment on both sides and in numerous ways (Leblang, 2010). 
Nanda and Khanna (2010) report that domestic entrepreneurs who have been part of diaspora are more likely 
to rely on diaspora networks in financing their businesses, and consequently, have better-performing firms. 
 Context of Bosnia and Herzegovina
 The diaspora remains an important financial anchor for the BiH economy by sending a few billions of 
BAM annually (1.0 CHF=1.58BAM; 1.0 Euro=1.95BAM; June 2013) – e.g. in 2012 the BiH received around 3.5 
billion BAM from abroad (including personal remittances, employee compensations, pensions and other 
transfers), (CBBiH, 2012). Interestingly enough, BiH is the sixth largest receiver of most remittances (as % of 
GDP) in the world. In comparison with all other countries, its remittance rate grew the most over the 1995 to 
2004 (IOM, 2007). However, over a medium to long run, it is forecasting that remittances to BiH will most likely 
decrease over time (IASCI/IOM, 2010). There might be the case that the second and third generations of BiH 
emigrant will stop sending as much remittances as the first generation. 
 
17
 If we examine the structure of these financial inflows in 2012, the personal remittances are estimated 
to be around 2.1 billion BAM and around 1.5 billion was related to other transactions, mostly pensions. 
According to the WB estimate, the “migrant remittances inflow” in 2012 was around 2.8 billion BAM, or around 
11% of GDP (WB, 2013a). 
 The CBBiH functions as a Currency Board arrangement (meaning that there is almost no possibility for it 
to influence the money market) while BiH has a continuously high current account deficit (because of high 
imports) – hence, remittances are an important determinant for the stability and sustainability of the domestic 
currency, - and therefore, the functioning of the BiH economy. The BiH diaspora, therefore, has a great 
influence on the development of BiH, both current and potential.
 The estimated average net savings of a BiH migrant household is around 8,500€ per year (IASCI/IOM, 
2010). Due to the large number of BiH households in receiving countries, “retained savings” for 2009 were 
estimated at around 4.6 billion €. Most BiH migrants are saving their money in countries they live in. Less than 
20% of BiH migrants in EU countries keep even a part of their savings in BiH, even though the BiH banking sector 
is one of the most developed in the region. Migrants who maintain savings in BiH mostly keep it in cash, whilst a 
small number use other banking services (IASCI/IOM, 2010).
 
 According to IASCI/IOM (2010) estimate, 32.3% of emigrants invested or plan to invest in BiH, and 
mostly they come from the USA, Canada and Australia. Accordingly, this potential remains unused and more 
should be done to encourage the diaspora to invest in BiH. According to the same report, only 6.1% of 
emigrants invested or provided credit to business enterprises in BiH. This is a much lower percentage than in 
other countries. In contrast, it is interesting to note that emigrants from BiH are still willing to invest in their 
destination country. 
 Retail trade, real estate, manufacturing, agriculture and tourism are the main micro, small and medium 
enterprise investments for BiH investors. Considering small-scale investment ambitions, BiH migrants prefer to 
invest individually or in partnership with family members, which might indicate higher social cohesion in BiH. 
Also, accessing affordable and appropriate credit for investment is a matter of great significance. Microcredit 
providers are preferred over bank loans for investors from former-Yugoslav countries. In conclusion, the 
preference for taking microcredit services over bank loans reflects investment intentions and short-term 
ambitions (IASCI/IOM, 2010).
19
Figure 2.2.2.Total remittances in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2000-2012
19
 The data includes personal remittances, employee compensations, pensions and other transfers.
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 2.3. Diaspora and human capital
 
 Human capital – the education, training and skills embodied in the labour force – is a key factor for 
economic growth and development (Barro, 2001; Benhabib and Speigler 1994). Today's high-income 
economies have reached high levels of GDP per capita through sustained periods of economic growth which 
were founded on increases in the population's level of education (Becker, 1993).  Due to the importance of 
human capital for economic development, the impact of migration on the level and growth of human capital 
has been widely debated in academic literature.  
 Highly-skilled individuals are more likely to emigrate than their compatriots with less education 
(Docquier and Rapoport, 2004; Grogger and Hanson, 2011). This phenomenon is known as the 'brain drain'. 
The conventional view has been that migration poses a threat to human capital in source countries because a 
greater proportion of high-skilled individuals emigrate than low-skilled. Given the importance of human capital 
for economic growth, international migration from less developed countries to richer countries has been 
regarded as detrimental to economic development and as causing increasing inequality between rich and poor 
countries. Although it is generally agreed that migration of the highly-skilled does have negative effects on 
economic development, the 'brain drain' theory has been challenged since it fails to recognise that migration 
can also positively affect human capital development in source countries of migration.  
 Migration may actually lead to 'brain gain' in source countries (Beine et al., 2001; Stark et al., 1997; 
Stark, 2004). A country's stock of human capital may be increased by migration because the opportunity to 
migrate in the future incentivises individuals to invest in their education. Poor economies with low-growth 
potential offer fewer opportunities for highly skilled individuals which makes it less worthwhile for citizens to 
invest in their education.  On the other hand, the world as a whole does offer good prospects and high rates of 
return for the highly educated. Thus, the opportunity to migrate at some point in the future encourages 
individuals to obtain a higher level of education than they would if they were restricted to remaining in their 
country of origin. Although some of these highly skilled individuals will emigrate, not all of them will.  
Consequently, the source country will actually experience a net gain in human capital – brain gain – which 
would not have occurred had the option of migration not been present.  Statistical evidence has been found to 
support the brain gain theory (Batista et al., 2012; Beine et al., 2001, 2011). However, the evidence also 
suggests that skilled migration prospects only lead to brain gain under certain circumstances. Beine et al. (2011) 
only find evidence of a net brain gain for low-income source countries which have a skilled emigration rate 
under 20-30% of skilled workers. They find no evidence of incentive effects increasing aggregate levels of 
human capital in middle or high income countries.  
 Additionally, the impact of the brain drain may be reduced by return migration. The brain drain theory 
assumes that an individual leaves their country of origin and settles permanently in a host country, thus the 
migrant's human capital is lost to their country of origin. However, not all migration is permanent; much is 
temporary.  Individuals may migrate temporarily for education or to benefit from higher wages to accumulate 
savings and then return to their country of origin. Furthermore, in recent years many governments in 
developed countries have tried to encourage temporary rather than permanent migration, issuing a larger 
share of temporary to permanent visas (Docquier and Rapoport, 2004, p. 18).  Return migration means that the 
migration of the highly skilled may not be permanent.  In fact, migrants return with more skills than they left as 
they may have acquired new skills and knowledge whilst abroad.  However, there is some debate whether high 
or low skilled migrants are more likely to return to their country of origin. The evidence so far is mixed 
(Dustmann, 2003; Jensen and Pedersen, 2007; Pungas et al., 2012)
 Yet, even if migration is permanent, this does not mean that migrants' human capital is lost to the 
source country. The whole notion of diaspora is based on the idea that migrants still maintain some connection 
to their country of origin. Whilst migrants may not return to permanently settle in their country of origin, they 
may still facilitate knowledge transfer to the country and improve the human capital of non-migrants. 
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The Development Strategy of BiH was devised in 2010 and was not adopted by the RS government. Therefore this document has the status of a draft and 
BiH has neither adopted a development strategy nor a Social Inclusion Strategy. 
21
IOM implemented this program with aim to attract highly qualified nationalities back to their areas of origin and contribute to reconstruction and 
development; the target host areas were Europe, North America, Australia and Arab countries.
22
Again IOM project in cooperation with Netherlands to acquired permanent resident citizens to temporarily return to BiH to provide technical expertise in 
their field.
Connections to migrants can increase social capital for non-migrants in the country of origin which may be not 
only beneficial for the individuals with links to non-migrants but also for the development of the origin country 
in general.  
 Apart from remittances, other areas where migrants contribute to the sending country are 
entrepreneurial development and transfer of knowledge and skills- which have been underlined as priorities in 
20
the Competitiveness section of the BiH Development Strategy draft.  One of the first steps taken in that 
direction was the project TOKTEN (Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals), which received a lot of 
exposure due to government efforts to encourage highly-qualified natives of BiH living abroad to accept short-
term consultancy contracts. After the project implementation, 32 consultants continued to carry out the 
cooperation with local institutions participants. 
 Later, other initiatives included Re-Connect, a Community of Bosnia (CoB) flagship project. Again it 
included a component to encourage the transfer of knowledge and skills from young BiH citizens living in the 
United States and elsewhere, to re-engage with their native country and to help the country's development. 
Further initiatives include, for example:
· Domestic Product Promotion Alliance (a program in which members of the diaspora are expected to 
invest in production in BiH and to support national companies to compete more successfully in 
international markets).
· BiH Students (the exchange of ideas and information flows between students inside and outside the 
country, in order to support the development of BiH).
· Reconstruction, Capacity Building and Development through the Return of Qualified Nationals to 
21
Bosnia and Herzegovina (RCDB).
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· Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals (TRQN).
2.4. Diaspora and social capital
 Social capital 'refers to features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that 
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit' (Putnam 1995, p. 67). The term 'capital' is used to 
emphasise that along with financial, physical and human capital, aspects of social organisation can be 
important for economic growth and development. Financial, physical and human capital are not used in 
isolation but require interactions between people (Woolcock, 1998). As a consequence, the content and 
structure of relationships can have a large impact on economic outcomes.  For example, some forms of social 
organisation are much better for the exchange of information, services and goods than others. Thus it is argued 
that the absence of social capital is detrimental to economic development (Putnam, 1995; Woolcock, 1998; Zak 
and Knack, 2001).
 Scholars researching social capital and migration have focused on the role of personal networks in 
migration. Migrant networks are a set of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former migrants and non-
migrants to one another through relations of kinship, friendship and shared community origin (Pallioni et al., 
2001: 1263-4). Migrant networks facilitate further migration from source countries. Individuals in source 
countries who have connections to migrants are far more likely to migrate themselves than those who are not 
connected to diaspora networks. This largely due to family reunification programmes which allow migrants to 
sponsor family members to migrate to their country of residence. However, beside family reunification 
programmes, having friends and acquaintances who have already migrated makes migration easier. Diaspora 
network connections provide potential migrants with better information about destinations, such as job 
opportunities and housing. These connections may also provide financial aid to migrate, as well as social and 
emotional support once in the destination country (Massey, 1990).
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 In addition to affecting the size and type of migration flows, diaspora networks are important because 
they can be used to transfer knowledge and resources back to the country of origin. As detailed in the section on 
financial capital above, diaspora networks are an important source of financial capital through remittances and 
investment. Their presence also boosts international trade. As well as sending home money, migrants send 
home ideas and cultural practices, norms. This diffusion of culture from receiving countries to source countries 
via migrant networks has been termed 'social remittances' by Levitt (1998). Social remittances change social 
capital in source countries as they impact on ideas and norms around social organisation. Such developments 
can be both positive and negative. For example, practices in receiving countries may impact on gender norms. 
They may provide examples which help to improve the position of non-migrant women in society and their 
participation in the labour market; but they could also reinforce traditional gender relations (Levitt and Lamba-
Nieves, 2011). Social remittances could also affect development via their impact on politics. The experience of 
Western democracies may lead migrants and those they influence to take a more critical opinion of homeland 
politics, in some cases motivating people to push for change. Yet it has also been argued that migration 
experience can reduce support for democratic principles – here the location of expatriation and the migration 
experience plays a big role (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011).
 
 2.5.     Diaspora and institutional environment
 
 The government of the sending country can engage with their diaspora through economic, political 
and social bonds. This collaboration typically has two main features: responsibility/obligations and interest 
of the origin country in its diaspora. 
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 The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Migration Policy Institute (MPI) have jointly published the handbook.
 Some governments consider the need to protect their emigrant population outside their borders 
(Baubock, 2008), whilst others regard them as traitors adopting ”long distance nationalism” (Anderson, 1998). 
At the same time, governments can also consider their diaspora to be an important source of financial, human 
and social capital. In that case diaspora investments, remittances and know-how activities can became a part of 
development policies in the country of origin. As it is frequently advocated, the diaspora might support 
development programs in the country of origin, lobby its governments, appeal to international institutions, or 
work to raise awareness of the broader population about contributing to national development (Newland and 
Tanaka, 2010). In all cases, the roles of diaspora, which varies from philanthropic, voluntary and investment 
initiatives, might be institutionalised in the origin country (Vezzoli and Lacroix, 2010).
 To that end, a number of sending countries, by themselves or with the support of international 
agencies and/or countries of destination, has developed diaspora engagement strategies and policies. In order 
to formalize relationships with their diaspora (population settled abroad), countries of origin might started to 
build mechanisms for channelling diaspora resources into development (Vezzoli and Lacorix, 2010). Frequently, 
this includes the establishment of different forms of national institutions and strategies, which can reach out to 
migrants and manage their activities (Gamlen, 2006).  
 To encourage the adjustment of migrant values towards current national development, development 
initiatives should  be designed with a clear understanding of the characteristics of the diaspora that they are 
supposed to support; the historical relations between the government and its migrants; and the interests and 
the objectives of the diaspora (Vezzoli and Lacroix, 2010, p. 4). According to guidelines for diaspora 
engagement in development published by the IOM (IOM, 2012), each country of origin has to create a link 
between itself and diaspora needs and interests for development. 
 
 Therefore, based on these two main assumptions - responsibility and interest - there are several areas 
which could be addressed when developing the link between institutional environment and diaspora (Gamlen, 
2008): 
 1. Capacity building (symbolic nation-building and institution building)
 2. Extending rights (voting rights/dual citizenship, civil and social rights)
 3. Extracting obligations (investment policies, lobby promotion)
 Capacity building refers to policies which aim to create a sense of national identity, need and desire to 
maintain contact with the origin countries along with the infrastructure to do so (Gamlen, 2008). These policies 
are frequently divided on the symbolic nation-building and institution building policies. The symbolic nation-
state building policies aim to create a transnational identity and increase a sense of belonging on the part of the 
diaspora towards the homeland (Gonzalez-Gutierrez, 1999). This includes various language, cultural, symbol 
and media projects, as well as other types of event. The institution-building policies support the establishment 
of institutions to reach out to migrants, and to support and manage their activities (Gamlen, 2006). It refers to 
the bureaucratic instruments and systems which adjust to broader global arenas as well as to local 
communities and urban municipalities. It might be organized within the ministerial-level agency, consular and 
constitutive bodies, networks, monitoring efforts and dedicated bureaucracy.
 Extending rights refers to policies which work towards the extension of rights to population resident 
outside the national borders. It includes both active and passive voting rights, realized through political 
incorporations either through dual citizenship, and/or civil and social rights. Political incorporation includes 
voting rights, special membership concessions, embassy voting, parliamentary representatives and postal 
voting. Political incorporation of emigrants means awarding political rights to expatriates which should then 
facilitate a better economic use of diaspora. Civil and social services to emigrants appear through welfare 
protection such as pensions to non-resident citizens, healthcare, advocacy in taxation, and tourist services.
22
  Extracting obligations refers to government efforts to incorporate the diaspora into economic and 
political agendas. That includes various investments policies and lobbies. Investment refers to policies 
concerning remittance-capture, broader FDI and infrastructure strategies. Furthermore, it includes knowledge 
of transfer programs, with a view to mobilizing highly-skilled diaspora to increase knowledge production 
(Gamlen, 2008). An example is UNDP's TOKTEN (Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriates Nationals) program 
which facilitates the temporary return of expatriate researchers for short-term consultations or fellowships in 
their country of origin. The lobbies might be presented not just for political needs but also for business purpose 
and attracting FDI as well as technology transfers.
 In practice, diaspora engagement policy contains different elements of each described policy area 
which need to be examined, in particular including the following:  
· knowledge about diaspora; 
· goals and capacities for diaspora engagement in development;
· trust/communication/relationships between the diaspora and country of origin; 
· mobilization of different stakeholders (government, the diaspora itself, civil society) on different levels 
(global, national, regional, local).
 These elements are elaborated by Agunias and Newland (2012) in a handbook focused on “Developing 
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a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development” . This study has been developed as a strategic road map 
for governments to build a constructive relationship with diasporas and examine the success and failure of 
policies, programs, and initiatives. Our later analysis refers to those elements and investigates them on the 
ground. 
 2.6.     Evidence from BiH
 In recent years, a number of authors have carried out different analyses on the BiH diaspora and its 
potential influence on different issues in BiH. We discuss some diaspora related research focused on BiH.
 Valenta and Ramet (2011) warns that diaspora engagement policies and initiatives coming from the 
BiH government have been rather weak. There are no clear diaspora engagement policies in BiH, nor related 
legislation. Instead, the main institutional actor is the Department for diaspora within the MHRRBiH. It 
therefore partly offsets the lack of diaspora engagement policies and endeavours to create and implement 
projects with national and international participants that will support BiH development mostly through 
financial and knowledge transfer. The authors find that BiH human capital, in combination with a European 
background (in comparison to non-European migrants), has eased integration into western countries. 
 Al-Ali et al. (2001) argue that emerging transnational activities of BiH refugees can hardly be defined as 
transnational in terms of both migrants and communities. They should rather be understood as heterogeneous 
and diverse due to the current political, economic and social development in post-Dayton BiH compared to the 
country of residence, which shapes refugees' shifting strategies and practices. A fine example of this is the high 
number of BiH refugees with an advanced education, who BiH politicians are still not considering seriously for 
post-war reconstruction. 
 
 Eastmond (2006) investigates return strategies adopted by BiH refugees in Sweden. According to her 
research, the return from Sweden to BiH should be understood as a dynamic and open-ended process. Instead 
of permanent return, BiH refugees have rather adopted a transnational strategy of short-term and seasonal 
visits, remittances, and so on. Permanent return is more related to the BiH socio-economic context and a sense 
of belonging. Crucial to these activities is the existence of dual citizenship, which enables refugees to engage in 
the development of BiH. 
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 Jakobsen (2011) examines the remittance-institutions-development nexus in BiH. He looked at the 
potential influence of remittances on BiH economy. Taken into account a variety of findings made about the 
relationship between remittances and development in previous studies, he argues that remittances might have 
a certain influence on economic growth in BiH. However, that influence is temporary and requires 
improvement of the economic and political institutional framework, followed by the inflow of FDI to BiH. 
 
 Kent (2006) analyses potential contributions of the BiH diaspora to development and economic 
growth. This article examines BiH World Diaspora Network, created after the large increase of BiH refugees 
abroad. The author finds the relation between diaspora activities and war recovery to be unclear. He 
recommends actions that host countries should take to fully comprehend how development agencies and 
diaspora networks should be coordinated.
 
 Halilovich (2012) investigates the relationship of BiH diaspora organisations and networks with BiH. He 
also explores recent scholarly literature in Australia, the United States and Europe that study BiH cultural 
habits. According to the author, the “transnational” conceptual framework should be updated to include 
“trans-localism,” which is the concept he uses in his research.
 
 Valenta and Strabac (2011) focus on the transnational exchange that connects BiH migrants (in this 
case mostly from Europe) with non-migrants in BiH. The data for the study was gathered in an ethnographical 
manner. The authors find that relatives do not help each other because they want to, but rather because they 
feel they have to. They indicate that the most important motivation for transnational activities is a feeling of 
obligation towards family and relatives in BiH.
 Nikolic et al. (2010) look into the effects of brain drain and its possible consequences. The authors 
consider that BiH is not doing very well in co-opting highly-qualified BiH diaspora to stop brain drain. Their 
research shows that the BiH diaspora has brain gain potential and it is crucial for BiH not to miss these 
developmental opportunities. Apathy over this issue may result in not only losing young people with great 
potential currently living in BiH, but also those already living abroad.
 Dimova and Wolf (2009) used longitudinal data from BiH to investigate the possibility of remittances 
triggering chain migration. The study shows that remittances have a positive impact on the migration prospects 
of potential migrants. Unemployment and a low standard of living are the main drivers for people to leave the 
country. Their research shows that young, healthy and educated people are most likely to migrate. 
 
 Williams (2006) analysed the link between property restitution and sustainable return. His findings 
confirm that property restitution has been crucial for sustainable return, and it could subsequently be used as 
an example for post-conflict projects in other countries. He also points out that lessons learnt in BiH should be a 
guide for planning other peace missions. 
 After this short literature review we can conclude that there is a lack of research that investigates more 
directly potential effects of diaspora on development in BiH, and there is a lot to be done before this link 
becomes better explored. This study provides more specific investigation that should contribute to better 
understanding of the potential of the BiH diaspora to economic development. 
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 3.1. Analysis of state officials' percpetions at all administrative levels
3.1.1. Introduction
 A number of sending countries have started to institutionalize relationships with their diasporas. Some 
governments claim to be motivated by national interests such as development, whilst others are motivated by a 
feeling of responsibility to population settled abroad (Gamlen, 2008). Yet the complex institutional 
environment in BiH, the different nature of emigration flows from BiH over previous decades (Velanta and 
Ramet, 2011), and the overall difficulty of transitioning to a democratic and market-oriented economy, have 
made it challenging to establish clear and concise diaspora engagement strategies. 
 
 In order to examine the current performance of institutions at all administrative levels in diaspora 
engagement, our analysis therefore examines the following elements (introduced in Section 2.5). First, it 
identifies goals and capacities towards diaspora engagement strategies. Second, it maps diaspora through an 
existing database, which also captures how state institutions gather information about diaspora and 
communicate with it. Third, it examines the relationship between trust and mobilization of the diaspora by 
focusing on the current business climate, different kinds of social and political rights, as well as cultural 
programs offered and exchanged with the diaspora.
3.1.2. Sample characteristics
 The methodology is based on in-depth interviews with state officials in BiH at all levels: state, entity, 
cantonal and local, including the Brčko District of BiH (DB). It includes interviews with 24 state officials: state 
level (3 officials); entity level (2 in FBiH; 3 in RS); DB (1 official); cantonal level (12 officials); local level (1 in FBiH 
and 2 in RS). The list of institutions and state officials, as well as their positions, are attached in Appendix B. The 
interviews were conducted between May and July 2013. Due to the main research focus - BiH diaspora and 
development - most of the interviews were conducted in the ministries of economy and development, 
including several interviews with ministries for refugees, specialized state agencies, the chamber of commerce 
and municipalities. All interviews were conducted in the offices of state officials, with the exception of two 
which were conducted in the written form and through the phone. 
 Two problems for conducting the fieldwork were identified: namely, the time taken to organize 
interviews and the difficulty of organizing interviews with state officials, especially in the entity RS. First, the 
arrangement of interviews with state officials usually took one-two months and included extensive 
phone/email correspondence; and second, different ministries within the RS government were contacted 
several times by letter, phone and emails, whilst either contacted institutions nor state officials expressed a 
willingness to accept the invitation for interview. To offset the lack of access to state officials in the RS 
government, interviews were arranged with representatives from the university, RS chamber of commerce, 
and the city of Banja Luka.
 
 The duration of interviews varied from thirty minutes to one and a half hours. The time assigned for 
interviews was around one hour, but in some cases state officials took more time to present their views. 
Interviews were organized around three main questions: diaspora development potential; the capacity of 
institutions to engage diaspora in development; and the main advantages and obstacles for diaspora 
engagement in development. In accordance with the answers and set up methodology, the analysis integrates 
all interviews and presents perceptions of state officials by introducing all institutional levels: state, entity, 
cantonal and local (municipality). 
BiH - DIASPORA - POTENTIAL FOR DEVELOPMENTIII.
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3.1.3. Identifying goals and capacities
 Goals
 State officials at all administrative levels share a common opinion about the potential of BiH diaspora 
to support development of BiH. According to state officials, the diaspora's financial and human capital can have 
a strong impact on development in BiH. In their opinion, the majority of BiH migrants who left the country in 
past decades have been successfully integrated into host countries, and therefore represent a big potential for 
the development of BiH through their financial resources, knowledge, skills and networks. In addition to these 
statements, state officials at all levels often listed some examples of successful outcomes from the diaspora; 
such as investment, transfer of knowledge, technology, economic lobbying, and financial support to BiH 
population through remittances. For example, according to a state official at the national level, diaspora is not 
only a representative of BiH, but also a financial resource:
The issue of diaspora is of particular importance for our institution. They are the best 
ambassadors of our country but also a source of 'fresh money'. There is a huge inflow 
of money through diaspora. Diaspora remits annually billions of US dollars, and 
invests millions of dollars through various activities, which is presented by statistics, 
as diaspora participates in GDP with 13-14 per cent annually. 
 A state official at the national level further emphasised the importance of diaspora for economic 
lobbying, and their potential as the main tool for promoting BiH economy. 
 A similar opinion was given by state officials at the entity level according to which BiH diaspora presents 
the best human potential for development in BiH. Through knowledge and skill, as well as the high inflow of 
remittances to families and friends, the future development of BiH could be directed in more productive ways:
Diaspora gives billions of dollars through remittances, which at the moment goes to 
their families. That is good, and we need to think that people should have interest to 
invest in the country through their cousins, provide them with a work place and help 
this country. Overall, the potential of diaspora is immense. There are new 
generations in BiH diaspora who have gained new technologies, new skills, and in any 
form, as BiH citizens, as dual citizens, or citizens of some other state with BiH origin, 
present forever potential for the development of BiH. The state which today gives up 
its human capital has no chance for progress and development. Therefore, we need 
to look for good practices from other states and implement them.  
 In addition, at the cantonal levels state officials presented some successful examples of diaspora 
investments, support in attracting foreign investors through their personal networks, and the transfer of 
money, knowledge and new technologies in cantons. According to the majority of interviewed officials at 
cantonal level, without the support of the diaspora, the cantons would face serious economic problems. This 
refers mostly to financial support provided by the diaspora for their family and friends, as well as their 
investment in housing, and occasionally in business, including FDI and green field investments. An example is 
the following:
 
If we cut now the financial support of diaspora, the situation in our canton will be terrible. At the 
same time, we cannot say that we have a lot of investors from diaspora. But the one's we have are 
very important. For example, I am talking about the biggest factory of sugar production in the 
region, which is from our diaspora. 
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 A similar opinion was provided by state officials at the local level, who see diaspora as the main 
resource for development of their local municipalities. They argue for a more intensified and organized use of 
financial and human diaspora potential for development by citing the best examples of diaspora investors in 
their municipalities, as well as support for them. To that end, here is the statement of an official at the local 
level:
We recognized economic and social potential of our diaspora due to the number of 
diaspora, their education, financial support, and their sentimental attachment to the 
city. In our local municipalities every second, if not every household, is financed by 
family settled abroad. Where we have diaspora, it is easy to resolve any problem. If 
we, for example, have difficulties in financing some local projects, they are always 
willing to co-finance it. With the level of current unemployment, without help from 
diaspora, this municipality would face serious difficulties. For this reason we have 
started to think about organizing activities which will mobilize our diaspora to 
support the development of our municipally. 
 Overall, state officials at all levels agree that the successful examples of financial support, investors and 
economic lobbyists from the diaspora are insufficient in comparison to their potential. It is a similar case with 
human capital, where both the transfer of knowledge and skills as resources for development need to be 
further explored. According to the majority of state officials, it is time to mobilize diaspora and prevent them 
from losing connections with BiH. This is particularly relevant to the mobilization of second and third 
generation migrants, due to their human capital as well as their greater distance from BiH. Generally, state 
officials agree that the current BiH diaspora is well-connected with BiH, but it is unclear whether the next 
generation will be.
 
 Capacities
 The gap between identified goals and unused potential of diaspora has been further explained through 
institutional capacities and their ability to utilise the financial, social and human potential of diaspora. At the 
state level, institutions directly responsible for diaspora have developed several projects to foster diaspora 
engagement with development in BiH. These projects focus on both financial and human capital, and they 
include all institutional levels in BiH. However, their current capacity to engage the diaspora in development is 
limited due to insufficient staffing, a lack of relevant laws and institutional cooperation for issues of diaspora, as 
well as the awareness of institutions about diaspora potential for development and the general complexity of 
the political and economic situation in BiH. The opinion of interviewed state officials might be summarized by 
this quote of a state official at the national level: 
We realize the importance of linking diaspora with development in BiH. Also, over 
time they might lose their relationships with BiH, especially the second and third 
generation. Therefore, we initiated several projects in that direction, and some of 
them showed some really good results. Unfortunately, these projects often lacked 
state support. Therefore, I think migration and development, as a new term, needs to 
be systematically connected to the state level. As an institution, we cannot create a 
law or oblige someone to implement new policies. But we can suggest. And there are 
already some positive reactions on our proposals and our initiatives, which need to 
be pushed further.
 At the entity level, state officials agree about the lack of capacity for diaspora engagement in the 
development of BiH, but also about the lack of institutional cooperation and partnership relationships with the 
diaspora. To that end, they presented several strategies that have recently been developed. For example, in 
FBiH, a ministry adopted a new organizational strategy which includes the employment of one/two persons 
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responsible for issues related to the diaspora. It is further planned to transfer this activity to the cantonal and 
local level, who will employ one person for the management of diaspora issues. Namely, according to state 
officials from FBiH, diaspora should be looked at through an economic lens, and it should be considered as a 
partner in the development of BiH. In the overall process of establishing capacities for diaspora engagement 
strategies in development, local municipalities should be given main responsibility. A state official at the entity 
level argues:
We usually talk about diaspora as somebody who has to give something to BiH. But, I 
think that BiH has to give something to its diaspora. There should be a two-sided 
communication, and that communication must be organized. The interests of both 
parties must be recognized and united. Our diaspora, I mean our people who have 
money, idea and vision - if you tell them what is the quickest and best way of investing 
in BiH - they will come. I am convinced that they will come because of interest! Why 
invest in some far away country, when it is possible to invest here. Therefore, we 
must build an effective state; but we must first relax BiH politically. And local 
municipalities must take a main role on the ground for activities regarding the 
diaspora. People will always invest but in their local municipalities first of all.
 In comparison to state and entity level, state officials at the cantonal level refer to their general current 
capacities, whilst addressing issues of diaspora and development. For example, in the case of investing capital, 
diaspora has access to all facilities available to both domestic and foreign investors. Such facilities include: tax 
facilities, various regulations, laws, private-public ownership, building permits and others. However, the 
implementation of proposed facilities as well as the attraction of domestic and foreign capital is influenced by 
the general political and economic situation in BiH. A lack of institutional cooperation at all levels as well as the 
position of cantons in FBiH, with their lack of ability to influence decision-making, further complicates the 
establishment of capacities for diaspora issues. In the opinion of a state official at cantonal level, a state needs 
to improve the political and economic environment, whilst taking more responsibility for BiH diaspora:
Ten of us will come and we will talk about what we should do, but that is not a 
solution. We don't have any database, important contacts, etc. What I would like to 
say, is that this is a 'diasporic canton', but the diaspora is not organized, and we, as 
institution, are not able to organize something more. We have been trying to 
establish something through our personal contacts, but we do not act as the state, 
and that is a problem. BiH is not doing anything for these people now, I mean 
institutionally! The diaspora needs an institutional point of entrance in BiH – and 
then other things will happen. Meanwhile, we do our best to meet their demands 
given our existing capacities and abilities. 
 Furthermore, some state officials see a difficulty in implementing their ideas for diaspora engagement 
in development due to the obstacles at cantonal level. State officials have divided opinions about the role of 
local municipalities in establishing capacities for diaspora development strategies. Some state officials argue 
that the role of the state in linking diaspora to development is crucial, whilst others agree that the diaspora 
tends to connect more at the local level.
 
 In contrast to the pessimistic perception of some state officials about the role of local municipalities, 
state officials at the local level seem to demonstrate rather positive opinions about diaspora engagement 
strategies. They agree that the complexity of the institutional environment, as well as the political and 
economic one, is influencing but not preventing their initiatives to engage the diaspora in the development of 
their municipalities. Indeed, municipalities included in this analysis show collaborative institutionalisation of 
relations with the diaspora, as well as with other state institutions. This confirms a state official at the local level 
who remarked:
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We change every strategy in accordance to needs of diaspora. If there are problems 
at the state level, we try to resolve it, at least temporarily. For example, we pursue 
diaspora enquiries with other ministries, or we simply give temporally building 
permission, for example. We also plan to develop a department for diaspora, in the 
near future. In the meantime, we are organizing economic forums for diaspora, and 
we have announced 2013 as the year of diaspora. This forum is actually initiated and 
supported by people from our municipality, who now work for state institutions and 
international organizations. 
 In addition, one state official described state efforts to adjust municipality development strategies and 
programs with diaspora needs. Another state official described how the municipality adjusted its 
administrative work to accommodate the schedules of diaspora during their visits. Such measures include: the 
working hours of administrative staff, the acquisition of permits, the provision of information, and so on.
 
 
3.1.4. Mapping BiH diaspora
 Data base
 State officials generally agree about a strong need for a database on BiH diaspora. According to state 
officials, a data base that provides information on number, education, gender, skills, ethnicity, status in host 
countries, and other information, is crucial for establishing strong relationship with the diaspora. This might be 
summarized by the quote of a state official at the entity level:
We need a kind of 'inventory' of our diaspora, to know who they are, which of them 
have firms, which want to return, to invest in BiH, etc. I am not sure whether we can 
locate where activities regarding diaspora begin and end.
 Most of the state officials interviewed were not aware of the existence of any database on the BiH 
diaspora. The exception was only at the state level, where state officials talked about their efforts to create a 
database on BiH diaspora organizations, scientists, the highly-skilled, and to some extent, investors with BiH 
origin. However, there were various obstacles to gathering these data. Not only that there is no diaspora census 
or resources from diplomatic representatives, but there have also been regulatory changes that complicate 
data collection on investments made by the diaspora. Equally important to this is the absence of a definition of 
the diaspora itself. For example, at the state level the term “BiH diaspora” has been used in a more general way. 
There is no division of BiH population, and all emigrants from BiH over space and time are considered to be 
diaspora. For them, the further use of diaspora requires more academic support to clarify the definition of 
diaspora. 
 At the other institutional levels, state officials confirmed the lack of a database and presented a quite 
loose understating of the term “diaspora”. At the entity level, state officials acknowledged the lack of a database 
and expressed opposing definitions of the term diaspora. In interviews with RS officials, diaspora should be 
categorised more in relation to different emigration flows, including those from 1960s, 1970s, 1990s and 
onwards. For FBiH officials, “diaspora” tends to refer to all people with BiH origin who have dual citizenship, or 
who have roots in BiH. 
 At the cantonal level, there is no evidence of data bases but there are an even greater variety of 
understandings on the term “diaspora”. For example, state officials frequently have difficulty understanding 
whether returnees who have invested in a canton should be considered as diaspora or not. Other state officials 
insist on defining the diaspora mainly in terms of their economic potential to BiH, ignoring refugees or potential 
returnees. Conversely, there are a number of state officials who consider the BiH diaspora to be mainly made up 
of those who left the country in the 1990s. There are also state officials who refer to the definition of the BiH 
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diaspora by only recognising diaspora in countries that are highly consolidated, and in which a majority of their 
diaspora live; such as Croatia, Austria and Switzerland. 
 Finally, at the local level, interviewed state officials demonstrated their understanding of diaspora 
more through the situation on the ground. They refer to diaspora simply as people who are regionally attached 
to the municipality, and who are linked to it through family and friends. In addition, no database exists at the 
local level either, but due to closer connection with individuals and organizations, municipalities are provided 
with more information - as was mentioned by state officials.
 Communication 
 
 A majority of state officials regard the communication gap with their diaspora to be an obstacle in 
mobilizing diaspora for development. Although their opinions about who should initiate this communication - 
BiH or diaspora – are divided, they almost unanimously agree that the state is not engaged enough in terms of 
mapping the diaspora. Moreover, the majority of state officials argue that most of the past/present initiatives 
have been coming from the diaspora itself.
 Therefore, most of the current communication at the state level is organized through the internet and 
diaspora organizations. There has been an exchange of information and participation in activities organized by 
both sides - diaspora and BiH - but this does not include all organizations and potential members of BiH 
diaspora. This is influenced by two important factors: first, it is difficult to reach all members of BiH diaspora due 
to lack of their attachment to diaspora organizations in general; and second, it has to be acknowledged that not 
all ethnic groups in BiH are related to BiH diaspora organizations equally. This contrasts to BiH Serbian and BiH 
Croat diasporans, a high percentage of who are attached to and involved with a diaspora organization from 
Serbia and Croatia respectively. This has also been claimed by a state official at the national level:
Most of our contact with diaspora is through the internet, where we announce all our 
activities. We also have direct contact when some of our events are organized. But, 
the contacts are mostly with organizations, which present an additional problem. 
The majority of individuals are not members of organizations. It is also important to 
mention that the Serbian population from BiH is attached to Serbian diaspora 
organizations. The same goes for Croats.
 At entity level, communication with BiH diaspora becomes even more complex. In RS, state officials 
communicate initiatives to engage with the diaspora mainly through RS representations internationally, as well 
as the economic departments of other BiH embassies. At the same time, the FBiH officials' experience of 
communicating with diaspora is mainly through individual initiatives/requests by the diaspora upon different 
institutions in FBiH, which frequently do not collaborate with each other to perform these requests. A state 
official at the entity level demonstrated the practical side of this communication by saying:
I, for example, have been working with returnees for a long time. I have realized that 
people must have a vision and a chance for employment, housing and infrastructure. 
Many people have good ideas but they do not know how to realize them. Or vice 
versa. And only if people meet, talk, or if we provide them with good communication, 
something might happen. This is the only way!
 In addition to difficulties in communicating with BiH diaspora, state officials at the cantonal level have 
mentioned further complexities as well as various strategies towards establishing communication with BiH 
diaspora. To that end, a number of state official do not consider communication with the diaspora to be a main 
obstacle for their engagement in development; rather they cite the main obstacle as being the complex 
economic and political environment in BiH. For example, state officials frequently mention an informal way of 
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communicating with members of diaspora (both individuals and organizations) through either personal or local 
population networks. This form of communication has produced some successful business partnerships, and 
therefore some state officials believe that there is no need for a formalization of relationships with the 
diaspora. The focus should be on creating a better investment climate. In cases where the communication with 
BiH diaspora is good, it is usually based on pre-existing (i.e. pre-war) strong links with countries such as Croatia, 
Austria or Switzerland. Due to strong links between some cantons and diaspora organizations in these 
countries, there are organized visits between cantons and diaspora in these countries. For other cantons, 
diaspora issues are quite new, and further communication is likely to be integrated into future development 
strategies. What is common for most cantons is that the majority of state officials, whilst highlighting the 
importance of a database, acknowledge the importance of BiH diplomatic work, or that done by state 
institutions, in gathering information on BiH diaspora. In their opinion, a database is important for any further 
plan and activity with BiH diaspora, whilst opinions about the institutionalization of relationships with the 
diaspora at the state level are divided. Whilst some prefer informal communication, others believe that 
communication with the diaspora will give results only if it is conducted through institutions at the state level. 
To that end, here is a quote of a state official at the cantonal level:
There are examples of good communication between diaspora organizations and 
this municipality. I also know of individual examples between cantons and countries, 
which is not a guarantee of any concrete results. We cannot make system like that, 
with hundreds of associations and organizations. We need to work out how to gather 
these organizations and individuals, and provide a place where the diaspora can get 
the information and direction they require for activities in BiH. Perhaps a kind of an 
institution or agency, to which embassies will serve as source of information about 
diaspora. 
 Finally, despite the doubts of state officials at cantonal level, state officials at the local level have not 
commented on the difficulty of establishing communication with the diaspora. In contrary, there are a lot of 
cases of communication with the diaspora conducted at the local level. This refers to both individuals and 
diaspora organizations. Moreover, the communication at the local level is mostly reciprocal – it comes from the 
diaspora and from state officials in local municipalities, which has been more elaborated in the next section 
focused on municipality officials only. According to local state officials, there is a closer link between diaspora 
members and the identification of their problems and ideas. For example, there are examples of diaspora visits 
to local municipalities, as well as to local diaspora members in their cities in the EU. Based on support from 
diaspora networks and organizations, the organized visits of local state officials to diaspora local cities abroad 
frequently entails establishment of various forms of cultural and even economic cooperation. 
3.1.5. Trust and mobilization
 In light of the aforementioned, state officials currently have different experiences and practices in 
creating a relationship of trust and mobilization with the diaspora – some targeting the facilitation of 
investments, and others providing different kinds of rights for diaspora members. As already described, in the 
majority of cases the relationship is limited to existing development strategies and institutional practices at 
different levels. Exceptions are at the state and local level, where state officials have presented several 
initiatives for diaspora engagement strategies which aim to build a relationship of trust between the diaspora 
and BiH institutions, whilst mobilizing the diaspora for development. For example, at the state level, state 
officials introduced projects developed in cooperation with international organizations such as the IOM, WUS, 
SDC, the BiH World Diaspora Organization; mainly addressing issues of brain gain, return and remittances. 
These projects resulted in initiating the mobilization of diaspora for development in BiH, as well as the potential 
for institutionalizing the links between the diaspora and development at different levels in BiH. This includes 
introducing migration and development into new state strategies, e.g.: Strategy in the Area of Migration and 
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Asylum and Action Plan for the Period 2012-2015, which adopts and recommends links between the diaspora 
and development. Furthermore, an official at the state level presented the latest project of diaspora 
engagement in development in targeted local municipalities, which is likely to have a high potential in 
mobilizing the diaspora for development in BiH: 
This project will be implemented in ten municipalities, equally distributed across the 
whole country. The project is integrated in the UNDP project of strategies for local 
development, where migration should be embedded in national development 
strategies, in accordance with municipality preferences. For example, through 
knowledge transfer, financial support, education, health or other forms of support to 
specified sectors. Learning from difficulties we have faced in previous work, we 
thought this might be the best way to initiate a link between migration and 
development, and then transfer it at other institutional levels.  
 At the entity level, state officials refer to creating a relationship of trust and mobilization of the 
diaspora, through existing capacities as well as through new institutional cooperation initiatives. A state official 
from RS gave an example from a regional project between chambers of commerce, where one of the 
conclusions was that the diaspora has to be considered more seriously in further economic activities in BiH:
We just had one meeting within the NET, a regional project, where we with other 
partners from FBiH discussed a possibility of lobbying for a greater role for the 
diaspora in the promotion of BiH economy. One of the conclusions was that we 
needed to improve and use an organized infrastructure which supports cooperation 
and connection with diaspora. We took this into consideration at several levels. 
 To this end, state officials at the cantonal level presented different examples of investment facilities 
which are not directly oriented towards BiH diaspora, but certainly might tackle the diaspora as potential 
domestic and international investors in BiH. For example, one state official presented rural areas and the 
production of water, where the diaspora might be involved to stimulate funding and to participate in projects of 
rural development. Furthermore, there is an example of free industrial zones, which the diaspora could use to 
establish new businesses in BiH. This particularly tackles various kinds of permits and other administrative 
obstacles, which currently take a long time to obtain or to start a business. In other cases, state officials at 
cantonal level gave other examples of stimulating funding for the development of small and middle size 
enterprises as well as private-public partnerships and the recognition of diplomas for specific jobs. Every year 
cantonal governments, in coordination with FBiH, assign a certain amount of funding for those who are likely to 
establish a small and middle size enterprise; there are new regulations for private-public partnerships; and 
moves to recognize diplomas for particular types of job. In more cases, state officials presented the 
development of intersectoral cantonal teams, which will work on the development of canton, including the 
mobilization of diaspora. Moreover, significant number of state officials strongly emphasized the possibilities 
for production in BiH, which have emerged from the entry of Croatia into the EU and the instigation of customs-
free exports to Turkey. According to a state official at the cantonal level these opportunities should be taken 
more seriously: 
We have some situations where businessmen from Croatia start to contact people 
here, who work on similar jobs, and have already started a business. It is simply 
cheaper to dislocate production from Croatia to BiH. BiH is a member of CEFTA, and 
there is also the opportunity of exporting to Turkey without import duties. People 
see an opportunity here, but I just think that the general investment climate is a key 
obstacle. So, we are planning to establish an office for cooperation and investments 
in the canton. We have signed cooperation agreements with other cantons in BiH, 
and some regions in Croatia. In this way, we will show our people that there is a place 
where they can send their requests; and this covers diaspora as well.
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 Again, the majority of state officials at cantonal level further stressed that the general investment 
environment and burden some administrative procedures are the main obstacles to creating a relationship of 
trust with and mobilization of the diaspora. In addition, a number of state officials underlined a lack of 
infrastructure and corruption in BiH. For example, a state official at the cantonal level cited an example of 
potential investors who confronted a lack of infrastructure and professionalism in the administrative service of 
BiH:
Recently, we had one potential big investor in yacht production, who had been 
invited by our diaspora. They told us that only reason they decided not to invest here 
is that the place looks like a “war zone”. It is a big old production hall, which was partly 
damaged during the war. We don't have the money to repair it, and I personally think 
that the state should help us more with infrastructural problems. I also think that 
more success is made by people who decided to return and invest. I saw a lot of cases 
of those who had been trying to establish their business here through different 
intermediaries, but they all failed. You have to take care for every step of your work if 
you would like to be successful. And you also need to know where to look for 
information and how!
 At the same time, the majority of state officials at the cantonal level believe that all administrative 
barriers, which are under the responsibility of the cantons, could be overcome and adjusted to the needs of 
diaspora.
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 Finally, there are state officials who believe that creating a relationship of trust and mobilization of the 
diaspora is not likely to be developed through activities which address the ”diaspora” separately to other 
national and international investors. This is mainly because of the negative perception of diaspora which has 
emerged during the war, but also in the post-war period: 
We don't have any concrete activities which are targeted exclusively at diaspora. For 
example, we promoted our economic potential in Italy, Austria and Germany. In 
addition, we took our successful entrepreneurs with us, including the diaspora 
investors. The Austrian Embassy also recently organized visits of our people 
[diaspora], who have contacts or firms and want to invest here. It was about twenty 
people, who came here to see the conditions and possibilities of investing. In all 
cases, we never called them diaspora. I think that people don't like that term, and we 
prefer to say national and foreign investors. You know when we say diaspora, it 
usually means they were not here when it was 'shooting'.
 In addition to this statement, there are other state officials who agree that the term diaspora still has a 
negative connotation among some BiH citizens. We can mention two potential reasons for this: some perceived 
or used to perceive BiH diaspora as “traitor” who left the country during the war. Also, irrespective of the war 
related perceptions, the local population sometimes sees the BiH diaspora as the summer visitors who come 
just to 'show off' and do 'things' they are not probably able to do in their countries of residence. Such 
perception strongly influences the relationship between the diaspora and BiH, and the state needs to take 
more responsibility in introducing the diaspora through positive examples and practices.
 In summarizing the statements at different state levels, state officials at the local level demonstrated 
their current relationships and mobilization of diaspora through concrete examples. In one municipality, state 
officials presented several initiatives that have created a relationship of trust and mobilized the diaspora. One 
refers to the diaspora economic forum, which has been organized for the first time this year. The idea behind 
the forum came from highly-skilled professionals from the municipality who have resettled within and outside 
BiH, as well as examples of successful firms that have been established by diaspora. Notably, state officials 
remarked that a good political environment in the municipality has had a great impact on diaspora 
investments, as well as collaboration between potential diaspora investors and the municipality. An example of 
this is one of the biggest firms established by a diaspora businessman, whose investment required a complete 
change of the development programs of the municipality. That included both changes to the strategic plan, as 
well as co-financing support for the investment from the municipality. In another municipality, a state official 
indicated their initiatives for establishing a relationship of trust with the diaspora, which will hopefully bring 
more possibilities for development in the future. A state official at the local level argues: 
We have a need to seriously include our diaspora in the development of our local 
municipality. We are developing industrial zones, and the next step is to convince our 
diaspora to invest their capital here. It will be difficult in regards to all the 
disadvantages here at the local and state level. Most of all, due to political and 
economic insecurity, people simply don't trust BiH institutions. They have spent a 
lifetime in very well organized states. For all that we need to think first how to fix our 
place. And we decided to rearrange our administration. This includes staying open at 
the weekend, when our diaspora from Austria (where the majority live) come here. If 
we will wait for embassies and the state, nothing will ever happen. 
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 Moreover, state officials at the local level acknowledge a good relationship and collaboration with 
diaspora at other levels, such as through religious and local cultural associations. This collaboration has 
frequently facilitated the establishment of other forms of collaboration. For example, collaboration with local 
diaspora organizations frequently resulted in organizing visits to their new cities of residence, as well as twining 
between the cities. According to a state official, more intensive communication between the local municipality 
and diaspora, as well as good organization of their diaspora, should be a pre-condition for further collaboration 
with the diaspora, as well as to build the trust of the diaspora in BiH institutions. A state official at the local level 
explains:
At the beginning of my mandate, I contacted the diaspora. I went to visit them, in an 
organized way. It means organizing meetings with local municipalities where they 
live. I noticed that they are very well-integrated and respected in their cities. But they 
have simply lost confidence in BiH state, and that blocks further collaboration. To 
rebuild the confidence of the diaspora, we also assigned one place in the 
municipality to work on diaspora issues. I would like to let them know that we do care 
for them! I think it is simply possible to be more functional at the municipality level, 
although, of course, many things also depend on the general situation in the country.
 According to interviewed state officials, the diaspora has rarely been consulted in development 
planning or investment activities at any institutional level. Although all state officials expressed openness 
towards such ideas, and awareness about the potential of diaspora, there is hardly any initiative to take 
responsibility of diaspora by providing different kinds of rights, such as the facilitation of access to health care, 
education, and other state services. Moreover, with some exceptions at state, entity and cantonal level, state 
officials hardly expressed any opinion about political rights as well as the importance of dual citizenship and 
voting rights. Although none of the state officials denied the importance of political rights, the majority 
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preferred to support the establishment of partner relationships with the diaspora for economic reasons, as well 
as to build potential collaboration through cultural events, business forums, language courses and others. 
Overall, according to a state official at the cantonal level, the question of diaspora and development in BiH 
should overcome the past, and, therefore, economic interest should be pursued over other issues:
I think that the problem with diaspora is that our relationship with them is heavily 
dependent on our recent past. By this I mean it is based on taking care of refugees. 
…It is a different kind of diaspora today, with economic interests and business at the 
center.
 Therefore, with the exception of the state and local level - where cultural, political and other forms of 
collaborations are considered to be important - other state officials prefer to talk about economic interests and 
collaboration with the BiH diaspora through investment, transfer of knowledge, and skills. 
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 3.1.6. Conclusion
 State officials at all institutional levels share a consistent opinion about importance of diaspora 
engagement in BiH development, and primarily through its financial and human capital, including in particular 
diaspora investment, remittances, transfer of knowledge, technology, economic lobbying and various forms of 
other financial support. We identify differences/difficulties between the existing institutional capacities and 
consequent possibilities to activate diaspora potential in development including in particular challenges in 
mapping diaspora, communicating with the diaspora, improving trust and wider diaspora mobilization. 
 State officials at all levels almost fully agree that there is a lack of institutional capacities for more active 
diaspora engagement in development; that is primarily reflection of the complex administrative, economic and 
political environment in BiH, further challenged with a lack of institutional cooperation. Consequently, the 
state level officials emphasize problems of inadequate state support that might be partly explained by a lack of 
knowledge about the relationships between diaspora and development (as a new term), which we also identify 
at the other institutional levels as well.
 Furthermore, at the entity level we identify a lack of cooperation with other relevant institutions as 
well as a lack of cooperation between the entities. While in FBiH there is some evidence of strategic approach to 
diaspora engagement in development at the entity level, in RS it almost does not exist. At the cantonal level, the 
state officials emphasize their limited independency in decision-making, a lack of support by the state and lack 
of collaboration between cantons as the main obstacles for diaspora engagement in development. 
 One of the challenges of a grater diaspora involvement in BiH development that we systematically 
identify is heterogeneities in different institutional levels in their mapping of BiH diaspora. State officials, on 
average, agree that there is a lack of comprehensive database that is followed by a lack of the diaspora census, 
support of diplomatic representatives and above all, a lack of definition of “diaspora" - we identify some 
differences between institutional levels in terms of different understanding of the term diaspora. 
 State officials frequently refer to a lack of communication with diaspora as one of the main obstacle for 
initiating mobilization of diaspora for development. Majority state officials, in particular at lower institutional 
levels, agree that diaspora has been more active in initiating initial communication. At the state level, the state 
officials agree that communication is based mostly with different diaspora organizations and groups, 
emphasizing that this is not sufficient; they argue that communication should be improved with all citizens 
around the world having BiH origin. At the entity level, state officials argue that communication with diaspora is 
organized mostly after individual diaspora requests, and with evident lack of institutional support. At the 
cantonal and local level, state officials share opinion that informal communication and closer link to diaspora 
members through informal way has been also present. We identify that, in general, there is evidence of 
informal non-systematic communication with its diaspora as moved towards lower institutional levels. 
 State officials share different experiences in creating a relationship of trust and mobilization with the 
diaspora. Mainly at the state level, and with much smaller extent at the entity level, the state officials presented 
convincing activities which have been addressing a link between diaspora and development. This refers to 
several projects, programs and strategies over the past ten years. At the cantonal level, that is rather not the 
case. 
 3.2. Analysis of municipality officials' perceptions
 Recently, local municipalities have started to be targeted as potential leaders of this ongoing trend to 
use diaspora and migrants in the development of origin countries. This is principally due to gaps in linking 
international and national initiatives with the situation on the ground; therefore supporting local 
municipalities as new stakeholders to achieve more promising results (JMDI, 2013). The following are often 
presented as important arguments to justify migration and development initiatives at the local level. 
 The first refers to identifying the migration and development potential in the local context - peoples' 
needs as well as daily lives and practices are the most noticeable at the local level. The second refers to 
decentralization - ability of local municipality to identify and manage needs of the local labour market and 
public services, the size and demographic of the local population. The third refers to local governance – the 
credibility of local municipalities in establishing partnership arrangements with a high number of potential 
stakeholders including: institutions at all levels, international organizations and institutions, domestic civil 
society organizations, migrants associations, social partners and the private sector; which also includes the 
building of local public institutions, services, civil society participations, and so on. As a result, the processes of 
democratization and social and economic development is likely to be more successful within a decentralized 
mechanism, built upon closer cooperation between the public administration and their citizens (JMDI, 2013).
 In accordance with the arguments presented above, a number of countries have started to implement 
strategies to increase local-municipality engagement in migrant-based development. These include: 
harnessing remittances for local development; supporting migrant transfer-of-skills and entrepreneurship; 
fostering links between migration and decentralized cooperation; and promoting migrants' socio-economic 
integration for development. However, it is important to keep in mind that geographic differences and 
development disparities between municipalities might affect development potential between municipalities, 
as well as capacities to accommodate the relationship between diaspora and development. This also includes 
the potential for diaspora participation in development strategies and other activities. 
 In the broader context, it is important to investigate whether local authorities (municipalities) are 
aware of a territorial approach to diaspora and development at the local level (i.e. it is awareness of importance 
of diaspora presence at the local level). In other words; are municipalities independent in establishing a 
potential relationship with their diaspora as well as if they can carry out the development plans, the 
distribution of natural resources, financial resources, the investment and supply of public facilities and various 
rights provided to diaspora. All of this further influences the development of the municipality through transfer 
of diaspora skills, remittances, investment, return and transnational entrepreneurship. 
 In the narrower context, it is important to assess whether and how local authorities (municipalities) put 
into practice diaspora potential for development. This includes the participation of diaspora members in 
decision-making; supporting migrants to transfer business management skills, training, and knowledge; the 
development of investment from abroad, such as trade, remittances, savings, business investments purchase 
of real estate; as well as the establishment of networks, communication, philanthropy and cultural 
collaboration.  
 Taking these elements, our analysis will assess the current state of strategies/policies for diaspora 
engagement at municipal level, in particular its potential for: building partnerships; increase vertical domestic 
interaction; attracting and channelling financial and human resources for capital; and capacity building (JMDI, 
2013).
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 3.2.1. Introduction
 In order to further examine the BiH institutional environment for diaspora engagement in 
development - including best practices on the ground - our research extends beyond institutional analysis at 
the municipal level. 
 First, according to the interviewed state officials, an important finding is that the diaspora relationship 
with BiH is evident at the local level. In addition, a number of state officials highlighted the local municipalities 
as a potential leader in further engagement with the diaspora for development of BiH. Second, the lack of a 
comprehensive database about the BiH diaspora often encourages communication and networking with 
diaspora at the local level, which might influence the establishment of a relationship with BiH diaspora at all 
other institutional levels. Third, a number of state officials stated that more knowledge and stronger 
networking with the BiH diaspora was achieved through local level development projects. These projects range 
from investment into local infrastructure, the business sector and tourism, to potential transfer of knowledge 
for capacity building. According to the  majority of state officials, the presence of a diaspora in the development 
of local municipalities is likely to encourage a bottom-up approach towards creating stronger institutional 
awareness for diaspora engagement policies and practices in BiH overall. Finally, through the previous 
interviewing we identified heterogeneities related to the local level diaspora engagement in development. 
While some municipalities are quite successful in developing a relationship with their diaspora, others still face 
a lot of difficulties.
 In order to improve our understanding of the current state of engaging the diaspora in BiH 
development at the local level, our analysis examines the following elements at the municipal level (introduced 
in Section 2.5). First, it identifies goals and capacities towards diaspora engagement strategies. Second, it maps 
diaspora through an existing database, which also captures how state institutions gather information about 
diaspora and communicate with it. Third, it examines the relationship between trust and mobilization of the 
diaspora by focusing on the current institutionalization of the relationship with diaspora.
 3.2.2. Sample characteristics
 In order to gain a greater institutional perspective of the engagement of the BiH diaspora in 
development, we extended our sample to an additional twenty municipalities in BiH as follows: ten local 
municipalities from both entities where the SDC-UNDP project implements migration and development 
policies (henceforth, “SDC-UNDP municipalities” – for more information about the project and sample, please, 
see the next box) and ten local municipalities from both entities with registered diaspora and development 
activities as well as those without (these 10 municipalities are: Lopare, Prnjavor, Konjic, Banja Luka, Tešanj, 
Zvornik, Šamac, Novi Grad, Vogošća, and Srebrenica). 
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 The methodology is based on in-depth interviews with municipal officials. Overall, interviews were 
conducted with 25 officials representing these 20 municipalities. The codes of these officials, as well as their 
positions, are attached in Appendix B. The interviews were conducted between January and February 2014. 
The majority of interviews were conducted in departments responsible for development and the economy, 
including interviews with mayors and their advisors. All interviews were conducted in municipal offices.
 
 Two problems for conducting the fieldwork were identified: the time taken to organize interviews, and 
the difficulty of organizing interviews in several municipalities. First, the arrangements of interviews with 
municipal officials usually took two-three weeks and included extensive phone/email correspondence. 
Second, several municipalities have been intensively contacted for interviews which at the end were not 
conducted. This includes ten municipalities coming from both entities, FBiH and RS. These municipalities 
refused to participate in the research due to three reasons: the public protests taking place in some of FBiH 
municipalities throughout February 2014; a lack of time to participate in a meeting; and a lack of interest on the 
issue by some municipalities.
 The duration of interviews was about one hour. The time assigned for interview was one hour, although 
we have variations between different municipalities in this respect. Interviews were organized around three 
main questions: diaspora development potential; the capacity and drive of institutions to engage diaspora in 
development; and the main advantages and obstacles for diaspora engagement in development; including the 
best practices for each segment of analysis. In accordance with the answers and set up methodology, the 
analysis integrates all interviews and presents the perceptions of municipal officials towards diaspora 
engagement in development at the municipal level. In particular, it emphasises the position of the ten SDC-
UNDP municipalities.
The project “Mainstreaming the Concept on Migration and Development Into 
Relevant Policies, Plans and Actions in BiH” aims to directly include the concept of 
migration and development into strategic documents of the local municipalities in 
BiH. The project involves ten partner municipalities of SDC-UNDP Integrated Local 
Development Project – including namely: Јajce, Ključ, Laktaši, Ljubuški, Maglaj, 
Nevesinje, Posušje, Prijedor, Sanski Most and Velika Kladuša. The project durations is 
June 2013 – July 2015 (24 months) while the available budget for implementation is 
975,568$. The project is funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation (SDC). The principal partner of the project is MHRRBiH, while the 
implementation of the first phase has been assigned to UNDP, this is in order to secure 
an efficient cooperation with the ongoing Swiss supported Integral Local 
Development Project. The local strategic frameworks are going to be complemented 
with priorities related to migrations and development. The project will come up with 
pilot actions for a process oriented integration of migration and development 
measures into local development planning in 10 selected municipalities, including the 
following steps:  i) socio-economic situation analysis; ii) design of needs based sector 
plans which are integrated into the general municipal planning scheme; iii) analysis of 
potential contributions from migrants or their groups; iv) planning of realistic 
communal projects with a partial support by migrants and co-financed by the local 
government. Capacities for an efficient and systematic migration and development 
concept promotion will be fostered among all key stakeholders of the project; this 
need has been clearly confirmed during the identification phase. At an initial stage, 
awareness raising activities about migrants' potential and roles in the local 
development context will be targeted to decision makers and managers of relevant 
policies and action plans.
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3.2.1. Identifying goals and capacities
 Goals
 Municipal officials tend to agree on the potential of the BiH diaspora to support municipal 
development, and the development of BiH overall. In their opinion, the majority of BiH migrants who left the 
country over recent decades present an important financial, human, and social resource for the development 
of their municipalities. In addition to these statements, municipal officials listed different examples of 
successful outcomes from diaspora engagement in the municipality; such as investment, transfer of 
knowledge, technology, financial support, economic lobbying, philanthropy (some of which will be presented 
below).
 In terms of diaspora investment activities, municipal officials have mentioned some good examples 
and practices. According to these municipal officials, the majority of diaspora investments at the local level are 
directed towards their own housing, either as (re)building, reparation or purchase of new apartments. There 
are also several examples of the diaspora participating in smaller municipal infrastructure projects such as 
public roads or street lights. Furthermore, there are examples of investment both through returnees' networks, 
transnational entrepreneurs, or production for diaspora needs, which have not been equally distributed 
among municipalities. According to municipal officials, for those municipalities where these kinds of 
investment activities are identified, diaspora business activities present an important asset for the local 
economy. The following quotes of the municipal officials emphasise that:
We have two companies here established with the capital of diaspora returnees. It is 
mainly the case of family business; they brought their money and knowledge to set 
up their businesses. Other examples are those who still live abroad and run 
businesses here, like a man who still lives in Sweden and has a company producing 
furniture here. 
We have one returnee from Switzerland who works in the textile industry, and he 
aims to enlarge his business by activating new capacities this spring. In addition to 
the current 100 employees, a further 200 jobs are expected to be open, whilst the 
whole production will be exported to Switzerland for the next 5 years. 
We have an interesting example of cooperation with our diaspora. There is a 
company which produces coffee, biscuits, etc. and its focus is on our diaspora in USA. 
For example, their export of 495 tons of coffee on the market targets our diaspora 
there. At the same time, investments from diaspora here frequently come from 
second-generation emigrants, who tried to implement some business ideas or open 
a branch office. Most of these activities are still rather small.
   
 In addition, these investments are frequently accompanied by a transfer of knowledge and technology. 
In the opinion of municipal officials, each investment is supported by new knowledge and technology, which 
the diaspora obtains in their country of residency. For many municipal officials, this seems to be just as 
important as the transfer of financial capital. 
 Furthermore, municipal officials cite the diaspora's financial contribution through remittances, 
diaspora spending during holiday visits, and above all, diaspora pensions. Moreover, in several municipalities 
municipal officials currently see pensions as the most important financial impact of the diaspora on the local 
economy. This was registered mostly in small municipalities and nicely presented by a state official from SDC-
UNDP municipality as follows:  
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The main positive effect of the diaspora here is actually the previous diaspora, dating 
from the 1960s. That generation is now retired and their pensions are quite high for 
our standard of living. It is estimated that we have about 1,000 retired people abroad, 
and it means that around 1 million BAM (around 500,000 Euro) every month is 
coming here on that basis. They spend all that money here, paying utilities, buying 
goods, and others, and that money circulates. 
 Cases of economic lobbying have been registered in the majority of interviews. State officials have 
mentioned various examples of diaspora individuals who provided contacts with their employers or 
institutions in the country of their residence. However, many of the initiatives based on investments have not 
been implemented. According to municipal officials, investment activities and business sector involvement 
were mainly replaced by different donations of foreign associations and individuals. Still, these donations have 
an important effect on the municipalities because of their socio-economic outcomes. Here are two examples 
from different SDC-UNDP and other municipalities respectively:
One of our citizens brought a Norwegian here who donated 40,000 BAM (20,000 
Euro) to the centre for mental health, which helped us to renovate the centre and 
integrate disabled persons better into society. They now have a space where they 
produce various handicrafts and really feel like they are a part of their society again.
After two years of sending money and clothes to the poorest families here, our 
diaspora organizations decided to find a better solution for supporting these 
families. Our local women associations in Switzerland supported financially by a 
Switzerland Women Association donated domestic animals and seeds to rural areas, 
including some other materials for the improvement of rural production. 
 Furthermore, all municipal officials agree that humanitarian work conducted by the diaspora is still the 
most dominant form of diaspora engagement in development, and it functions the best. It includes various 
humanitarian events organized by both BiH and the destination country. In most cases humanitarian assistance 
addresses individuals, schools, hospitals, public services as well as sport and cultural clubs and events. Here are 
two examples from SDC-UNDP and other municipalities respectively:
These days we are expecting hospital equipment donated by our diaspora. In 
general, the diaspora has been supporting sport clubs, cultural associations, and 
many other social activities in our municipality. 
Our local diaspora in Austria traditionally organizes humanitarian concerts. The 
collected money is then donated here. For example, one year the money was used to 
purchase an ambulance car. Another year, the donation was used for to reconstruct 
the space for children with special needs; this donation was about 30,000 BAM 
(15,000 Euro).
 In addition to humanitarian work, the majority of municipal officials mentioned the cultural exchange 
with their diaspora as the most dominant relationship. However, the majority of officials agree that neither of 
these two activities should be the primary focus of cooperation with the diaspora. They rather agree that the 
potential for diaspora engagement in development is through investment, financial support, transfer of 
knowledge and skills, and economic lobbying, and all of these practices should be further explored. The main 
reason for targeting the diaspora potential is the existence of high unemployment, which in the majority of 
municipalities reaches more than 40 per cent; lack of investment, new knowledge and new technologies. 
Furthermore, all municipal officials agree that apart from job creation, other aspects of economic and social life 
will be indirectly improved as well. At the same time, it would also help diaspora members - in particular second 
and third generations - to maintain better links and identification with their country of origin.
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 Therefore, although municipal officials are aware of the financial, human and cultural capital of 
diaspora, the identified goals, possibilities and good practices in the majority of municipalities still tend to 
present examples rather than real-life practices. Reasons for this situation are further elaborated below. 
 Capacities 
 The gap between identified goals and the unused potential of diaspora has been attributed to 
municipal capacity and their ability to utilise the financial and human potential of diaspora as well as their 
independence in decision-making. 
 According to the majority of interviews, the current capacities of municipalities towards diaspora 
engagement in development are first and foremost influenced by the existing complex institutional 
environment, as well as the unfavourable economic and political situation in the country. The opinion of all 
interviewed municipal officials in SDC-UNDP and other municipalities might be summarized in the following 
quote of a state official:
The biggest obstacle for engaging the diaspora in the development of BiH is the 
complex administrative apparatus of the state, and the even more complex political 
and economic situation. Within these circumstances it is very difficult to create an 
appropriate environment for diaspora engagement in economic development. 
 Other factors which influence the engagement of diaspora in municipal development were explained 
in more detail by some municipal officials. For all municipalities their limited institutional independence 
followed by an inadequate distribution of resources, as well as investment in and supply of public facilities, have 
a strong impact on the level to which the diaspora contributes towards municipal development. As has been 
explained by municipal officials in both SDC-UNDP and other municipalities, the limited independence of the 
municipality in respect to the cantonal, entity and state level prevents them from offering anything more to 
their diaspora than they do to other domestic and/or foreign investors at the local level: 
Within the cantonal institutional level, our independence is very limited. The upper 
institutional level created some legal instruments which mean that all profits made 
at the local level go to the higher level. It was the same case with the former 
privatization process. Privatization of big companies in our municipality was done 
under entity and cantonal directives. They took all ex-companies under their 
property, and therefore our capacities in that respect today are very limited. All that 
we can offer to diaspora now is probably just our land.
We can offer the diaspora all stimulation investment funds that we have at our 
disposal. But that is very limited, since we have very small budgets for such kind of 
support. This situation has been affected by factors which limit our capacities for 
investors, including the diaspora. The redistribution of taxes collected at the local 
level and various forms of permissions for public facilities are still under entity 
responsibility. So, even when we have some investments in our municipality the 
profit doesn't remain here, we don't get money back from taxes and we can't 
influence the issuance of various permissions. 
 In several municipalities the municipal officials underlined their unequal opportunity to participate in 
the various grants and stimulations offered at entity level. They further explain that although the municipalities 
are directly linked to the entity level, such as the case in the RS entity, there are still lot of difficulties in vertical 
collaboration, including the entity and the state level as well. The municipal officials from SDC-UNDP and other 
municipalities respectively emphasize:  
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Our capacities for investment are rather limited. But everything we have is to serve 
investors, including the diaspora. There is also a problem related to property-legal 
issue, which is also under the responsibility of the entity, including changeable fiscal 
policy, work habits, etc.
Here we have much easier access to information and we can apply to open calls made 
by ministries at the entity level. But, the problem is that everything finishes up in the 
hands of the several big municipalities. I am afraid that the same might happen with 
the programmes addressing diaspora.  
 At the same time, the majority of municipal officials at the municipal level agree that the lack of 
institutional cooperation and their limited independency in different areas should not prevent them from 
further collaborating with their diaspora. What is more important to recognize is that the municipal officials 
rely rather on their own capacities to achieve that. As it has been explained by the municipal officials from SDC-
UNDP and other municipalities respectively:
I think we can do a lot as a municipality. For example, one returnee from Switzerland 
obtained grants from the Swiss government which he invested in the textile industry 
here. From our side, we connected him with the cantonal, federal, and state 
ministries where he was able to obtain grants and support as well. We are willing to 
do that for all our diaspora.
I think that the EU and the world understand that it is hard to make anything here at 
the state level, so they are trying to take another direction. So, if collaboration is hard 
to make at the state level, then we should be fully focused at the local. Although the 
BiH diaspora likes the country, I am sure they are more tied to their local 
municipalities. 
 Therefore, the interviews indicate that the diaspora and development relationship at the local level is 
twofold. First, we recognize that the municipalities are often targeting diaspora to activate their potential 
engagement in local development. Second, we recognize difficulties and a lack of municipal capacity to activate 
the diaspora's potential in development. In order to further explore a potential link between the two we shall 
continue to investigate the current state of informational resources (i.e. databases) and communication, as 
well as diaspora trust and mobilization at the municipal level. 
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3.2.2. Mapping BiH diaspora
 Database 
 According to the municipal officials, a database that provides information on numbers, education, 
gender, skills, ethnicity, status in host country, and other relevant information, is crucial for establishing a strong 
relationship with the diaspora. Although the majority of municipal officials are unofficially informed about the 
countries where most of their local population are settled, the relevant databases do not exist in any of the 
examined municipalities. Consequently, several municipal officials gave approximate numbers for their 
diaspora, estimated on the basis of different indirect parameters. For example, they rely on indicators such as: 
preliminary results from the census of 2013, registered private property, summer visits, and those temporarily 
absent from the local municipality. In some other cases, municipal officials demonstrated attempts to create 
their own database. However, we have not identified a fully successful municipality in this respect. We quote 
here the municipal officials from SDC-UNDP and other municipalities respectively: 
In our strategy for 2006, we planned a project aiming to establish a database on the 
economic aspects of our diaspora (all citizens from our local municipality who run 
successful businesses outside BiH). We didn't have the capacity to do that, and we 
didn't have any support from outside. So, it has never been implemented. 
We opened a call for the diaspora to register on our own webpage. But, the results 
were very disappointing and I am afraid to say that the diaspora is very careful in 
providing relevant information. There is a clear lack of trust, as the diaspora thinks 
that we just want to take their money.
According to municipal officials, these problems are accompanied by a lack of information at the other 
levels. As has been directly stated by a municipal official:
I was in Washington in the BiH Embassy several months ago. When I asked how many 
people form BiH live there and where I can find products from BiH, they simply didn't 
have an answer. I am also sure that the Ministry of Civil Affairs of BiH should have 
information about the BiH diaspora, or some other institutions at state level. They 
should help us to identify our diaspora.
 To a degree, municipal officials agree that having an official and comprehensive database on the BiH 
diaspora could be advantageous for establishing initial contacts with the BiH diaspora. In their words, 
communication with the diaspora would be easier if it were backed by official statistics.
 The majority of municipal officials do not define the diaspora in the context of the state. For the majority 
of them the diaspora is understood and defined in the context of locality, ethnicity, time and geography. 
Furthermore, in most of our interviews these four concepts interrelate in defining the diaspora. In the context of 
the locality, municipality officials see diaspora as the local population settled around the world over different 
periods of time and for different reasons. It is frequently mentioned that diaspora is divided to the different 
emigration flows: emigrants of the 1960s (economic), 1990s (war and family reunification) and today 
(economic, marriages, education, seasonal). Furthermore, the diaspora is usually considered as first, second 
and third generation. In several cases, the diaspora is understood equally in the context of ethnicity and locality. 
For example, this is almost always the case in situations where the majority of the population in the local 
municipality belongs to the same ethnic group, and where there was no internal movement of population 
during the war and afterwards. In all these cases, the municipality officials are aware of the geographic context 
of diaspora; the countries where the majority of diaspora currently live. There are also examples where the 
diaspora are understood in terms of economic and non-economic diaspora; those with registered businesses 
abroad and others. Yet, in all cases municipal officials link the absence of a database to difficulties in establishing 
communication with the diaspora, which is explained below.
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 Communication 
 In addition to the absence of a relevant database, the majority of interviewed municipal officials agreed 
that the communication presents the biggest challenge for them. On the one hand, the current communication 
with diaspora proceeds with a lot of difficulties. On the other hand, the improvement of communication is 
crucial for any of the further planned activities with the diaspora. This particularly targets the second and third 
generation expatriates who have slightly lost their connection with BiH. The majority of opinions coming from 
both the SDC-UNDP and other municipalities could be summarized through the quote of a municipality official:
We have to establish a good communication with our diaspora, in particular with the 
second and third generation – they are our hope but they are losing connections with 
us. We have let them know that they should not be afraid of giving information to us 
and of our attempts to be in contact with them. We should keep sending them the 
message that they are part of this municipality and each segment of the society 
should be devoted to that goal! 
 According to the words of municipal officials in the SDC-UNDP and other municipalities, the current 
communication is not sufficient and in the majority of cases it proceeds with a lot of difficulties. Currently, 
communication with the diaspora is organized around three levels: individual contacts, collective meetings with 
the diaspora during holiday times, and through communication with hometown associations (if they exist). At 
the individual level, contact with the diaspora usually refers to individual requests for need-fulfilment or to 
express interest in investment, a better business environment, wider possibilities for cooperation, and so on. 
These contacts are organized via e-mail or direct contacts, as well as visits by diaspora members to their 
municipalities. As a municipality official has explained:
We have been contacted by our diaspora mostly through individual initiatives. They 
send requests about some personal issues, or ask for some documents like 
development plans, investment environment, etc. In some cases they prefer to be in 
contact with the mayor. 
 However, contact with the diaspora has been identified in several SDC-UNDP and other municipalities. 
They have been organizing summer meetings with their diaspora during their holidays. The meetings are known 
as “Days of diaspora” (Dani Dijaspore), and their main goal is to gather together the local population and 
diaspora through sport, cultural and economic activities. However, the outcomes of these meetings have varied. 
In only two cases of these municipalities have the results been quite encouraging. This has been explained by the 
municipal officials:
We organized the first diaspora business forum which gathered about 300 
representatives of the diaspora and local entrepreneurs, municipal officials, 
governmental and nongovernmental organizations and others. Within two days of 
intensive presentations and round-tables on various issues, I think we achieved great 
results, and opened a door for further collaboration in this field.  
We have been organizing days of diaspora for years. Just in 2012 the municipality 
council decided to organize “Days of diaspora”, with the intention of institutionalising 
it as a traditional event. Up to now, summer meetings with the diaspora are used to 
socialize the local population with its diaspora – through music, meals, dance, etc. No 
concrete activities relevant for development were implemented.  
 Finally, there are several examples of communication with the diaspora through different hometown 
associations. According to municipal officials from non SDC-UNDP municipalities, the communication organized 
with representatives of hometown associations is quite satisfying:
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We have several hometown associations in Switzerland such as local and women 
associations. The majority of their activities, including the “Days of diaspora” are 
organized in cooperation between us. The representatives of our municipality 
participate in all activities organized in Switzerland, and vice versa. We also arrange 
many activities through our common agreement.
We have the best communication with two hometown associations; one from 
Austria, and the other from Germany. Both are of a humanitarian nature and all 
communication and cooperation with them has been very good!
 However, apart from these examples, other municipalities face difficulties in communicating with their 
diaspora. In several examples attempts to initiate communication with their diaspora have actually failed. Some 
of the interviewed municipal officials mentioned open calls to diaspora through their web page, organized 
meetings with entrepreneurs from the diaspora, invitations to co-opt the diaspora into the development of the 
municipality, and similar programmes. In all these cases, positive results have hardly been achieved.
 
 Considering the current stage of communication, all municipal officials indicate an insufficient 
communication with the BiH diaspora. These officials recognize a clear gap in communication with the diaspora, 
mainly due to the following reasons: the absence of a database, the lack of state initiatives to engage the 
diaspora, the general lack of state responsibility towards the BiH diaspora, but also, the lack of diaspora trust in 
BiH institutions. The following quotes of municipal officials support these statements:
The diaspora care for their local municipalities but they are very much disappointed 
with their treatment by the state. 
I think that the diaspora wait for municipalities to make the first steps towards their 
engagement in municipal development. I think the establishment of a special 
committee that could work with the diaspora, maintain a database, etc., would be the 
best solution. We actually need to change the local community's perception about its 
diaspora and let the diaspora know that we care for them and that they have their 
own place here. Note, we are now talking about new generations who do not even 
know the local language.
We have to work on our database and contacts with the diaspora. We should not 
scare them with that database but rather introduce them to our activities and 
possibilities here firstly. We have to convince them that there are lot of possibilities 
here. For example, in comparison to the countries of their residency, our diaspora is 
full of prejudices that our banks are not good, our administration is bad, etc. We have 
to change their prejudices.
All the emotional capital of our diaspora has gone. They don't trust in our institutions 
anymore. They always see us as somebody asking something from them. If we want to 
keep them, we must approach them as our partners; not as our donors.
 In addition, some municipal officials see a lack of hometown associations and lack of information and 
knowledge about the diaspora and development policies as important obstacles. 
 Finally, in all examples, municipal officials regard the deepening of relationships with the diaspora as 
requiring them to build a relationship of trust between the diaspora and local municipalities, and to mobilize the 
diaspora in sustainable development through a partnership relationship. This particularly refers to various kinds 
of business forums (cooperation), as a starting point, which should have its impact on all other aspects of lives. 
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 3.2.3. Trust and mobilization of diaspora
 
 In light of the aforementioned, municipal officials have similar ideas about creating a relationship of 
trust and mobilization with diaspora. The aim of all municipalities to utilize diaspora potential for development 
is seen through attempts to institutionalise their relationship with the diaspora. Different experiences among 
different municipalities have been registered. There are two municipalities who have institutionalized their 
relationship with the diaspora; ten SDC-UNDP municipalities who are in the process of institutionalising their 
relationship; and eight municipalities who have listed the institutionalization diaspora relations as one of their 
development goals. 
 In the two examples mentioned, institutionalized relationships with the diaspora happened recently, 
over the last two years. In the both municipalities, the initiatives came from municipalities, which recognized the 
potential of diaspora through the high number of their citizens living abroad and their close links to the local 
society. As the first step, municipalities supported the establishment of hometown associations in the country of 
diaspora residency, which further created a base for other kinds of cooperation in different aspects of economic, 
social and cultural life. As a step forward, they also established a “Diaspora department” with one or two 
employees. The main aim of these departments is to provide diaspora with all required support in terms of 
administration, information, and other areas of interest. This is nicely explained by a municipal official from a 
non SDC-UNDP municipality:
We first contacted our people in three countries, where they are settled. Only in one 
did we manage to establish a hometown association. After that, we have continued to 
collaborate with them in all fields. If, for example, they are organizing an event of a 
humanitarian character, we usually give advice on the project that it might be best to 
focus on – in terms of financing here in our municipality. It is always hard to be trusted 
by people there, so we also provide a person in our municipality to work just with 
them. Now, they have a person here who works just for them.
 In other municipalities, institutionalization has been supported by the implementation of new 
migration policies supported by SDC-UNDP. In accordance with this project, the ten municipalities embedded 
their diaspora as a partner in development strategies, and included them in several development programs. 
 For the majority of interviewed municipal officials in the SDC-UNDP municipalities, the initial goal is to 
improve the communication with their diaspora through the establishment of a database and an organized 
economic forum targeting their diaspora. Afterwards, these activities should lead to the implementation of 
various common projects from different developmental fields such as investment, tourism, agriculture etc. 
Several examples have been mentioned by the municipal officials from SDC-UNDP municipalities:
We have participated in the SDC-UNDP migration and development project, and this 
is our first initiative related to diaspora and development issues. We are planning to 
create a database of our diaspora, and to organize an economic forum. We also have 
some other small projects with our diaspora, but our main hope is to work on 
common investment projects that include the diaspora.
We expect a lot from the SDC-UNDP project. We have already failed in our attempts to 
mobilize diaspora; but I think by supporting this program, and taking a more 
organized approach towards diaspora, we can regain the trust of our diaspora. We 
have plans to include the diaspora in our development projects in tourism and 
agriculture. 
I expect that through the SDC-UNDP project we will finally get knowledge and all 
other forms of support to mobilize our diaspora and make them our partners in the 
development of our municipality.
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 Furthermore, of the ten SDC-UNDP municipalities, three already have an active diaspora engagement in 
development plans and strategies. As the municipal officials explain, the diaspora has been invited to give their 
opinions on creating plans and strategies for development through the participation of their representatives. In 
addition, it has been organized via an open call on their municipality webpage, where the diaspora could present 
their opinions and suggestions for these plans and strategies. Some examples are given by the municipal officials 
below:
We had an open call on our webpage for our diaspora asking them to give suggestions 
and ideas about our development strategy. We are quite satisfied with their 
responses.
Whilst we drafted the development strategy, we included a representative from our 
diaspora. He attended several meetings, where he presented his opinions and ideas 
about diaspora engagement in activities for municipal development. Later, it was 
hard for him to come to all our meetings. He also mentioned problems faced whilst 
trying to contact our diaspora abroad. They were all sceptical about his attempt – 
since they used to just being asked to donate! We are now aware of what we should 
work more on – improving the trust of diaspora towards our municipality!
 A similar lack of diaspora trust towards BiH institutions has been shared amongst other municipalities 
who attempted to institutionalize the relationship with their diaspora. According to some municipal officials, a 
lack of trust and lack of capacity will not be easy to offset now:  
In 2006, through our development strategy, we decided to establish cooperation with 
successful diaspora in Croatia, Austria and other EU countries. Unfortunately, we did 
not have the capacity to do that, and I am afraid that it now might be too late to do 
anything; we lost an opportunity to mobilize our diaspora after the war, and to use 
their willingness to do something for their country. We really need to work hard to 
change their perceptions.
Via our web page, we have encouraged our diaspora to share their opinions, to send 
us their requests, to criticize our work, and many other things, as well as to agree to 
meet us. I have to say that I am very disappointed with the response. We received only 
several responses. And I don't see any changes to that trend. But we will keep working 
on that for sure. Our diaspora is our best potential. 
 In other cases, municipal officials acknowledge that there are no institutional initiatives towards 
diaspora engagement in development at the moment. According to their words, the municipality recognises the 
potential of diaspora, but a lack of knowledge about linking diaspora to development, as well as collaboration 
with other institutions in BiH, influences further engagement in this field. According to the words of a municipal 
official:
We are aware of the potential of our diaspora. I think it is really good idea to work on 
the relationship between diaspora and development. Just, honestly, we still don't 
know how to do that. 
 
 Finally, all municipalities expressed a strong willingness to adjust their programs and strategies to 
improve collaboration with the diaspora, which is a promising sing. 
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3.2.6. Conclusion
 In this analysis we investigate perceptions of municipality officials towards diaspora engagement in BiH 
development. We interviewed 25 municipal officials in twenty municipalities defined as two groups: ten where 
SDC-UNDP support migration and development policies – “SDC-UNDP municipalities” and other from both 
entities.  
 
 We identify a consistent opinion about importance of diaspora potential in supporting BiH 
development. All municipal officials recognize the potential of diaspora engagement in development of their 
municipalities – investments, transfer of knowledge, technology, financial support, economic lobbying, and 
philanthropy. Majority of the municipal officials presented different positive examples from the ground to 
confirm their statements. However, due to the high unemployment, lack of investments, knowledge and 
technologies, the municipal officials in these municipalities still give priority to financial assistance of diaspora, 
and slightly less to the human or social capital. Furthermore, their goals and existing practices in their 
municipalities are influenced by lack of municipal capacities for relevant institutionalization of the relationship 
between the diaspora and development. In addition, they are further challenged with a lack of comprehensive 
databases, communication, trust and mobilization of diaspora.
 First, the municipal officials indicate that capacities and abilities of the municipalities to utilise diaspora 
potential for development are affected by existing complex institutional environment and non-desirable 
economic and political situation in the country. The limited institutional independence in respect to cantonal, 
entity and state level is followed by a lack of adequate distribution of resources, public investments and supply 
of public facilities. Furthermore, the examined municipalities have huge disparities in the achieved 
development. Therefore, within this institutional environment and uneven development, the current state of a 
link between diaspora and development, majority of the municipalities rely on their own available capacities. 
What they often do is relying on existing capacities offered to domestic and/or foreign investors at their local 
level. At the same time, all municipalities stated that their limited independency should not prevent their 
further collaboration with their diaspora. 
 Second, majority municipal officials argue that a lack of comprehensive diaspora database presents an 
important obstacle which needs to be overcome in order to improve communication and collaboration with the 
diaspora. At the moment, there is no official database about diaspora in any of the municipalities in both groups. 
However, sometimes we get impression that the lack of database is used as a nice excuse for not doing more, 
especially at the municipal level where it is much easier to identify its diaspora and establish communication 
with it. In addition, the municipal officials in all municipalities often refer to the definition of diaspora in terms of 
locality, ethnicity, time and geography, rather than in the broader context– BiH diaspora.
 Third, majority interviewed municipal officials recognize difficulties in communication with its diaspora 
and a need for improvement. They believe that this particularly targets the second and third generations of 
emigrants who have been losing their contacts and connections with BiH. At the moment, the communication 
between municipalities and diaspora is organized around three levels: mostly through individual 
contacts/requests, and less through collective meetings with diaspora during holidays, including “Days of 
diaspora”, and organized collaboration with diaspora associations, in the case that they exist. This includes both 
groups of municipalities. 
 Forth, majority municipal officials see further potential of diaspora engagement in development 
through creating a relationship of trust between the diaspora and local municipalities. In other words, the 
officials recognize institutionalization of the relationship with diaspora as a step forward. To that end, different 
experiences are noticed on the ground. There are two non SDC-UNDP municipalities which have 
institutionalized their relationship with diaspora; ten SDC-UNDP municipalities who are in a stage of 
institutionalization of their relationship with diaspora; and eight non SDC-UNDP municipalities who attempt to 
institutionalise their relations with diaspora in their development goals. In several cases, diaspora has also been 
participating in establishment of municipality development strategies. 
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 To conclude, the diaspora potential for supporting development of the municipalities has been 
recognized by all municipal officials. As it is obtained through this analysis, some municipalities have a rather 
developed relationship with their diaspora established through a good and frequent communication, various 
economic and cultural activities, and hometown associations. However, the complex political and economic 
environment followed by a lack of municipal own capacities, including a lack database, difficulties in 
communication, and unsatisfied current state of the trust and mobilization, are identified as the main challenges 
towards a grater diaspora engagement in the development. 
 The current initiatives of institutionalization of the relationships between migration and development 
in the context of the SDC-UNDP municipalities should improve the diaspora engagement in development at the 
local level. Although our initial intention was to give more comparison between the SDC-UNDP versus “other” 
municipalities, the obtained results suggest that we cannot say much at this stage. The main reason is that it is 
still early to assess the results of SDC-UNDP-MHRRBiH pilot project and whether the actions in the pilot lead to 
some structural improvements. Currently, we can see very few differences between the two types of 
municipalities. However, there is a tendency to formalize/institutionalize diaspora relations in SDC-UNDP 
municipalities, but it is not clear whether this has actually had a significant impact on the current diaspora 
involvement as well. Apparently, this will need to be assessed with a certain time lag, including the analysis of 
the diaspora side as the response on this initiative.
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3.3. Analysis of ex-diaspora entrepreneurs' perceptions
3.3.1. Introduction
nd
 The latest Doing Business report has ranked BiH as 132  out of 189 countries for ease of doing a 
business (IBRD/WB, 2013). While such a position is problematic, a more worrying signal is the fact that little has 
improved over the last few years. BiH currently holds the lowest position in the South East European region. 
Apparently, running a business is characterized by a number of challenges and obstacles. The Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (2008) based on firm-level survey data identifies the following 
business obstacles as the greatest: tax rate, political instability, corruption, tax administration and access to 
finance. Similarly, UNODC (2013) report identifies the following obstacles to doing business in BiH: high taxes, 
complicated laws, political instability, labour regulation, limited access to finance and corruption. Both reports 
rank mainly institutional causes/failures (e.g. taxes, laws, regulation and corruption) to be the most 
problematic, including political instability.   
 In order to get more insights into starting and running a business in BiH, we examine entrepreneurs 
who are ex-diaspora. Accordingly, this analysis deals with entrepreneurs who have been abroad, who have 
probably had some experience in doing businesses outside BiH, and today, from a distance, can judge the 
business environment and their personal successes, advantages, disadvantages, and business obstacles they 
face.
 The main purpose of this chapter is to investigate successful and to some extent unsuccessful ex-
diaspora entrepreneurs in doing their businesses with the main focus on determinants of their success/failure. 
The analysis is based on semi-structured interviews. The chapter is organized as follows. After introductory 
section we present qualitative analysis starting with sample characteristics, personal information of 
interviewed entrepreneurs, their migration experience and business performance of their companies. The 
penultimate section is focused on business obstacles; the last section concludes the chapter. 
3.3.2. Sample characteristics
 The planned sample for this analysis was 20 businessmen; we effectively deal with 23 entrepreneurs 
who satisfied the main criteria; all of them are ex-diaspora, they returned to BiH and mainly brought the initial 
capital for their businesses. Overall, we conducted or tried to get in touch with some 30 entrepreneurs; hence, 
the response rate was quite high. We relied on snow-ball method in searching for these entrepreneurs since 
there is no any official data about these kinds of businesses. Initially, we started snow-balling in four cities 
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where the team members identified ex-diaspora entrepreneurs . It was challenging to identify them, not least 
because there are a relatively small number of ex-diaspora entrepreneurs on the ground, to our knowledge. 
 The final sample covers quite proportionally two entities in BiH (FBiH 10 and RS 13), all ethnicities 
(Bosniacs, Croats, Serbs, and Others), different sectors of the economy, companies of different size (the codes 
of interviewed entrepreneurs with basic information is available in Appendix C). In the end, the interviews were 
conducted in 13 different cities throughout BiH (namely, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Gorazde, Jajce, Zavidovici, 
Tesanj, Teslic, Banja Luka, Gradiska, Kotor Varos, Ilidza, and Celinac) and the period of interviewing was from 
mid-August to the beginning of October 2013. 
25
 The duration of these interviews was between 45 minutes and one hour . The questionnaire had some 
23 basic questions (often, the interview led to some additional questions) and four main sections, including 
personal information, migration experience, business performance of their companies and obstacles in doing 
24
 These cities are: Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Goražde and Zavidovići.
25
 This includes introduction of the project, explanation of the purpose, interviewing and related conversation.
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their businesses. Not all examined questions were relevant for all entrepreneurs and for some questions they 
used to provide quite short and quick answers, making interviews in some cases quite short. However, 
preparation of the interviews (introduction) and later informal chat lasted usually longer. In these off-the-
record discussions (which often was more rich and intense), the majority of interviewed individuals discussed 
the current effects of economic crisis on their businesses; hence, about some short run problems they have. 
Our questionnaire does not focus on the current global crisis, which was, generally, the main topic of these off-
the-record conversations.
 The majority of interviewed individuals were willing to talk about their businesses, migration 
experiences, and future aspirations. Moreover, we felt a sort of satisfaction amongst them that „someone“ 
identified them as businessmen who returned to BiH, decided to stay, run their own business, and mainly 
succeeded in their intentions. The majority of them were proud that they are in BiH and doing successfully in 
their businesses and, on average, we could not identify or feel any sort of desire to emigrate again. We discuss 
below some of the most interesting findings from these four sections.  
3.3.3. Personal information
 All interviews were conducted with owners of their businesses and in the majority of cases they were 
also the managers/directors of their companies. There is only one example of a company in which the 
interviewed entrepreneur has 50% of ownership (all others own 100%). The average age of interviewed 
individuals is 50 years, the majority of them are married and have families, and the majority of them have not 
completed a university degree (30% have a university degree). On average, these companies have 11 
employees, although the distribution is not normal in the statistical sense. There are only a few companies with 
over 30 employees and the majority of others have up to 10 employees. Accordingly, in the sample we deal with 
small and a few medium-sized companies. The total revenue is reported in the range from 4,000 up to 
7,000,000 Euro. The majority of companies were established in the beginning of 2000s, and only one before the 
war (1986). Finally, a dominant sector in which these entrepreneurs run their business is the service sector 
(around 50%), the remaining businesses are located in sectors such as trade (some 20%); industry (15%); 
agriculture (10%); and others.   
3.3.4. Migration experience
 The migration experience of interviewed individuals is primarily (85% of cases) linked to the war period 
(1991-1995) and there are only a few cases of before (3 examples) and after the war migration (3 examples). 
The average time spent abroad in the sample is six years. Half of the interviewed individuals report that the 
main reason for emigration was the war; the second largest group give the economic situation and search for 
employment, and the third largest group studying incentives. Interestingly enough, around 80% of individuals 
were successful in finding employment abroad and only three respondents were unemployed. The main skills 
gained abroad are very diverse and linked primarily to the type of employment, including experiences such as 
the following:
I gained my whole skill set abroad. This includes project management, project 
implementation and product sales. 
My experience is working and only working. I was abroad with my whole family and 
we have always been working together. We had learnt the importance of quality in 
your work and did not rely on any support. 
Discipline, work, different business skills such as business organization, managerial 
skills, transferring knowledge. 
The main skills I gained outside BiH are cooking and catering. I was working with 
cruise companies and, practicaly, for five years did not touch the ground. This helped 
me to learn about all world cuisines. 
Language, work and life experience which I would never gain here. Nevertheless, I 
was in number of places even before migration. 
Professional experience, life experience and 100% of my experiences in all aspects of 
life. Language: I speak English now, I was studying French. 
 Around 60% of respondents claim that diferent emotional links and nostalgia are the main reasons for 
returning to BiH; but this is sometimes combined with some other arguments (e.g. patriotism, economic 
support to the country). The second reason for returning was those who were pushed to move back by their 
host countries, and the remaining reasons include arguments such as family, business, assets, and support to 
economic development. Here are some interesting quotes that explain different reasons for return:
I came back because I could not stay there since I could not get all necessary 
documentation. If I had got the papers done, I would stay. However, now, I would not 
leave my country even if I could get the necessary papers to leave.  
The main reason for return is nostalgia and desire to support making BiH a “western” 
economy with a business climate that will simulate the West to come here. I would 
like to see that we employ workers from Germany. My desire is also to improve the 
economic environment. 
My spouse was taken to the army, my children were alone and I had to come back. 
But honestly, I was not happy at all in that particular country. Probably if I was in 
another country it could have be different. The life of people there is miserly to me. 
And I told to myself, it is better to go to my own country where I have assets, where I 
have something that is mine, rather than living in some strange houses and sleeping 
on couches.  
It is a desire to bring skills and knowledge that I gained abroad to my own country, to 
my home city. I wanted to help the development of this country and in addition I was 
slightly tired of moving from one place to another. 
I returned to live and establish my family here, where I am at my own place. I was 
everywhere on my way back to BiH, but I feel the best at my home. 
 Around 90% of respondents returned to the municipalities they lived in prior to migration, suggesting 
strong return links to initial pre-migration localities. Apparently, it is an important indication that ex-diaspora 
entrepreneurs are more linked and interested to run their businesses in their home municipalities. 
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3.3.5. Business performance
 An absolute majority of respondents claim that they have not received any form of financial or non-
financial support when they decided to run their own business in BiH. However, in three cases they got financial 
support for establishing their businesses from entity authorities. One of these companies grew into a medium-
sized company (26 employees), which has an important role in the BiH food market and has expanded its 
business outside BiH as well. In all other cases, the initial capital was mainly brought from abroad, and on 
average, it was around 70,000 Euro, with substantial variations between different cases. On average, these 
entrepreneurs who invested more in the initial period are today bigger companies in terms of number of 
employees as well as reported revenues. Still, there are examples of very little investment in the initial period 
and large success today (some examples for which we have all necessary data are reported in Table 3.3.1.)
 Table 3.3.1. Initial capital, revenue and number of employees
FIRM ID SECTOR INITIAL CAPITAL REVENUE 2012 NO. of EMPLOYEES
1 SERVICE 200,000 200,000 6
2 SERVICE 2,000 300,000 12
4 INDUSTRY 20,000 2,000,000  30
5 TRADE; SERVICE 1,000,000 2,500,000  21
6 AGRICULTURE 2,000 50,000  2
7 TRADE 20,000 350,000 10
10 TRADE 50,000 500,000 2
11 SERVICE 10,000 250,000 7
13 SERVICE 400,000 2,000,000  36
15 TRADE 2,000 13,000,000  16
19 INDUSTRY 380,000 1,300,000  26
20 SERVICE 50,000 8,000  1
21 SERVICE 500,000 42,000  3
Note, initial capital and revenue 2012 are reported in the local currency, Konvertibilna Marka (BAM).
The current exchange rates are: 1 Euro=1.95 BAM; 1 CHF=1.58 BAM. 
 In order to investigate the correlation between initial capital, total revenues and the current number of 
employees, we estimate simple pair wise correlations between these variables (not available for the full sample 
but for the listed companies). Although the sample is very small, we can still get at least some intuitions from 
these coefficients. Since we have one quite obvious outlier in the sample (Firm ID 15), we exclude it from 
calculations. 
 The correlation coefficient between initial capital and total revenues in 2012 is quite high (0.61), and is 
statistically significant (p-value is 0.0356). Accordingly, we have some indication that the level of initial capital is 
correlated with the latter success. Those entrepreneurs who invested more in the initial period are more 
successful today in terms of the total revenue reported. This is in line with general economic theory and 
practice. The correlation between the number of employees and initial capital is also positive, being 0.36, but 
not statistically significant. Finally, the number of employees is highly correlated (coefficient=0.88; p-
value=0.0002) with the total revenue reported, and again, in line with our expectations (Table 3.3.2). It would 
be interesting to run an empirical model with these determinants and to compare these results with non-
diaspora entrepreneurs, but we do not have useful data for these purposes. 
Table 3.3.2. Pairwaise correlation - initial capital, revenue and number of employees
INITIAL CAPITAL REVENUE 2012 NO. OF EMPLOYEE 
INITIAL CAPITAL 
1,000 
 
  
REVENUE 2012 
0.61 
(0.0356)
 
1,000
 
 
NO. OF EMPLOYEE 
0.36 
(0.247)
 
0.88 
(0.002)
 
1,000
 
Note, p-values are reported in parentheses. Calculated in STATA 12.
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I think there is enough space for everyone; they just need to be determined.
 It is worth fighting for BiH, and that fight is not over in the economic context. 
It is only important to have a good idea because people in BiH are willing to work. 
 
Honestly, I am disappointed with diaspora. If they think about coming to BiH, they 
need to think how BiH will survive or quite soon they will not have a place to come to. 
The diaspora does not have appropriate interest for BiH. Some concrete activities by 
diaspora should be undertaken, e.g. more investment into agriculture.
There are a lot of projects in BiH which deserve attention, such as agriculture and 
fruit-growing.
It is logical that the diaspora should invest in BiH. There is a lot of money here (at least 
in the context of natural resources and potential).
Diaspora should be careful. They should study laws and carefully examine all 
business aspects before making decisions.
I do not recommend anything before politicians make some joint efforts in this 
respect.
If some asked me where to invest and make a quick profit, I would invest in tourism 
and catering. I would recommend investing in BiH.
They should firstly open their eyes, conduct a detail research and examination, and 
then decide whether to invest.
It worth investing in BiH but this should be done with trusty people... I would 
recommend the diaspora to invest in BiH and the main reason is to keep our 
resources from foreigners and from destruction. We have so many rivers; if we only 
work with rivers... It is sad what we are doing to our forests. 
 One of the questions/suggestions that we wanted to get from ex-diaspora entrepreneurs is their 
recommendation to potential BiH diaspora investors. Interestingly enough, the responses are very 
heterogeneous although the general conclusion would be that it is worth investing in BiH but some caution is 
needed. A lot of them recognize the BiH diaspora as an economic potential that is not properly activated. We 
summarize here shortly the most interesting responses: 
 A policy to support the engagement of BiH diaspora entrepreneurs should involve the greater 
involvement of government, particularly in the regulation of administrative and institutional barriers that 
potential investors currently face. The majority of interviewed entrepreneurs believe that the diaspora policy 
should be located at the state level, although a good number of them emphasize the importance of the local 
level too. Overall, the state and municipality institutional levels are identified as the most important for any 
potential policy that should be activated to promote diaspora involvement in BiH development. 
3.3.6. Business obstacles
 One of the sections in the ex-diaspora entrepreneurs' questionnaire was focused on obstacles they 
face(d) as citizens as well as business people. The absolute majority of respondents claim that they did not have 
any sort of specific problems as citizens, returnees, after coming back to BiH. However, as businessmen they 
quite agree that the main obstacles they faced and face even today are related to administrative and 
institutional barriers. Among these barriers they also listed some related issues such as corruption, taxes, lack 
of skilled people in public administration, general business climate, mentality, judiciary, local government, and 
police. They were quite clear in saying that these barriers were not linked to their status as ex-diaspora 
entrepreneurs, but as sort of general barriers that everyone was/is facing in this country. At least, this is a clear 
indication of non-discriminatory (institutional) behaviour towards ex-diaspora entrepreneurs. Still, some 30% 
of respondents claim that they did not have any particular barriers when they were starting their businesses. 
Among those who report some obstacles we quote a few interesting cases, including two with the opposite 
experience (the last two):
 
A slow administration and a desire to get permissions authorised as slowly as 
possible, or if possible not at all. There was no protection by institutions. 
A state relationship towards business people, corruption, taxes; well, the whole 
system and the state.
These were primarily problems of an administrative nature. My husband and I – after 
years spent abroad in different countries – were shocked by how much time it took 
to register and start our own business. There was a huge problem in finding 
appropriate employees as well; in this case, foreign language professors with 
appropriate quality. 
There were a lot of barriers, but the first was mentality. The state should 
acknowledge that these (diaspora entrepreneurs) people are needed here. ... At the 
local level it is necessary to organize such a system when businessmen come they 
should have their “own place” to adopt and adjust to the environment. Local 
communities should have their own centres, sort of mini agencies for investment, 
which entrepreneurs could use to go through dozens of rules in an easy way; sort of 
advisory centres. 
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There are some particular examples where it is worth investing. However, one must 
first think of certainty, and also of profit. No-one will invest here without the 
possibility of making a profit. 
It is the most important that they clued up about the business environment in BiH. 
And certainly they will need some support, at least for a few years when they decide 
to start a business here. They should not expect positive results immediately; it takes 
time like for everything. Probably, joint ventures with domestic partners are the best 
solution.
We did not have any problems; we came with a lot of money, and the gates were 
open to us everywhere. But, we were nervous because of all the administration, but 
still, we completed everything in about fifteen days. 
Well, there were not any obstacles. People are just talking about it.
 Coping with these and other barriers is always challenging and the majority of entrepreneurs report 
that they relied mainly on the support of family, friends and professional colleagues, but did not really on 
support from abroad. Informal institutions (reliance on support from family, friends, colleagues and similar) in 
BiH are an important determinant that is used to support the inefficiency of formal institutions and something 
which has already been identified in this country (e.g., Efendic et al., 2011), as well as being consistent with our 
findings. However, it is rather unexpected that external (diaspora) business links seems to be rather weak.  
 Although businessmen are quite critical about the general business environment, the majority feel that 
some improvements have been made since they started their businesses, and on average, in the majority of 
cases this was at the beginning of the 2000s (the simple average is 2002). Entrepreneurs regard the main reason 
for the success of their businesses as being their personal efforts, commitment, enthusiasm, experience, and 
only a few emphasize the skills they gained outside of BiH. Interestingly enough, the interviewed entrepreneurs 
do not identify links or networks with the current BiH diaspora as an important advantage for their businesses, 
which suggests that ex-diaspora entrepreneurs are more locally and domestically linked with the market and 
business environment. 
 In the questionnaire, we examine future business growth aspirations and it is possible to identify a 
limited optimism in some 40% of cases, whilst in a few cases the entrepreneurs are very pessimistic and expect 
the closure of their businesses. It is important to stress that the majority of entrepreneurs claim problems they 
face because of the current economic crisis in BiH and the region (especially in the off-the record conversation), 
which might affect their concerns related to the growth of their businesses. 
 In the sample we have two entrepreneurs who failed in running their own businesses. In the first case it 
is example of an international language school established in 1995, while in the second, it was a construction 
firm established in 2008. Both individuals today are employed; one is a self-employed individual producer. 
However, it is interesting that in both cases they invested some 20,000 Euros, started their businesses, had 
some initial success, but after a few years decided to quit. In the context of the foreign language school the main 
reason for failure identified by the respondent was problems with employees, i.e. insufficient human capital. In 
the second case, it was also a problem with employees and a lack of experience in the business. None of them 
cite failure as being due to a problem with financing their business activities, but rather due to problems in 
organizing the business with their employees.  
 What is interesting about these two examples is that even though they did not succeed in running their 
own businesses, they have remained in BiH and both encourage the diaspora to invest in BiH. What they say is:
 
Diaspora should invest in BiH, at least to try. Although I did not succeed in my 
business, ... I still think that potential investors should try to invest for some reasons 
other than purely financial gain, and to try to implement their ideas. But they should 
be aware how much energy and effort is needed for this activity in BiH.
Diaspora needs to focus more on BiH because of their patriotic, moral and social 
responsibilities.
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 3.3.7. Conclusion
 In this analysis we deal with responses from 23 ex-diaspora entrepreneurs obtained through face-to-
face interviews aimed at identifying their migration and business performance. 
 The migration experience of interviewed individuals is primarily (85% of cases) linked to the war period 
(1991-1995). The average time spent abroad in the sample is six years. Half of the interviewed individuals 
report that the main reason for emigration was the war, on the second place it is economic situation and search 
for employment. Interestingly enough, around 80% of individuals were successful in finding employment 
abroad and only three respondents were unemployed. Finally, around 60% of respondents claim that different 
emotional links and nostalgia is the main reason for return to BiH, in the second place are these who are pushed 
to move back by the host countries, and the remaining reasons include arguments as family, business, support 
to economic development. Around 90% of respondents returned to the municipalities where they lived before 
the migration. It is an important indication that ex-diaspora entrepreneurs are more linked and interested to 
run their businesses in their home municipalities. 
 Almost all of the ex-diaspora entrepreneurs emphasize BiH diaspora as an economic potential that is 
not properly activated. The policy that should support engagement of BiH diaspora entrepreneurs see primarily 
through a greater involvement of government and primarily in the regulation of administrative (institutional) 
barriers that potential (diaspora) investors currently face. In addition to the main economic barriers, mentality, 
business climate and lack of entrepreneurial spirit was emphasised as well. Overall, the state and municipality 
institutional levels are identified as the most relevant for any potential policy that should be activated to 
promote diaspora involvement in BiH development.
 
 The main reason for the success of their businesses, ex-diaspora entrepreneurs see in their personal 
efforts, commitments, enthusiasm, experience, and only a few emphasize the skills they gained outside BiH. 
Interestingly enough, no one of the interviewed entrepreneurs have identified links with the current BiH 
diaspora as an advantage for their businesses. Overall, this suggests that the ex-diaspora entrepreneurs remain 
to be more locally and domestically linked with the market and business environment.
Jusuf Arifagić 
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 In fact three quota groups were used: 1) returnees, 2) internally displaced during the war and non-migrants, and 3) non-migrants and non-
internally displaced. In the following analysis we do not distinguish between the internally displaced and non-internally displaced non-migrants. 
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 3.4. Analysis of BiH population's experiences and perceptions
 3.4.1. Introduction
 We conducted a survey to find out more about migration intentions among the BiH population and 
returnee migrants. Face-to-face computer aided surveys were carried out in July 2013 with 600 adults of which 
200 were returnee migrants and 400 non-migrants. A migrant was defined as an individual who had lived for 
three or more months outside of BiH.  Although often migration surveys only categorise individuals who have 
lived for more than 12 months outside their country of origin as migrants, we did not want to exclude 
temporary or circular migrants. Three months should be a long enough period to exclude tourists from our 
sample. 203 returnee migrants were interviewed to discover some insight into the migration experiences of 
returnees. 
 
 We used quota sampling to ensure a large enough sample of returnee migrants. Quota sampling allows 
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us to ensure a reasonable number of returnees in our sample . However, using a quota means that the 
individuals within the returnee and non-migrant groups are not picked entirely at random and we do not know 
the probability of selecting each respondent. As a consequence we do not know how representative our 
sample is of the general population. 
 The questionnaire covered the following topics:
  - socio-demographic characteristics of respondents
  - migration experiences (for returnees only)
  - connections to the diaspora 
  - migration intentions
  - opinions on how the diaspora could help the development of BiH.
 3.4.2. Migration destination
 The majority of returnee migrants had moved to EU15 states (116 out of 203 respondents – see Figure 
3.4.1), with largest number having returned from Germany (73 individuals). This is likely to be due to the large 
size of the BiH diaspora community in Germany, but also the fact that Germany did not grant permanent 
settlement status to BiH refugees in the 1990s. Of the 320,000 refugees Germany received between 1992 and 
1995; 246,000 had been repatriated to BiH by 2005 (Valenta and Ramet, 2011). Most returnee migrants had 
spent their entire migration experience in one host country, with just 7 respondents indicating that they had 
settled in more than one country (3%). Most of these individuals had first migrated to a neighbouring country 
(Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia) before moving to the country where they spent most of their time abroad. 
 
 Figure 3.4.1. Migration destination of returnee migrants
 Information given: migration destination, percentage and number of returnees who migrated to the 
destination.
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 3.4.3. Migration characteristics
 As discussed in Chapter 1, there are three distinct periods of BiH migration: pre-war (before the 1990s), 
the war period (1992-1995) and the post-war period. Each period of migration is covered in our sample: the 
earliest migration experience we captured being in 1964 and the latest 2013. Furthermore, these three periods 
correspond to different causes in migration: economic migration dominating in the pre- and post-war periods 
and war-related migration in the war-period. 
 15% of returnees sampled migrated between 1964 and 1989, the pre-war period, with departures 
reasonably evenly spread across this period (see Figure 3.4.2). Almost all of these individuals migrated to find 
work or get a better job (30 out of 32 individuals or 94%). The returnees who migrated after 1997 (23% of the 
sample) also listed these economic factors as the main reasons for migrating. Although, 21% of post-war 
returnees indicated that family reunion was their main reason for migration, a factor not mentioned by the pre-
war respondents. 
 Figure 3.4.2. Years of migration and return
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 Most of returnees migrated during the war. 120 out of 203 returnees or 59% migrated between 1990 
and 1996, with peak migration period in 1992 and falling off at the end of the 1990s. This pattern seems to 
match general migration trends (for example a 2010 survey of BiH migrants conducted by MHRRBiH and IOM). 
79% of individuals who migrated between 1990 and 1996 stated that fleeing the war was their main reason for 
leaving. It is unsurprising that the majority of returnees belong to the war period of migration. This period 
witnessed the largest outflow of refugees – between 1992 and 1995 more than 1.2 million BiH citizens left the 
country and settled abroad (IOM/IASCI, 2010). 
 9% of returnees, 31 in total, indicated that they were circular migrants, and 15 had migrated three to 
ten times. The latter group tended to migrate for short periods, three to twelve months to find work or a better 
job (12 out of 15 respondents). Both males and females are equally represented in this group and the ages of 
these individuals run from 23 to 66 with evidence of circular migration across all time periods (1972 to 2013).    
 86% of returnees sampled returned to BiH after 1996. All returnees were asked the main reason for 
their return in an open question so that we would not influence their answer by them giving options to choose 
from.  It is evident that the majority of migrants were attracted back to BiH because of personal ties to family 
and to the country rather than direct economic reasons. 27% (53 out of 200) of our returnees came back to BiH 
for family reasons such as being closer to relatives or getting married (see Figure 3.4.3) and another 26% (52 out 
of 200) returned because they liked living in BiH and wanted to come back home. Others returned to retire, due 
to their studies ending or for job opportunities. However, some returned because they were no longer able to 
stay – 22.5% no longer had the papers required to stay in their host country and 7% no longer had a job. 
 Figure 3.4.3. Main reason for returning to BiH
Main reason for returning to BiH
%
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 3.4.4. Connections to the diaspora
 The results of our survey suggest that the majority of adults living in BiH have connections to the 
diaspora. 75% of respondents (451 out of 600) have friends and family in the BiH diaspora. Unsurprisingly, 
individuals who have migrated are more likely to have contacts in the diaspora - 90% of returnees have 
connections to the diaspora compared to 68% of non-migrants. 19% of non-migrants have immediate family 
members living abroad such as their wife, husband, children or parents, but most non-migrants (57%) have a 
member of their extended family living abroad. For returnee migrants the figures are considerably higher: 31% 
have immediate family members living abroad and 81% have extended family abroad.  
 Figure 3.4.4. Connections to the diaspora
 It appears that many individuals in BiH have regular contact with members of the diaspora - 47% of 
respondents state they are in contact with family or friends in the diaspora at least a few times a month.
 Around one in five respondents received remittances in the past 12 months from members of the 
diaspora. Whilst it seems that the receipt of remittances is quite common, it is less frequent than interviews with 
BiH officials suggested. Most households used their remittances to pay for everyday consumption (81%), rather 
than to pay off debt, to invest in land/housing, businesses or add to savings. A larger percentage of returnee 
migrants received remittances compared to non-migrants: 27% to 16%. However, we find no relationship 
between household income level and receiving remittances: there is no statistically significant difference in the 
proportions low, middle and high income households and the receipt (see Table below). There also does not 
seem to be a relationship between age and receipt of remittances.
 Table 3.4.1. Remittances and household income relations
Connections to the diaspora
Household received 
remittances in the last 
12 months
  
Household income 
 
Low
 
Medium
 
High
 
No
 
190
 
248
 
36
 
 
79%
 
80%
 
88%
 
Yes
 
51
 
61
 
5
 
 
21%
 
20%
 
12%
 
Total
 
241
 
309
 
41
 
  
2
Pearson    X  =   1.7756    p -value = 0.412
Fisher's exact  =                   p -value = 0.436
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 3.4.5. Migration intentions
 Migration intentions from 2013 survey
 Respondents were asked if they would leave BiH and settle abroad if they had the chance and 55.8% of 
respondents said that they would leave and more than half of these would settle abroad permanently (see 
Figure 3.4.5 below). Returnees are more likely to respond that they would move abroad once again if they had 
the chance. Although it appears from Figure 3.4.5 below that there are differences between percentage of 
returnees and non-migrants in whether they would consider temporary versus permanent migration, these 
differences are not statistically significant. 
 Figure 3.4.5. Aspiration for emigration
 However, only 17% respondents had any concrete plans to move abroad for more than three months. 
Hence, most individuals who would migrate if they had the chance do not actually have any plans to migrate. 
Yet, returnees are much more likely to have concrete plans to move abroad than individuals with no migration 
experience: 34% of returnees have plans to move abroad versus 8% of non-returnees. 
 Pull-factors rather than push-factors dominate as the reasons why individuals would like to move 
abroad. Most individuals who indicate that they would move abroad if they had the chance would like to move 
abroad for better opportunities (see Figure 3.4.6 below). The standard push factor, migration due to the poor 
economic situation in the country of origin, is only cited by 6% of those surveyed. However, whilst those 
individuals who only would consider moving abroad temporarily focus more on finding work or getting a better 
paid job, those who would move abroad permanently seem more pessimistic as the majority indicate that they 
do not see a future in BiH for them or their children and that they think they will obtain a better standard of 
living abroad. Interestingly, only one respondent gives education as a reason to move abroad.
If you had the chance would you leave BiH and settle abroad?
48.0% (187)
36.9% (73)
44.2% (260)
18.7% (73)
24.2% (48)
20.6% (121)
33.3% (130)
38.9% (77)
35.2% (207)
Note, frequencies given within brackets
65
Figure 3.4.6. Main reason for migration
 Table 3.4.2 below shows various socio-demographic characteristics of individuals who would migrate if 
they had the opportunity against those who would not; there are some differences. They tend to be younger, 
their mean age is 38 compared to 57, and be educated to secondary school level. Positively for the brain drain, 
individuals with higher education do not seem to be more likely to emigrate, only 10% of those individuals who 
would migrate have completed higher education compared to 12% who wouldn't migrate. Yet 10% of 
respondents who are considering migrating are students than compared to 1% who are not. This statistics is 
likely to be influenced by the role age plays in migration – younger people are more likely to migrate. We can see 
the influence of age on the relationship between occupation and willingness to migrate in the fact that 42% of 
individuals who would not consider migrating are retired, compared to 8% of individuals who would migrate. 
These patterns are similar when comparing individuals who have plans to migrate and those who do not. 
Interestingly, returnees are more likely to consider moving abroad and much more likely to have plans to do so. 
The relationship between socio-demographic characteristics and migration intentions is analysed in more 
detail below and the findings from this further analysis match the patterns described here.
Main reason respondents would migrate
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Table 3.4.2. Plans for migration
No migration 
plans  
Migration 
Plans  
Would not 
migrate  
Would 
migrate  Total  
48  38  57  38  46 
46%
 
58%
 
46%
 
49%
 
48%
 
8%
 
1%
 
13%
 
2%
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27%
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62%
 
78%
 
49%
 
77%
 
65%
 
11%
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12%
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44%
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45%
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8%
 
22%
 
19%
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59%
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 Migration intentions – empirical investigation of the data 2000-2010
 As a next step in our investigation, we utilize the UNDP EWS survey database (2002-2010) and apply 
relevant econometric methodology to answer the questions of interest here: What are the main determinants 
of aspirations for migration out of BiH?; What is their influence in terms of magnitude or strength?; What is the 
rank (importance) of these determinants?. 
 
 In this empirical investigation we analyse data from the household sector BiH.  A series of quarterly 
surveys were conducted over the period 2000-2010  by a professional survey agency to support the UNDP 
project „Early Warning System“. 37 waves of data were collected, leading to over 66,000 observations overall 
(1,800 observations per survey, on average). There were some deviations between years regarding the 
implemented surveys (i.e., not for all years in the observed period we deal with four surveys, but in some case 
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with less). In addition, not all variables of interest are available for the whole period , which makes that 
effectively we will have a sample of around 45,000 individuals and time span 2002-2010.
 Although this is a household survey, we deal with individual responses (only one individual per 
household) from  adults who are citizens of BiH. Each individual was randomly selected for the interview based 
on the sample criteria. The sample is representative of entities in BiH, regions, municipalities, ethnic groups, 
genders, and urban/rural areas. A unique feature of this dataset is that it was designed to capture socio-
economic determinants, including the question of our interest – aspirations of respondents to leave the 
country, or more precisely, adult population who is willing to migrate abroad. 
 We start by examining the main question (the dependent variable) in our empirical analysis: „If you 
have a chance, would you be willing to leave BiH and settle abroad?“. The aggregated and disagregated 
responses are available in the table below.
 Table 3.4.3. Aspirations to migrate abroad
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 Note, variable capturing if respondents are employed or not is available from 2002. This variable has a significant effect in the model, 
we have theoretical reasons to include it, and finally, the model fit is highly improved if this variable is included in the model. Accordingly, 
the baseline model starts from 2002, while in our robustness section we will report the results without this variable and with the full 
sample 2000-2010. 
If you have a chance, would you be willing to leave BiH and settle abroad? (%)
 
FULL SAMPLE 2000-2010
 
AGE
 
EMPLOYMENT
 
EDUCATION
 
GENDER
 
% BiH Young 
 
Old 
 
Employed 
 
Not 
employed
 
Secondary
 
and high
 
No and 
primary
 
Female
 
Male
 
NO 58
 
38
 
68
 
57
 
50
 
52
 
74
 
60
 
56
 
YES 42
 
62
 
31
 
43
 
50
 
48
 
26
 
40
 
44
 
 *Note, „do not know“ responses excluded. Author's calculation using STATA 12. 
Source: UNDP BiH EWS 2000-2010 data base.
 As it can be seen from the table, there is 42% of people claiming that they would be willing to leave the 
country if they have a chance. The World Bank (2013) reports that 32% of the BiH adult population is willing to 
migrate abroad. These data are based on LITS (2010) survey and WB estimates, which means that they are not 
directly comparable to our data. Still, this indicates  a large number  of potential migrants from BiH. Recall, the 
previous chapter based on 2013 survey data revealed that more than 50% of individuals have  „migration 
intentions“.  
 
 The information that we obtain from this question is percentage of adult population (and different 
subcategories) who are willing to migrate abroad. This means that we are measuring neither real migration nor 
capabilities to migrate. In real life situations many of respondents who claim “willingness” to leave the country 
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will probably not have relevant capacities (financial, administrative, institutional, networking and others) to 
either start this process and especially to migrate abroad. Accordingly, they might face number of internal and 
external barriers to emigration; and, majority of them will not (have a chance or plan to) migrate abroad. What 
we are measuring is intentions, aspirations, desires to migrate abroad. As an indication of significant 
differences between intentions for migration (internal and external) and moving to different places, we can 
refer to WB (2013) report. This reports acknowledges that there is over 60% of adults willing to migrate either 
internally or externally in BiH, while only 17% of adult population moved in the last 20 years; hence, including 
the war induced (mainly forced) migration. Interestingly, the previous section has similar data: 56% is aspiration 
for migration abroad but only 17% of respondents are having concrete plans. 
 However, going back to the question of interest, we can see that adults' aspirations to migrate abroad 
(42%) changes between different categories of respondents being the highest for young respondents (62%) 
and those who are not employed (50%). In addition, a quite high percentage is obtained for more educated 
individuals being close to 50%. After looking these data we have initial indications that age, economic situation 
and education (human capital) might be very important determinants to investigate in our empirical modelling. 
A visual interpretation of the estimated model is below (Figure 3.4.7) while explanation of the model 
specification, descriptive statistics of variables, base-line model results and marginal effects from the base-line 
model after probit estimates are available in Appendix C. 
 Figure 3.4.7.Modelling determinants of aspirations to migrate abroad
Source: Author's illustration.
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 We find that majority of controlled variables are statistically significant at the 10% level. The 
quantitative-qualitative explanation of statistically significant influences is the following:
1. Ageing of the respondents has the largest effect in the model. The younger respondents (18-35 years) 
have a 30 percent higher probability to report aspirations to migrate abroad in comparison to the older 
respondents (36 years and over). 
2. The level of education has the second largest effect. There is an 18 percent greater probability that more 
educated individuals (secondary and higher education) have aspirations to leave BiH in comparison to 
less educated individuals (no education and primary education). This finding is an indication of potential 
brain drain phenomenon. 
3. The family income has also a quite large marginal effect. There is 14% higher probability to report 
intention to migrate out of BiH by respondents coming from families reporting their income at the „edge 
of existence“ in comparison to those who reported the average income. This probability is higher for 6% 
for those reporting their income below the average, while it has a negative effect (-7%) for those 
respondents coming from families with income above the average. Apparently, the level of family 
income is an important determinant of aspirations to leave the country; the lower the income the 
stronger is aspiration to migrate abroad.  
4. Political situation has also a strong and significant effect in the model. There is 8% higher probability to 
claim intentions for leaving BiH by respondents perceiving political situation as of worsening in 
comparison to those who are more optimistic (political situation marked as developing in the direction 
of improvement). 
 The results clearly suggest that three most important factors (i.e. the largest  magnitude) are the age of 
respondents (30%), the level of education (14%), and the (low) level of family income (14%). We have conducted 
number of additional checking of the base-line model, including a model extension with some new variables, 
distinguishing between different age and education categories and investigating interaction effects of the main 
variables in the model. These checking do not bring any new information and they are not reported here because 
of the space. 
 However, some more interesting results can be obtained by looking at the combined effects of the three 
determinants with the highest magnitudes in the model (for economic determinants we investigate interactions 
with both: employment status and family income level). The following figure presents these estimated effects in 
a visual display. To make interpretation and visibility easier, we present (below) the main graph as well as we split 
the graph into two subgraphs. 
 Figure 3.4.8. Interaction effects of employment status, age and education
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 To help understanding of the graph, one example of explanation is the following. The lowest line (blue) 
shows the probability of having aspirations to leave the country (D_OUTOFBH=1) for older individuals 
(D_AGE=0) with no or primary education (D_EDUCATION=0) and employment status:
 · employed (D_EMPLOY=1); and 
 · not employed (D_EMPLOY =0).
 Accordingly, the left-hand top extreme of the brown line shows that high-educated young people who 
are employed report 72% per cent probability of having aspiration to migrate abroad. Overall, the young 
respondents report a high aspiration to leave the country no matter if they are educated or not and if they are 
employed or not employed (always over 60%). 
 
 In contrast, for older respondents the change in the employment status (from employed to not 
employed) significantly increases probability of the intention to migrate abroad. Older respondents who are 
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not employedare estimated to have the same probability (47%) of aspiring to migrate no matter if they are 
educated or not. However, if employed, the older respondents report significantly different intentions 
depending on the level of education – suggesting that more educated employed individuals report higher 
probability (37%) in comparison to the less educated (20%). All in all, this is an indication of potential brain drain 
effect for the older respondents. 
 Next, we continue by looking interaction of the second economic determinant, the level of family 
income (the smallest level of income), age and education. Note, we include in the specification only a dummy 
for the income at “the edge of existence”. 
 Figure 3.4.9. Interaction effects of family (low) income, age and education
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 In the context of family income effect (D_INCOMEexist=1), we can see that in all combinations the low 
level of family income increases probability of having intentions to migrate abroad, no matter if individuals are 
educated or not and if they are younger or older. However, as in the previous case, there is systematically higher 
probability for young respondents, which is additionally increased by the low-income status of the family. 
Accordingly, the highest statistically significant probability of aspirations for migration abroad (82%) is reported 
for non-educated young individuals living in low-income families. 
 3.4.6. How can the diaspora help development?
 We asked all respondents in 2013 survey an open question about how they thought the diaspora could 
help the development of BiH. The vast majority (72% or 432 out of 600) replied that they thought the diaspora 
could give some form of economic assistance. Various types of economic assistance were suggested, the most 
popular being that the diaspora should invest in BiH businesses (203 respondents or 34%) whereas other 
suggested that the diaspora should give financial aid, build houses and factories in BiH or spend money in BiH.  
Another category of proposals is that the diaspora should target their support at certain sections of BiH society, 
some suggesting their relatives, others that they should target vulnerable groups, and a few respondents 
thought that the diaspora should provide scholarships and help to young people. Some respondents thought 
that the diaspora could help development by instigating political change in the country. Finally, some 
individuals did not know how the diaspora could help development (8%) and others felt that the diaspora can't 
help (7.5%). However, only a very small number of individuals felt that the diaspora did not want to help (1%). 
The other category included suggestion such as the diaspora could help BiH by returning, finding jobs for 
friends and family abroad and providing information. 
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 There is no statistically significant difference in the opinions of men and women (figure 3.4.11).  The 
overall trend in responses is similar in FBiH and RS, although there are some small differences as can be seen in 
Figure 3.4.12. More respondents in RS think that the diaspora can help through economic assistance and 
targeted support to individuals than in FBiH and fewer respondents in the RS think that the diaspora is unable to 
help.
 Figure 3.4.11. Diaspora and development – by gender
Figure 3.4.10. Diaspora and development of BiH
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Figure 3.4.12. Diaspora and development – by entity
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 3.4.7. Conclusions
 The results from this section indicate that a very large proportion of individuals in BiH have strong 
connections to the diaspora – 57% of individuals who have never migrated have members of their extended 
family abroad and many are in regular contact with their family and friends in the diaspora. However, the 
proportion of individuals who receive remittances is much smaller – in our sample around a fifth of households 
receive remittances from the diaspora. Whilst much literature emphasises the importance of remittances in 
helping the development of the country of origin, social connections with the diaspora have been less analysed 
and discussed. In this survey we can see that many more individuals have social connections than receive 
remittances. These connections indicate that there are vast social networks which keep the diaspora linked to 
BiH. Furthermore, the reasons returnee migrants give for their return speaks of a strong bond with the country: 
26% indicated that they returned because they felt attachment to BiH and another 26.5% because of family 
attachments in BiH. These social connections could provide a strong basis for encouraging greater diaspora 
engagement with the development of BiH.
 However, less optimistically, around half of our respondents indicated that they would move abroad if 
they had the chance and over one-third would like to settle abroad permanently. The empirical econometric 
investigation suggests that the highest probability of having aspirations for migration abroad is linked with 
young-educated-employed individuals (72% probability for having this aspiration) and for young-non-
educated-low family income respondents (82% probability). In the context of aging, the main effect on high 
aspirations is linked to (younger) age, and without huge differences if combined with education, employment 
and income. However, in the context of older respondents, the primary determinant of higher aspiration for 
migration abroad is linked to the employment status and family-income level, hence, being more linked to the 
economic determinants.
 Furthermore, although many returnees have been attracted back to BiH rather than forced to return 
because they could no longer stay in their host country, more returnees would consider moving abroad than 
individuals without any migration experience and many more returnees have concrete plans to move abroad 
again. It seems that more needs to be done by the government to make ex-diaspora in BiH want to stay in the 
country. 
 Finally, most individuals think that the diaspora should be able to help the development of BiH by 
providing economic and financial assistance. Investing in BiH businesses is stressed by more than half of the 
individuals who think the diaspora can help economically. Yet, many feel that the diaspora should provide 
economic aid. 
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 Conclusions
 The role of diasporas as potential contributors to development has gained a lot of attention in 
development thinking. Some even recognize diaspora as “wings of development”, “heroes of development”, 
“development agents” of their countries of origins. Diasporas are identified as potential source of financial, 
human and social capital that might be used to support development of their home countries. The diasporas' 
contributions to the development vary according to specific circumstances, background and structure, 
including in particular the size, time-dimension, integration outcomes, experience of engagement and 
individual characteristics. 
 The most recent estimates suggest that the BiH diaspora accounts for more than 50% of BiH population 
(over 2.0 million) and it is the biggest diaspora (as % of total population) in the South East European region. The 
BiH diaspora is often highly educated, well integrated into host countries and economically active. As such, the 
BiH diaspora is a potential agent that could contribute to development of its country of origin through different 
types of support. 
 
 The BiH diaspora remains to be an important source of financial capital for BiH - it sends more than 10% 
of GDP remittances annually. These remittances are mainly (81%) used to support current consumption of 
goods and services rather than to pay off debt, to invest in land/housing, businesses or add to savings. Such 
structure of remittances suggests that remittances are a short-term stabilizer for (low-income) households' 
current consumption. We find no relationship between household income level and receiving remittances. 
Over the last few years, remittances in BiH infused more money than foreign investors. However, some 
estimates suggest that financial remittances might diminish in the medium to long term. 
 Diaspora can economically contribute to its home country by providing badly-needed investment and 
improving perceptions of investment climate. The estimated average net saving of a BiH migrant household 
abroad is around 8,500 Euro per year and the total retained saving is estimated to be around 5 billion Euro  in 
2009 (around 40% of BiH GDP). At the same time, a small percentage (some 20%) of BiH migrants in EU 
countries keep even part of their savings in BiH, although the BiH banking sector is one of the most developed in 
the region. Still, some 30% of BiH diaspora plan to invest in BiH, while only 6% directly invested or provided 
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credit to businesses in BiH . Investment potential of BiH diaspora is large but remains underused. Moreover, 
each investment is supported by new knowledge and technology, which BiH diaspora has obtained in their 
country of residence, and this seems to be just as important as the transfer of financial capital. 
 Human capital – the education, training and skills embodied in the labour forces - is a key factor for 
economic growth and development. Whilst many BiH migrants may not return to permanently settle in BiH, 
they may still facilitate knowledge and skill transfers and improve human capital and economic incentives in the 
country. The existing data suggest that BiH diaspora is often highly educated (e.g. over 50% of BiH migrants have 
tertiary education in Australia, over 40% in USA and around 30% in Sweden) and can be an important source of 
knowledge transfers.
 Social capital – social networks, norms, social trust – is an important determinant of development as 
well. Migrant networks are often an important source of information about job opportunities, housing, and 
access to finance. In addition, migrant networks provide financial, social and emotional support in the 
destination country; they are a mean of transferring knowledge and resources. This research indicates that 75% 
of respondents have friends and family in the BiH diaspora and the majority of adults living in BiH have 
connections to the diaspora; 47% of respondents state they are in contact with family or friends in the diaspora 
at least a few times a month.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSIV.
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 Source of the presented data: IASCI/IOCM, 2010.
 Whilst much literature emphasises the importance of remittances in helping the development of the 
country of origin, social connections with the diaspora have been less analysed and discussed. We find that 
many more individuals have social connections than receive remittances. These connections indicate that 
there are vast social networks which keep the diaspora linked to BiH. Furthermore, the reasons returnee 
migrants give for their return speaks of a strong bond with the country: 26% indicated that they returned 
because they felt attachment to BiH and another 26.5% because of family attachments in BiH. These social 
connections could provide a strong basis for encouraging greater diaspora engagement with the development 
of BiH.
 Institutional environment for diaspora engagement (in development) affects economic, political and 
social ties to the country. A number of countries have started to institutionalize relationships with their 
diasporas. Some governments claim to be motivated by national interests such as development, whilst others 
are motivated by a feeling of responsibility to population settled abroad.
 
 The Constitution of BiH assigns “immigration, refugee and asylum policy and regulation” to the state 
level. The Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees BiH (MHRRBiH) was established in 2000 and it has jurisdiction 
over the creation of policies towards BiH diaspora – it drafts diaspora related laws and strategic document. 
MHRRBiH has a Department for diaspora that is currently one of the most active institutional units in the area of 
diaspora and development. It collects, systematises, investigates, publicises and distributes data related to BiH 
diaspora; it promotes economic, human and other potential of BiH diaspora. 
 The state level in BiH (Council of Ministers of BiH) adopted the Strategy in the Area of Migration and 
Asylum and Action Plan for the Period 2012-2015 where the goal six is Strengthening institutional capacities in 
BiH with the purpose of connecting migration and development. The strategy is in the process of 
implementation, while a Coordination body monitors the implementation of this strategy. It is too early to 
analyse outcomes of this strategy. However, diaspora engagement policies and initiatives coming from the BiH 
government(s) have been rather week in the past, although some more concrete activities are identified in the 
recent years. 
 
 The analysis of government institutions in this study focuses on the perceptions and capacities of BiH 
institutions to involve the BiH diaspora in development. At all administrative levels (state, entity, cantonal, 
municipality and the Brčko District of BiH) public officials identify different kinds of the diaspora's potential as a 
source of development, but primarily financial and human capital. State officials generally regard the diaspora 
as one of the most important financial and human resources for development in BiH, although some seem to 
overestimate the possibilities to exploit the full potential. Apparently, there is a great awareness about the 
potential that diaspora can play in development, although an economic understanding of development 
predominates. 
 There is a lack of institutional capacity for more active diaspora engagement in development. This 
limitation is primarily a reflection of the complex administrative, economic and political environment in BiH. It 
is further challenged by a limited institutional cooperation between different institutions, relevant institutional 
sectors as well as different administrative levels. 
 The majority of the state officials mention the lack of a comprehensive diaspora data, which makes it 
difficult to map the BiH diaspora and communicate with it. It is possible to identify different experiences in 
communication with the diaspora, including some examples of an organized communication with targeted 
groups and individuals (e.g. different diaspora organizations) primarily at the state level and also, to the 
contrary, examples of informal communication (e.g. through personal or local population networks) or an 
absence of communication, identified at the lower institutional levels. However, sometimes we get the 
impression that the lack of database is used as an excuse for not doing more, especially at the municipal level 
where it is much easier to identify its diaspora and establish communication with it (for example, several 
municipal officials has even presented approximate numbers of their diaspora, estimated on the basis of 
different indirect parameters they operate with).
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 Nevertheless, the communication gap with the BiH diaspora remains one of the challenges for 
mobilizing the diaspora for development. In particular, there is an urgent need to improve communication with 
the second and third generation expatriates – those born abroad. Consequently, with the exception of the state 
level, communication between institutions and the diaspora is often based on individual and private contacts.
 The investigation at the municipality level includes 10 municipalities where the project Mainstreaming 
the Concept on Migration and Development into Relevant Policies, Plans and Actions in BiH is in the process of 
implementation (SDC-UNDP municipalities) and 13 others. The project is funded by the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation (SDC) and implemented by UNDP BiH, while the responsible national partner is 
the MHRR BiH. 
 Officials at the municipal level identify many different ways in which the diaspora can contribute to 
development (including investments, transfer of knowledge, technology, financial support, remittances, 
pensions, economic lobbying, and philanthropy). In particular they refer to positive examples of the 
humanitarian and voluntary support of the diaspora in various sectors over the years.  
 The interviewed municipality officials also recognize importance of investment activities and potential 
of the BiH diaspora. They also underline that each investment is supported by new knowledge and technology 
which the BiH diaspora has obtained in their country of residence. In their view, this seems to be just as 
important as these investments .
 The municipality officials emphasize their limited independence and capacities to activate BiH 
diaspora potential compared to other administrative levels. In particular, they emphasize challenges because 
of a lack of adequate distribution of resources, investments, and supply of public facilities. Still, they are 
determined to take more concrete actions – some of them present collaborative institutionalisation of 
relations with the diaspora, as well as with other state institutions.
 Communication of municipality officials with the BiH diaspora also proceeds with a lot of difficulties, 
although we find evidence of two-sided communication. The examined municipalities report a need for a 
diaspora database to address the challenges in communication they are facing. Currently, most communication 
occurs at the individual level (based on individual requests from the BiH diaspora), more rarely at the collective 
level (organized communication involving groups). At the collective level, summer meetings, hometown 
associations and business forums dominate.
 There are existing difficulties in establishing trust and mobilizing the diaspora at the municipal level. 
There are several examples of municipalities that institutionalized their relationship with the diaspora, whilst 
there are a number of municipalities that are still (2013) in the process of institutionalization – namely, the ten 
SDC-UNDP municipalities. Accordingly, there is some evidence in three “other” municipalities that involved its 
diaspora into creating plans and strategies for development through participation of their representatives. 
Apart from this effort, the majority of municipal officials do not present a clear vision on how to establish the 
relationship between the diaspora and development. 
 Municipality officials, like officials at other institutional levels, generally believe that the diaspora do 
not trust BiH institutions. Consequently, they highlight a need for improving institutional and societal trust. This 
is identified as an important factor for greater involvement of the BiH diaspora into development and it is 
certainly linked to the improved and transparent communication as well.
 Examples of good practice have been identified by several municipalities; one of the biggest activities 
on the ground is the SDC-UNDP Migration and Development focused initiative. Irrespective of this project, the 
majority of municipalities are willing to proceed with further activities for greater diaspora engagement in 
development. The ten SDC-UNDP municipalities are in the process of institutionalizing their relationship with 
the diaspora, while only two of the others have taken similar steps. The majority of them, however, are still 
searching for a clear vision on how to establish and deepen the relationship between diaspora and 
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development. Currently (2013), there is no much difference between these two subsamples of municipalities, 
although the SDC-UNDP project is in its initial stage and the outcomes should be investigated with a certain 
time-lag. 
 The analysis of businesses is focused on (former diaspora) entrepreneurs in BiH, on the role of their 
migration experience, their current business performance as well as the business obstacles these 
entrepreneurs faced when returning to the country. The migration experience of interviewed entrepreneurs is 
primarily linked to the war (85%). The most commonly stated reason to return is emotinal links and nostalgia 
(60%), often stated alongside other arguments like being pushed back by host countries, family reunification, or 
simple business opportunities. The business skills which these businessmen have gained abroad are very 
diverse, reflecting the type of employment carried out. These skills are regarded as the main benefit of the 
migration experience.
 Ex-diaspora entrepreneurs (small and medium sized companies are dominant in the sample) do not 
identify present-day links with the current BiH diaspora as an important advantage in their current businesses 
and tend to remain more locally and domestically linked with the market and business environment. At the 
same time, different institutional and administrative barriers are identified as the most important obstacles for 
starting and later running a business. The entrepreneurs also explain that these hurdles are not related to their 
returnee situation but are general business barriers in BiH. 
 Despite the real or perceived barriers mentioned, the majority of interviewed entrepreneurs 
recommend investingin BiH. They stress normative aspects, and in their view the diaspora should have greater 
interest in BiH development, not only to make a profit, but also to make BiH a better place to live. These 
expectations that members of the diaspora should be more involved reflect the common perception that the 
BiH diaspora are still part of BiH society, irrespective of their residence abroad. At the same time, similar to the 
public officials, most interviewed businessmen emphasized the potential of the diaspora, without providing a 
fuller reflection, like concrete ideas who should do what. Interestingly, the same entrepreneurs who call for 
greater diaspora involvement also caution potential investors to be patient and to work with others who know 
local specificities.
 Ex-diaspora entrepreneurs see their business success primarily as a result of their personal efforts, 
commitment, enthusiasm and experience, whilst some of them emphasize skills they gained during the period 
of emigration as well. Interestingly, they relied a lot on the support of family, friends and professional 
colleagues (i.e., strong network ties) in coping with different business barriers and challenges. The role of social 
ties (i.e. strong ties and networks based on close family and friends) is identified as an important determinant 
(i.e. support to overcoming different challenges and barriers) in entrepreneurial activities and, presumably, in 
dealing with local specificities. Social capital plays a great role in the success of businesses established by the 
interviewed entrepreneurs, but the role of financial capital should not be ignored. 
 The initial capital invested into businesses is highly correlated with later success (in terms of total 
revenue or the number of employees). Mostly, the initial capital was brought from abroad and invested in BiH, 
while the majority of entrepreneurs relied on typical financing (i.e. borrowing from banks in BiH) in expanding 
their businesses. There are two (successful) companies in the sample that received some financial support 
from the entity authorities, although the majority claim that they did not receive any support at all.  
 Similar to interviewed officials and business people, the vast majority of interviewed individuals 
(targeted 2013 survey) think that the diaspora could play an important role in the development of BiH, listing 
diaspora investment as the most important factor. Once again, an economic understanding of development 
comes to the fore. At the same time, few of the individuals surveyed had clear and concrete ideas on how the 
diaspora should help – the view of the diaspora as a fuzzy and largely intangible potential seems to be 
dominant, yet much hope is placed into them. For most respondents some of the more concrete diaspora-
related activities are: the (social) contacts they have with members of the diaspora as well as the (financial) 
remittances they receive from members of their family and friends living abroad. 
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 Like in the case of ex-diaspora entrepreneurs, for the majority of former migrants' social capital was 
central in the decision to return to BiH – rather than direct economic reasons. This is reflected in the high 
proportion of respondents citing family reasons and that they like living in BiH (including responses such as: 
strong personal ties to the family, being closer to the family, being closer to relatives, getting married, missing 
the country and living in BiH, having wanted to come back home), and a low proportion of respondents citing 
job opportunities in BiH. 
 
 Most households in BiH (around 50%) have a strong (social) connection to the diaspora, namely regular 
contacts, often as frequent as a few times a month. Around one fifth of households receive regular (financial) 
remittances (this percentage is larger for former migrants). Not surprisingly, most households use them for 
everyday consumption of goods and services (81%). A larger percentage of ex-migrants receive remittances 
compared to non-migrants. 
 Despite social reasons to return to BiH, and the nostalgia highlighted by some entrepreneurs in the 
previous section, an overwhelming percentage of the population consider leaving BiH in the future – hence, 
they constitute a potential that could be missing for development at some point. Only a rather small percentage 
has concrete plans (17%), but these figures still highlight that the very idea of emigration remains popular in 
BiH. This also implies that the attachment to BiH is somewhat ambivalent: economic, political, and social 
factors can yield contradictory pressures with unknown consequences for future development. 
 The highest aspirations to emigrate can be identified for the young (30% increased probability of 
wanting to emigrate in comparison to older); those with higher levels of education; those with low incomes; 
those who see the political situation as worsening; and those not employed. 
 In all examined models, age is the most significant factor for migration aspirations. Young respondents 
who are neither highly educated nor employed or living in low-income families are the most likely to want to 
leave the country (around 80% probability). This situation might indicate a 'young' human capital drain; a 
category of the workforce particularly relevant for the long-term development of BiH.
 The final implication of the research is that the BiH diaspora's potential engagement in development is 
very endogenous – interlinked – to the internal economic, political, institutional and societal challenges. An 
improved economic and political environment, greater institutional efficiency and coordination, an improved 
societal trust, ... – are just recommendations that are beneficial to the general performance of BiH but also a 
stimulus for a grater engagement of diaspora in BiH. 
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 Recommendations 
 There is very strong evidence that state officials at different administrative levels in BiH, interviewed 
businessmen and individuals recognize the (economic and non-economic) potential of the diaspora as a 
contributor to development. However, there is a need to develop a better understanding and a clearer vision in 
BiH about how the diaspora and development should be connected. Particularly, some public officials seem to 
seek support in how they can tap into the potential the diaspora promises to be. Hence, diaspora and 
development is a concept welcomed by all examined sectors, while little is known (on average) how to make 
this connection operational, efficient and feasible.  
 While typical and the most visible financial supports (i.e. remittances, investment) of diaspora are 
regarded as a good way to support development, the study reveals a presence of social capital that is already 
established and built with the BiH diaspora. In addition, the role of human capital is identified as an essential 
aspect of development but this is also a side of development potential that remains underused. Apart financial 
contributions to development, the role of human and social capital of diaspora deserves more attention – 
among both, researchers and practitioners-policy makers. 
 Although there is a general institutional framework for potential diaspora participation in 
development, still there is a need to improve institutional capacities (organizational, legal and financial) for 
more active diaspora engagement in development. Currently, there is a lot of heterogeneity in the institutional 
environment, approaches, communication, capacities, policies, activities. In particular, there is need to 
improve institutional environment that will enhance a better institutional cooperation between different 
institutions, sectors and institutional/administrative levels working on diaspora and development issues. 
 It is necessary that institutions in BiH work more on building trust with the diaspora, and this goes hand 
in hand with better communication, transparency and exchange of developmental ideas. In addition, a better 
communication should stimulate cultural and other forms of social collaboration between the BiH diaspora and 
BiH institutions.
 
 Public institutions at all levels should be more proactive in introducing the diaspora to local people 
through positive examples and practices in order to dislodge some existing stereotypes about the diaspora. A 
more active engagement of the local and diaspora media is an important factor in presenting and welcoming 
diaspora's role in development.
 Ex-diaspora entrepreneurs emphasize the necessity of a greater involvement from government(s) in 
the regulation of administrative and institutional barriers that potential (diaspora) investors currently face in 
BiH. Simply, a more entrepreneur-friendly environment should be created by institutions. This implies that 
diaspora related policies and actions are very much linked to the internal problems in the country – anything 
that improves business environment is actually increasing incentives of diaspora engagement in development 
as well.
 The BiH diaspora is still interested to invest in BiH, but firstly, in their local municipalities. And this 
should be an important starting point – there is a need to link particular projects (localities) to particular 
members of the diaspora. To achieve better involvement of diaspora entrepreneurs, there is a need to improve 
communication between entrepreneurs through various activities such as business forums, conferences, 
workshops, projects, as well as presenting the best examples on the ground. 
28
 Source of the presented data: IASCI/IOCM, 2010.
82
 Business networks of ex-diaspora SMEs tend to be developed locally, with little use of external 
(diaspora) network ties. There is a need to support local entrepreneurs engagement with external diaspora 
networks, which can be a key mechanism to support investment from a migrant's host country to BiH (either 
through direct portfolio investment or foreign direct investment), as well as to increase access to international 
finances. It is important to improve (institutional) mechanisms for exaggerating benefits of social networks and 
other forms of social capital for establishing transnational entrepreneurship.
 If policymakers wish to reduce migration and potential loss of human capital in the medium to long-
run, they should develop policies focused on keeping citizens in BiH. Currently, the policy priority is to support 
economic prosperity and political stability; hence, job creation, economic prosperity and better institutional 
efficiency, focusing in particular on younger generations. Although it is not a direct migration policy, indirectly it 
will be the best way to encourage ex-migrants and the local population to stay in BiH and be an active part of 
development.
 There are more individuals that have social connections to the diaspora than financial connections 
(remittances), but these connections need to be activated more often to be beneficial for development in BiH. 
There is a need to create a better environment for facilitating the advantages of strong social networks and 
maximising the benefits of support received through various channels such as philanthropy and humanitarian 
work. 
 Only every fifth BiH migrant in EU countries keeps some savings in BiH although the BiH banking sector 
is one of the most developed in the region. The diaspora should be stimulated to keep some saving in the BiH 
banking sector. Some activities could include, for example, tailored saving accounts for diaspora, greater 
transparency and a strong marketing strategy. 
 It is already time to devote special attention to the young members of the BiH diaspora that might lose 
connection to the country; hence, the diaspora potential that is currently identified might diminish from year to 
year in the near future. How to keep younger diaspora generations linked to the country is certainly an 
important research task. In addition, this should be a vital focus of diaspora policy for relevant institutions in 
BiH. 
 In order to increase the interest of the diaspora in development activities in BiH, public policies should 
be established in such a way as to not only ask “what the diaspora can do for BiH” but also “what the BiH 
government(s)/institutions/others can do for diaspora (investors)”, in terms of legislation, policies, procedures, 
building trust, and exchange of ideas and practices. In this way a two-sided communication will be fostered. 
There is a need to develop diaspora-specific policies that will facilitate investment in BiH, cultivate a sense of 
connection between BiH and diaspora, and encourage social-status recognition of diaspora investors in BiH. 
Diaspora investments, remittances, social capital and know-how activities should become a part of 
developmental policies in BiH – development agencies/actors and diaspora networks should be institutionally 
coordinated and be recognised as partners in BiH development.
 We end this section by citing an entity official – the statement which in a few sentences elaborates a lot 
– a vision, a responsibility, a policy implication:
We usually talk about the diaspora as somebody who has to give 
something to BiH. But, I think that BiH has to give something to its 
diaspora. There should be a two-sided communication, and that 
communication must be organized. The interests of both parties 
must be recognized and united. Our diaspora, I mean our people who 
have money, ideas and a vision – if you tell them what is the quickest 
and best way of investing in BiH – they will come.
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 Appendix  A
 
 The Foreign Investment Promotion Agency (FIPA) is a state agency which promotes BiH as a location for 
foreign investment, strengthens the  business climate, maintains current foreign investment and advocates FDI 
policy. They provide all information on the BiH business environment and offer services for investors. They are 
improving cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the diaspora on FDI promotion abroad. FIPA 
cooperates with the Council of Ministers, Entity governments, the Brcko District of BiH, Cantons and 
Municipalities, and other relevant organizations in BiH (FIPA, 2012).
 In terms of institutional organization for the BiH diaspora, the World Diaspora Association of BiH 
(WDABiH) explains itself to be an umbrella organization for BiH diaspora. It was established in 2002 at the first 
BiH Diaspora Congress and has made connections with all major diaspora organizations throughout the world. 
Headquartered in Birmingham, UK, at the global level, WDABiH aims to be recognized as an independent non-
government institution by the UN bodies. In addition, WDABiH is promoting the establishment of a Ministry of 
the BiH Diaspora as the main institution in BiH responsible for the BiH diaspora, but this seems to be a rather 
ambitious plan considering the current political establishment. The Sixth Congress of WDABiH was held in July 
2012 in the Parliamentary Assembly BiH with help from MHHR. Participants of the Congress acknowledged that 
none of their previous requests had been accepted and implemented by institutions in BiH.
 In November 2012 WDABiH organized a meeting in Germany, where they gathered members of this 
organization from various countries, representatives from BiH political institutions such as MHRRBiH, 
Parliament of FBiH and many others. They talked about the recent activities of the BiH diaspora and the 
familiarity of Bosnian citizens with these activities. One of the topics of this meeting was the relationship of the 
BiH government with the diaspora, and it was concluded that this should be improved and intensified. 
 They demand that the BiH authorities implement the activities they have adopted. They are striving for 
the legal regulation of native language training for the children of BiH natives abroad, the opening up of cultural 
and informational centres in countries with a large diaspora, the simplification of voting processes for BiH 
natives abroad, and the better organization of census (WDA, 2013).
  The Bosnian-Herzegovinian American Academy of Arts and the Sciences (BHAAAS) claims to be “a 
voluntary non-profit, non-governmental, non-partisan, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural organization, whose 
purposes are exclusively educational, scientific and charitable”. The Academy aims to provide connections 
between BiH scientists, artists and professionals in North America and to build bridges of cooperation with 
their homeland. It was established in North Carolina in 2007. They have 200 active members and since 2009 
they have organised and participated in various activities and events in cooperation with MHRRBiH, Academy 
of Sciences and Arts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and universities and local authorities in BiH (BHAAAS, 2013).  
  NAUK is an association of BiH scientists, artists and prominent individuals in their professional fields, 
who live and work in the Netherlands. The purpose and aim of this organization is the expansion and 
development of science and art in the BiH diaspora residing in the Netherlands (NAUK, 2013).
  APU Network engages academics, entrepreneurs, artists and cultural workers originating from BiH in 
order to create more jobs and better business opportunities and to promote entrepreneurship and BiH culture 
in Sweden (APU, 2013).
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  In September 2012 APU Network participated in the “Connexchange BiH” conference which was held 
in Tuzla. Besides the APU Network, a few BiH organizations, entrepreneurs, teachers and international 
organisations which operate in BiH also took part in the conference. “Connexchange” stands for connections 
and exchange so the administration of Stockholm, the employees of its Office for voluntary return and Social 
guide Centres exchanged and transferred knowledge with conference participants. 
 The last but not the least, it is worth mentioning that in 2009 the Party of the BiH Diaspora (SDBiH) was 
founded in BiH. SDBiH is registered in BiH and also in Sweden. In their Statute they claim that they aim to 
politically organize the BiH diaspora and to contribute to the development of BiH, primarily through European 
and global integration. SDBiH can hardly be considered as an influential party on the BiH political scene. SDBiH 
went practically unnoticed in the 2010 general elections and did not participate in the 2012 local elections. 
Among the other objectives they are making an effort to ensure the right to vote for returnees, internally 
displaced persons and refugees in all the places of their pre-war residence, and to protect voting rights for the 
BiH diaspora. 
 
 There are a good number of international organizations which directly and/or indirectly focus on the 
issues of the BiH disapora.
 The Office of the High Representative (OHR) is an international institution responsible for monitoring 
implementation of the civil aspects of the GFPA. The High Representative is cooperating with citizens, BiH 
institutions and the international community to help BiH on the way towards Euro-Atlantic integration. The 
mandate of the High Representative is set out in Annex 10 of the GFPA, prescribing the role of OHR as crucial for 
the GFPA. The Peace Implementation Council (PIC) and OHR are closely linked. PIC is a group of 55 countries and 
international organisations which sponsor the peace implementation and nominate the High Representative. 
The UN Security Council considers the nomination and decides further actions (OHR, 2013).
 The World Bank (WB), together with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
and the European Commission (EC) has supported post-war reconstruction and development in BiH. According 
to the World Bank Country Program Snapshot, over 20,000 public apartment units and about 2,000 private 
houses were repaired. They supported the reconstruction of 2,300 km of roads, 41 bridges, 3 tunnels and the 
reconstruction of the Sarajevo Airport. The WB helped create 200,000 jobs by managing two microfinance 
projects. Over the last 15 years the WB has financed 67 projects to the sum of approximately $1.72 billion (WB, 
2012).
 The Delegation of the European Union to Bosnia and Herzegovina (formerly the Delegation of the 
European Commission) was established in 1996. In accordance with an EU Council decision of 2011, the 
authority and jurisdiction of the EU Special Representative (EUSR) and the Head of the European Union 
Delegation Office were delegated to Peter Sorensen. The EU Delegation in BiH is responsible for explaining and 
implementing EU policy, whilst promoting EU interests in relation to, amongst other things: foreign and security 
issues; commerce; transport; and health and safety policies. Through the Instrument for Pre-accession 
Assistance (IPA) they support reforms with financial and technical help, preparing BiH for the rights and 
obligations that come with EU membership. 
 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is the United Nations development network 
established in 1966, which transfers knowledge and experience to countries in which they operate. The UNDP 
also builds and fosters partnerships with other key development actors. Currently, they are carrying out their 
activities in 177 countries and territories. UNDP in BiH has been supported by UNDP's global framework since 
1996. The major financial contributions to UNDP in BiH are provided by the Governments of the Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Japan and Switzerland, alongside the European Commission (UNDP, 2013).
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 The Integrated Local Development Project is funded by the SDC and implemented by UNDP. The first 
phase of the project was finalized in 2009 and resulted in a standardized methodology for integrated and 
participatory local development planning. During the ILDP implementation, special attention was devoted to 
strengthening inter-municipal cooperation and linking migrant resources to the development of municipalities 
with a larger number of migrants.  
 At the international level, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is an important player 
which focuses on building the capacity of the BiH Government to manage migration according to EU standards. 
IOM in BiH aims to work with governments, international and national stakeholders, and civil society to 
promote migration management, international cooperation, and practical solutions to managing migration in 
the region (IOM, 2012). 
 Finally, the NGO community in BiH is rather large, diversified, focused on different issues, has different 
goals and policies, and can be recognized as a potential player here as well. According to the Bureau for 
Humanitarian Issues (IBHI), in 2008 there were around 12,000 registered NGOs in BiH (IBHI, 2009). Currently, 
there are 48 active NGO networks with more than 1,600 different organizations. It should be emphasized that 
the Union for Sustainable Return and Integrations in BiH is a member of the European Citizen Action Service 
(ECAS). The Union for Sustainable Return and Integrations in BiH was founded in 1993 as the Association of 
Refugees and Displaced Persons of BiH (ARDP), and in 2002 was registered under the current name. From 2002 
they have provided services for employment and economic related issues, as well as the social integration of 
returnees (Union for Sustainable Return and Integrations in BiH, 2011).
 Note, this list could be much longer, but for  the reasons of space and focus of this research we end it 
here. We do apologise in advance to all of those which should be here but are not presented.
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 Appendix  B
Note, the following codes are used: SN – officials at the state level; SE – officials at the entity level; SC – officials 
at the cantonal levels; SL – officials at the municipality level. 
Institutional level  No. 
Codes of state  
officials * 
The position of state officials/the name of the institution 
1 BiH 3
 
SN
 
The Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees, the Unit for 
Cooperation in the Areas of Economics, Education and Culture, 
Head of the Unit
 
  
SN
 
Head of the Investor Support Department, FIPA
 
  
SN
 
Head of the Department for Coordination
 
-
 
Department, 
Implementation of Social Inclusion, BiH Directorate for 
Economic Planning
 
Entities 
      
2 FBiH
 
2
 
SE
 
Assistant Ministry, The Ministry of Resettled Population and 
Returnees
 
FBiH
 
  
SE
 
Assistant minister, The Ministry of Entrepreneurship and 
Development
 
FBiH
 
3 RS 3
 
SE
 
Professor at the University Banja Luka, EX Officer of the 
 
Ministry of Refugees and  Displaced People RS
 
  
SE
 
Department of the Displaced People and Minorities, the City of 
Banja Luka
 
  
SE
 
Head of Department for Macroeconomy and Development, 
 
The RS Chamber of Commerce
 
4 Brcko District 
 
1
 
SE
 
Head of the Division
 
for Economic Development, Brcko District
 
Cantons
      
5 Unsko-Sanski canton
 
2
 
SC
 
Ministry
 
of  Economy, Usko-Sanski Canton
 
  
SC
 
Advisor of the Minister of Economy, Usko-Sanski canton
 
6 Posavski canton
 
1
 
SC
 
Assistant
 
minister, The Ministry of Health, Labour and Social 
Politics, Posavski Canton
 
7 Tuzlanski canton
 
2
 
SC
 
Assistant minister, The Ministry of Economy , Tuzlanski Canton
 
  
SC
 
Assistant minister, The Ministry of Refuge es and Resettled 
Population, Tuzlanski Canton
 
8
Zenicko-Dobojski 
canton
 
1
 
SC
 
Assistant minister, The Ministry of Economy , Zenicko-Dobojski 
Canton
  
9
Bosansko-Podrinjinski 
canton
 
1
 
SC
 
Minister
 
of the Economy, Bosansko-Podrinjski Canton
 
10
Srednjobosanski
 
canton
 
1
 
SC
 
Advisor for the EU Integrations, Prime Ministries Office, 
Srednjobosanski Canton
 
11
Herzegovacko-
Neretvanski canton
 
1
 
SC
 
Minister
 
of the Economy, Hercegovacko-Neretvanski Canton
 
12
Zapadnoherzegovacki 
canton
 
1
 
SC
 
Assistant minister, The Ministry of SME and Development, 
Zapadnohercegovacki Canton
 
13 Canton Sarajevo
 
1
 
SC
 
Assistant minister, The Ministry of Economy , Canton Sarajevo
 
14 Canton number 10. 
 
1
 
SC
 
Assistant minister, The Ministry of Economy , Canton Number 10
 
Municipalities 
      
15 Buzim (FBiH) 1 SL The Mayor of Buzim, Buzim
16 Prijedor (RS) 2 SL Head of the Department for Economy and Agriculture, Prijedor
SL Chief of the Department for Economy, Prijedor
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 The list of interviewed municipality officials 
Municipalities No.
Codes of municipal 
officials*
The position of municipality officials/the name of 
the institution
1 Velika Kladuša 3 SLU Major
SLU Assistant to the Major for Social Services
SLU
Assistant to the Major for industry, agriculture and 
development 
2 Sanski Most 1 SLU Major’s Adviser
3 Ključ 1 SLU Head of the Department for Administrative Service 
4 Prijedor 2 SLU
Head of the Department for Economy and 
Agriculture
SLU Head of the Department for Economy
5 Jajce 2 SLU Assistant in the Department for Development
SLU Senior Advisor
6 Laktaši 2 SLU
Head of the Office for Economic Integration and 
Development 
7 Posušje 1 SLU Head of the Office for Development 
8 Ljubuški SLU
Assistant in the Department for Development –
Coordinator for Cooperation with Diaspora
9 Maglaj 2 SLU
Assistant to the  Major for Economy, Finance and 
Entrepreneurship 
SLU
Assistant to the Major for Administrative and Social 
Service
10 Nevesinje 1 SLU Major
11 Tešanj 1 SL Major
12 Novi Grad 1 SL Major’s Advisor
13 Prnjavor 1 SL
Coordinator of the Department for Diaspora and 
Minorities
14 Šamac 1 SL Senior Assistant for the Local Development
15 Konjic 1 SL Director of the Municipal Local Development Agency
16 Banja Luka 1 SL
Senior Assistant in the Department for Minorities 
and Returnees 
17 Lopare 1 SL Major
18 Zvornik 1 SL Deputy of the Major
19 Vogošda 1 SL Major
20 Srebrenica 1 SL Community development
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 Appendix  C
 One of the primary reasons for emigration (identified in the previous analysis) is a non-desirable 
economic environment. Unemployment is extensive: the official unemployment rate reached 44% in 2012 
(DEP BiH, 2013), while the Labour Force Survey (which uses a more strict definition of unemployment) reports 
that in the same year the unemployment rate is around 28% (CBBiH, 2013). The youth unemployment is higher 
and some report that it can be around 60% (EUSR, 2014). No matter which indicator we take into consideration 
unemployment remains to be a serious macroeconomic problem. Accordingly, one of the most important 
proxies of economic performance at the individual level that we can control includes employment status 
(employed versus not employed, D_EMPLOY). We believe that there is a (higher) probability that employed 
individuals, because of having a better economic status in the society, have smaller aspirations to leave the 
29
country in comparison to others (not employed, i.e., unemployed or out of the labour market ). 
 Next, we control the level of household income as a proxy for financial strength of the respondent's 
family (perception of the income level in comparison to BiH average). There are four income categories coded: 
income at the edge of existence (D_INCOMEexist), below average (D_INCOMEexbel), average (D_INCOMEav), 
and above average (D_INCOMEexab). We use these four categories because they fit the model better in 
comparison to a binary variable (i.e. low and high income). In the environment characterized with strong 
reliance on informal institutions (Efendic et al., 2011) and in particular on strong family ties (Efendic et al., 
2014), we expect that the level of family income might be an important individual economic factor in our 
modelling. More precisely, we expect that respondents from low income families might report stronger 
aspirations to migrate abroad than those from high income families. 
 In recent decades, BiH has been characterized by political instability which might affect intentions to 
leave the country as well. Political instability might change perception of general stability and certainty, which 
in the end can affect migration aspirations.  In order to capture the effect of political situation in BiH, we include 
responses on the perception of political situation (D_POLITICS) seen as an improved or a worsened political 
situation. We expect that those respondents who perceive the political situation as „worse“ are more likely to 
have higher aspirations to migrate abroad than those with more optimistic views. 
 BiH is a multicultural country having one of the most “complicated” ethnic structures in Europe. This 
ethnic complexity is identified by a number of problems in the recent past, including the last Bosnian war (1992-
1995), and controlling ethnic environment seems more than interesting for this analysis. Accordingly, we 
include two determinants which measure different ethnic dimensions. First, we control for the self-reported 
ethnicity of respondents being especially interested to see potential structural differences between the three 
dominant ethnicities (Bosniacs, Serbs, Croats; D_ETHNICITYb; D_ETHNICITYs; D_ETHNICITYc) versus Others 
(Bosnians, Yugoslavians, ...., ; D_ETHNICITYo). Second, in the context of BiH it is important to control for 
majority/minority status (D_MAJORITY) within the country not least because particular ethnicities appear to 
be in some parts of the country a majority while in others a minority (Efendic et al., 2011). Accordingly, at the 
individual level, we can expect variations in migration aspirations depending on self-reported 
majority/minority statuses. 
 As it has already been pointed out in Chapter 1, BiH has experienced emigration of educated 
population. This suggests a need to control for the level of education (D_EDUCATION) a sa potential 
determinant of aspirations for migrating abroad. We expect that more educated individuals could have higher 
aspirations to migrate abroad than less educated (i.e., brain drain). 
 It may also be important to control for geographical factors (Sachs, 2003), including the type of area 
from which respondents are coming (i.e. urban versus rural, D_URBAN) as well as different (18) regions in the 
country (R_region_No) used in sampling.
29
 Note, we cannot distinguish between unemployed and those who are out of the labour market since the variable that we are using has only these two 
codes: employed or working and unemployed or not working. 
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 It is standard practice in empirical research to control for individual characteristics of respondents, 
which in our case include gender (male versus female respondents; D_GENDER) and age (young versus old; 
D_AGE). It will be of particular importance to investigate the effect of aging on aspirations for migration abroad, 
since in our descriptive statistics we have already identified difference between young and older respondents. 
 Finally, we are using the pooled data which raises the problem of potential different distributions of the 
data in different time periods. An appropriate remedy for this potential statistical problem is to enable the 
intercept to differ across the different annual surveys (Wooldridge, 2006). Therefore, we include time dummies 
in the final specification. 
 
 We will investigate in our robustness analysis two more potentially important influences in the model. 
Firstly, linked to the ethnic tensions' problems, we believe that it would be important to control if respondents 
had some bad/unpleasant experiences because of their ethnic background over the last year 
30
(D_NATTENSEXP) . The Bosnian war (1992-1995) was the period when a multiethnic BiH went through a 
radical change from ethnically quite tolerant to quite intolerant in just a few years (Dyrstad, 2012) and almost 
two decades after the Bosnian war, the country remains highly segregated along ethnic lines (Bieber, 2006). All 
of this might affect ethnic tensions within the country; consequently, individual aspirations to leave the 
country. 
 Secondly, since the Bosnian war induced a huge internal and external migration of population, which in 
the end might affect aspirations to move abroad as well, we will control the migration status of families 
31
(domicile families versus other – i.e., internal and external migration families; D_MIGRAT ). We expect that 
individuals who moved from their homes, home cities, entities, might have stronger aspirations to move 
abroad than individuals that did not move during or after the war period (also supported by findings of the 
previous chapter). 
In the model to be estimated, the following probit specification (Equation 1) is used:
where the variables are explained in the table below, P refers to probit estimation, signifies a function of the 
independent variables,  (0-37) are coefficients to be estimated, and  is the usual model error term.bˆ eˆ
 Missing values and “do not know” answers are an endemic problem of survey data. However, the 
average incidence of missing values per variable is less than one per cent at which simple omission is regarded 
as unlikely to lead to substantial bias. In addition, we apply the same principle to withheld responses (do not 
know/wish to answer), even though these are not necessarily missing at random. In our specification, the 
biggest number of “do not know” responses is identified for perception of political situation (10.8%), the 
dependent variable – aspirations for migration abroad (7.2%), and estimates of family income (2.3%). Being 
cautious about these responses, especially in the case of the dependent variable, we will conduct an additional 
robustness check by controlling these responses.
 The second challenge to valid estimation is to take account of survey design. The survey design for this 
sample is the following: the whole of BiH was stratified into 18 regions (12 covering the Federation BiH, 5 the RS 
and one the Brčko District of BiH); then individuals were sampled within each stratum (region). Following 
Efendic et al. (2014a) we do not apply Finite Population Correction (FPC) for two reasons: there is no accurate 
30
 Note, including this variable in the model reduces significantly the number of observations to around 24,000. 
31
 If this variable is included in the base-line model, we operate with around 19,000 observations. Moreover, if included together with D_NATTENSEXP, 
the sample drops to only 12,000.
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population count for individual regions. In addition, a main disadvantage of controlling simple design is that it 
makes no allowance for possible clustering effects in the data, which in our case seems to be important to take 
into account. Consequently, in estimating our model we:
 a)   do not use the stratification, but instead
 b)   include a full set of regional dummies, with Bihać as the omitted category, and
 c)   report cluster-robust standard errors at the level of the municipalities.
 This estimation strategy minimises the possibility of omitted variables related to location and adopts a 
conservative approach to inference. Finally, descriptive statistics for the variables used in the final model are 
reported in the table below.
 Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variables
Explanation of dummy variables 
(do not know/wish to answer responses excluded)
Number of 
observations
D_OUTOFBH Aspirations for migration abroad: 1 = yes; 0=no 47,404
D_EMPLOY Employment status: 1=employed; 0=not employed 54,036
D_EDUCATION Education: 1 = secondary/high; 0=no education/primary 48,982
D_AGE Age of respondents: 1=young (18-35); 0=older (36 more) 54279
D_INCOMEexist Household income level: 1=edge of existence; 0=other 45,700
D_INCOMEexbel Household income level: 1=below average; 0=other 45,700
D_INCOMEexav Household income level: 1=average; 0=other 45,700
D_INCOMEexab Household income level: 1=above average; 0=other 45,700
D_POLITICS Perception of political situation: 1=bad; 0=good 48,465
D_MAJORITY Ethnic status: 1=majority; 0=minority 54,386
D_URBAN Survey area: 1=urban; 0=rural 54,387
D_GENDER Gender of respondents: 1=male; 0=female 54,388
S2002 Surveys conducted in 2002: 1=yes; 0=no 54,388
S2003 Surveys conducted in 2003: 1=yes; 0=no 54,388
S2004 Surveys conducted in 2004: 1=yes; 0=no 54,388
S2005 Surveys conducted in 2005: 1=yes; 0=no 54,388
S2006 Surveys conducted in 2006: 1=yes; 0=no 54,388
S2007 Surveys conducted in 2007: 1=yes; 0=no 54,388
S2009 Surveys conducted in 2009: 1=yes; 0=no 54,388
S2010 Surveys conducted in 2010: 1=yes; 0=no 54,388
R_region_1 Surveyed region: 1=Bihac; 0=other 54,388
R_region_2 Surveyed region: 1=Orasje; 0=other 54,388
R_region_3 Surveyed region: 1=Tuzla; 0=other 54,388
R_region_4 Surveyed region: 1=Zenica; 0=other 54,388
R_region_5 Surveyed region: 1=Gorazde; 0=other 54,388
R_region_6 Surveyed region: 1=Tavnik-bos; 0=other 54,388
R_region_7 Surveyed region: 1=Mostar-bos; 0=other 54,388
R_region_8 Surveyed region: 1=Siroki Brijeg; 0=other 54,388
R_region_9 Surveyed region: 1=Sarajevo; 0=other 54,388
R_region_10 Surveyed region: 1=Livno; 0=other 54,388
R_region_11 Surveyed region: 1=Banja Luka; 0=other 54,388
R_region_12 Surveyed region: 1=Doboj; 0=other 54,388
R_region_13 Surveyed region: 1=Bijeljina; 0=other 54,388
R_region_14 Surveyed region: 1=Pale; 0=other 54,388
R_region_15 Surveyed region: 1=Trebinje; 0=other 54,388
R_region_16 Surveyed region: 1=Travnik-hr; 0=other 54,388
R_region_17 Surveyed region: 1=Mostar-hr; 0=other 54,388
R_region_18 Surveyed region: 1=District Brcko; 0=other 54,388
D_ETHNICITYb Ethnic self-identification: 1=Bosnjak; 0=other 53,942
D_ETHNICITYs Ethnic self-identification: 1=Serb; 0=other 53,942
D_ETHNICITc Ethnic self-identification: 1=Croat; 0=other 53,942
D_ETHNICITY Ethnic self-identification: 1=other nationality; 0=other 53,942
D_MIGRAT Household status: 1=migration; 0=domicile 31,333
D_NATTENSEXP Personal experience of ethnic tensions: 1=yes; 0=no 42,704
Mean
0.45
0.67
0.72
0.34
0.13
0.36
0.44
0.07
0.58
0.79
0.47
0.18
0.15
0.13
0.11
0.12
0.09
0.17
0.03
0.02
0.05
0.04
0.09
0.07
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.05
0.07
0.05
0.13
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.03
0.08
0.09
0.03
0.41
0.31
0.26
0.01
0.38
0.04
Source: Authors' calculations using STATA 12 (STATA 12, StataCorp, Texas, USA).
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Note, these are observations per surveys: 9 (2002)=1946 observations; 13 (2003)=1,509; 14 (2003)=1,847; 32(2008)=1,577; 33(2008)=3,000; 
34(2008)=3,076; 35(2008)=1,541.
 The difference between the numbers of observations for particular variables is linked to two reasons. 
Firstly, these variables are coded by excluding “do not know” answers, which is explained earlier. More these 
responses reduce the sample differently for different variables (previous section identifies variables with the 
biggest percentages of these observations). Secondly, in some surveys all of the variables were not included, 
namely: D_OUTOFBH in survey 33 (2008); D_EDUCATION in surveys 9 (2002); 13, 14 (2003); and income 
32
D_INCOMExxx variables in surveys 32, 33, 34, 35 (all surveys in 2008) . This problem is exogenous and we cannot 
do much about it but to inform the reader that we are effectively loosing 2008 in our empirical modelling, 
including quarterly surveys as listed for variable D_EDUCATION. Accordingly, in the final empirical modelling we 
are losing around 14,000 observations leaving the sample to be around 45,000 observations. After excluding 
missing and do not know answers, our effective sample is around 33,600 observations, substantially smaller, but 
still big enough for our modelling strategy. 
 Specification of the probit model (Equation 1) enables us to test whether economic, political, ethnic, 
geographic and individual determinants might explain aspirations for migration from BiH. The table below 
reports the obtained results.
Base-line model after probit estimates 
The dependent variables are D_OUTOFBH=1 (There is aspiration for migration abroad)
Coeff.
Std. 
error
z-stat.
Employment status: 1=employed; 0=unemployed or 
out of the labour market 
-0.09 0.02 -4.29
Education: 1 = secondary/high; 0=no 
education/primary
0.47 0.02 19.91
Age: 1=young (18-35); 0=older (36 more) 0.78 0.03 31.17
Household income level: 1=edge of existence; 0=other 0.36 0.03 11.07
Household income level: 1=below average; 0=other 0.16 0.02 6.92
Household income level: 1=above average; 0=other -0.18 0.03 -5.89
Perception of political situation: 1=worse; 0=better 0.20 0.02 9.78
Ethnic status: 1=majority; 0=minority 0.07 0.03 2.15
Survey area: 1=urban; 0=rural -0.01 0.02 -0.27
Gender of respondents: 1=male; 0=female -0.01 0.01 -0.16
Ethnic self-identification: 1=Bosniacks; 0=other -0.13 0.07 -1.88
Ethnic self-identification: 1=Serbs; 0=other -0.10 0.09 -1.20
Ethnic self-identification: 1=Croats; 0=other -0.22 0.09 -2.50
Surveys conducted in 2003: 1=yes; 0=no; 2002 base -0.01 0.03 -0.16
Surveys conducted in 2004: 1=yes; 0=no; 2002 base -0.11 0.03 -3.38
Surveys conducted in 2005: 1=yes; 0=no; 2002 base 0.04 0.04 0.86
Surveys conducted in 2006: 1=yes; 0=no; 2002 base 0.11 0.05 2.30
Surveys conducted in 2007: 1=yes; 0=no; 2002 base 0.04 0.04 0.83
Surveys conducted in 2009: 1=yes; 0=no; 2002 base -0.01 0.07 -0.01
Surveys conducted in 2010: 1=yes; 0=no; 2002 base 0.03 0.05 0.49
Explanation of the variablesVariable
D_EMPLOY
D_EDUCATION
D_AGE
D_INCOMEexist
D_INCOMEexbel
D_INCOMEexab
D_POLITICS
D_MAJORITY
D_URBAN
D_GENDER
D_ETHNICITYb
D_ETHNICITYs
D_ETHNICITc
S2003
S2004
S2005
S2006
S2007
S2009
S2010
CONS The constant term -0.71 0.08 -8.57
Note, region dummies are not reported because of the space. 
MODEL DIAGNOSTICS
Number of observations 33,591
Wald test Chi2(37) = 3,791;  Prob>chi2=0.000
Pseudo R
2
0.11
Hosmer-Lemeshow statistics (HL), Number of groups=10 chi2(8) = 9.57; Prob > chi2 = 0.30
Note, dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.  
P> z
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.032
0.785
0.876
0.060
0.231
0.012
0.871
0.001
0.390
0.016
0.405
0.991
0.623
0.000
Source: Author's calculations using STATA 12 (STATA 12, StataCorp, Texas, USA).
POSTESTIMATION STATISTICS: We start examining statistical diagnostics with testing joint significance of the independent 
variables by conducting the Wald and Likelihood ratio tests. The both tests reject the null hypothesis at the highest level of 
significance (p=0.000) that the explanatory variables included in the model are jointly equal to zero. Moreover, according to the 
general theory of the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) for random samples, the MLE estimator is heteroskedasticity 
robust, consistent, asymptotically normal, and efficient (Wooldridge, 2002; 2006). As a test for model specification we rely on 
2
the Hosmer-Lemeshow (HL) test that is approximately X  distributed if the model is correct, i.e., if it fits well. The HL test does 
not reject the null hypothesis at any conventional level of significance that the model does fit well (p=0.33). Accordingly, we can 
conclude that the estimated model has acceptable specification and diagnostics.
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Marginal effects from the base model
 Specification of the probit model (Equation 1) enables us to test whether economic, political, ethnic, 
geographic and individual determinants might explain aspirations for migration from BiH. The table below 
reports the obtained results. The most useful information from such models we obtain by looking at the 
marginal effects.
The dependent variables are D_OUTOFBH=1 (There is aspiration for migration abroad)
Note, dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1.  
Source: Author's calculations using STATA 12 (STATA 12, StataCorp, Texas, USA).
Explanation of the variables dy/dx
Stand.
error
z-statics
Employment status: 1=employed; 0=not employed -0.03 0.01 -4.29
Education: 1 = secondary/high; 0=no 
education/primary
0.18 0.01 20.83
Age: 1=young (18-35); 0=older (36 more) 0.30 0.01 32.90
Household income level: 1=edge of existence; 
0=other
0.14 0.01 11.22
Household income level: 1=below average; 
0=other
0.06 0.01 6.92
Household income level: 1=above average; 
0=other
-0.07 0.01 -5.99
Perception of political situation: 1=bad; 0=good 0.08 0.01 9.83
Ethnic status: 1=majority; 0=minority 0.03 0.01 2.15
Survey area: 1=urban; 0=rural -0.01 0.01 -0.27
Gender of respondents: 1=male; 0=female -0.01 0.01 -0.16
Ethnic self-identification: 1=Bosnjak; 0=other -0.05 0.03 -1.88
Ethnic self-identification: 1=Serb; 0=other -0.04 0.03 -1.20
Ethnic self-identification: 1=Croat; 0=other -0.09 0.03 -2.54
Surveys conducted in 2003: 1=yes; 0=no; 2002
base
-0.01 0.01 -0.16
Surveys conducted in 2004: 1=yes; 0=no; 2002
base
-0.04 0.01 -3.40
Surveys conducted in 2005: 1=yes; 0=no; 2002
base
0.01 0.02 0.86
Surveys conducted in 2006: 1=yes; 0=no; 2002
base
0.04 0.02 2.30
Surveys conducted in 2007: 1=yes; 0=no; 2002
base
0.01 0.02 0.83
Surveys conducted in 2009: 1=yes; 0=no; 2002
base
-0.01 0.03 -0.01
Surveys conducted in 2010: 1=yes; 0=no; 2002
base
0.01 0.02 0.49
Note, region dummies are not reported because of the space. 
Variable
D_EMPLOY
D_EDUCATION
D_AGE
D_INCOMEexist
D_INCOMEexbel
D_INCOMEexab
D_POLITICS
D_MAJORITY
D_URBAN
D_GENDER
D_ETHNICITYb
D_ETHNICITYs
D_ETHNICITc
S2003
S2004
S2005
S2006
S2007
S2009
S2010
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.031
0.785
0.876
0.060
0.230
0.011
0.871
0.001
0.390
0.022
0.406
0.991
0.624
P> z
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ENTITY SECTOR TOWN
FBIH SERVICE GORAŽDE
FBIH SERVICE GORAŽDE
RS AGRICULTURE SREBRENICA
FBIH INDUSTRY ZAVIDOVICI
FBIH TRADE TEŠANJ
RS AGRICULTURE BANJA LUKA
RS TRADE KOTOR VAROŠ
RS TRADE GRADIŠKA
RS SERVICE GRADIŠKA
RS TRADE GRADIŠKA
RS SERVICE GRADIŠKA
FB IH SERVICE JAJCE
FBIH SERVICE JAJCE
RS FOOD IND. CELINAC
FBIH TRADE ILIDZA
RS SERVICE BANJA LUKA
FBIH SERVICE SARAJEVO
FBIH MORTGAGES SARAJEVO
RS FOOD IND. ZEPA
RS SERVICE TESLIC
FBIH SERVICE ZAVIDOVICI
RS SERVICE BANJA LUKA
FIRM ID
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23. RS SERVICE BANJA LUKA
Appendix  D
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MHRRBiH ACTIVITIES
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First Business Forum of BiH Diaspora - BiHdiaFOR, Prijedor, August 2013
(copyright owner: BiHdiaFOR and NGONaša perspektivaSarajevo, Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
- MHRR is authorized by the copyright owner to use this photo)
Second Business Forum of BiH Diaspora - BiHdiaFOR, Sarajevo, August 2014 
(organized under the auspices of MHRR); 
copyright owner: Armin Alijagić - BiHdiaFOR, MHRR is authorized by the owner to use this photo
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Second international research workshop on migration and development
Organized by MHRR, with SDC and UNDP support, Sarajevo, Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, November 2014, 
copyright owner: MHRR
Working group – education in the area of migration and development within a wider MHRR/SDC/UNDP 
Mainstreaming Migration into Development in BiH Project, Sarajevo, November 2014
(copyright owner: MHRR)
7th meeting within BiH Switzerland, and Liechtenstein Dialogue on Migration Parnership
Vaduz,  Liechtenstein, March 2014 
(copyright owner: MHRR)
Days of Bosnian and Herzegovinian – American Academy of Arts and Science – BHAAAS, Mostar, 
the University of Mostar, April 2013 
(copyright owner: Dr. Enes Kanlić, BHAAAS, MHRR is authorized by the copyright owner to use this photo)
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Second meeting of BiH Diaspora Youth, August 2014, 
the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Sarajevo, August 2014 (organized by NGO Youth Centre for Social Education, Sarajevo, under the auspices of MHRR); copyright 
owner: NGO Youth Centre for Social Education, MHRR is authorized by the copyright owner to use this photo 
International workshop on intellectual emigration
Organized by EC TAIEX, MHRR BiH (Sector for Diaspora), MARRI and RACVIAC, Sarajevo, September 2013 
(copyright owner: MHRR) 
MHRRBiH - Publications 
MHRR BiH – Publications (all available in pdf format at MHRR web site http://mhrr.gov.ba – Iseljeništvo):
Address Book of Organizations, 
Associations and Clubs from BiH in Diaspora
Business Directory of BiH Diaspora Who is Who in BiH Diaspora: PhD Holders and 
Researchers (Part II)
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107Analysis of BiH Diaspora Situation, MHRR, April 2014
Who is Who in BiH Diaspora: 
PhD Holders and Researchers (Part I)
Who is Who in BiH Diaspora: Writers
Information Booklet for BiH Diaspora Members
 Institutions of BiH have prepared independently annual migration profiles of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
since 2009. MHRR has regularly prepared BiH Migration Profile's chapter on emigration, including remittances 
inflow. 
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